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ORÍRUN

UNIOSUN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

VOLUMES 3&4, 2022/23

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About the Journal

Orírun: *UNIOSUN Journal of African Studies* is a multidisciplinary journal with special focus on local and global phenomena that influence the intersections of history and modernity in Nigerian and African spaces. It also welcomes articles on the African diaspora and its undercurrents.

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Editorial

It is intellectually stimulating to engage with the present edition of *ORIRUN* mainly because it accords primacy to many timely and fundamental issues such as cultural preservation, insecurity, peace and development. Culturally, this special edition is celebratory of its collaboration with the ongoing UNESCO-IFCD-UNIOSUN Cultural Diversity Project. Hence, its lead article by Tunde Oduwobi is a penetrating scholarly revisit to the ancient Sungbo's Eredo Ramparts in Ijebuland – a prospective UNESCO Heritage Site. This cultural monument is a cluster of community earthworks spanning about sixteen thousand kilometers. It consists of tightly packed small settlement enclosures dating back to around the 8th century A.D. As a way of drawing attention to the cultural and historical significance of this ancient monument the UNESCO-IFCD-UNIOSUN Project strongly supports the submission to UNESCO by the National Commission for Museums and Monuments for the categorization of the ancient Sungbo's Eredo Ramparts as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. <https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/488/>

As far as the thematic focus on insecurity is concerned, there is no part of Nigeria that is safe from one form of security threat or the other. Non-state armed actors are busy spreading violence all over Nigeria. Virtually every region is affected. It is common knowledge that the northeast has been plagued by kidnapping, banditry and the menace of Boko Haram insurgency for several years. The south-eastern region of the country has been engulfed by violent separatist agitations as exemplified in the activities of IPOB. The North-west is enmeshed in banditry, kidnappings, cattle rustling and Islamic insurgency. The northcentral region is still grappling with violent farmer-herder crises and banditry. The southwest has witnessed an upsurge of gangsterism, cultism, ritual killings and kidnappings. Of course, the age-long piracy, oil theft and violence in the Niger Delta are yet to abate.

The government appears helpless and the responses of its various security agencies appear to be ineffective and reactive simply because it has been reasonably argued that Nigeria's national security system is unduly centralist and militarist. Hence, the insistence on state and community policing and the depoliticisation of matters of national security. Indeed, five contributions out of eleven aptly captured the focus on peace and security.

Adoyi Onoja kicks off the discussion on insecurity by devoting considerable attention to the challenges of Humanities scholarship when it comes to discourses on national security issues. The need to foster a culture of harmonious and peaceful intergroup relations is the topical issue addressed by Akintayo Olayinka in the third article. Closely following on the heels of Olayinka is the submission by Abiona Ayodeji which concentrates on the dynamics of boundary conflicts in Nigeria. The article argues from a comparative perspective by zeroing in on the Ife-Modakeke and the boundary crises in Kaduna. In the fourth article, Adeyemi Balogun brings to the fore the challenges of nation-building and the innate potential of the National Youth Service Corps scheme to serve a veritable tool for fostering peace and national unity.

However, and being a multidisciplinary journal, the remaining articles explore issues which verge on health, migration, pre-colonial and colonial history as well as historical pedagogy. For instance, by relying heavily on archival data and secondary sources, Paul Ilesanmi Akanmidu discusses colonial health interventions in Okun-Yorubaland in the fifth article. Meanwhile, historical pedagogy especially the new emphasis on team teaching captures the attention of Abubakar Sadiq Haruna and Rabiatsu Musa in sixth article.

Darasinmi Abiodun Fakunle concentrates on the changing dynamics of fashion in post-colonial Nigeria, it is migrants' manifold contributions to the development of Katsina that serves as the thematic focus of the article by Samuel Wycliff.

The last article by Olukoya Ogen is largely celebratory of a Yoruba monarchical institution of value with its focus on Abolarin College, an ultra-modern, non-fee paying school established by HRM Oba Adedokun Abolarin, the Oragun of Oke-Ila.

Finally, Temitope Fagunwa's critical review of J.K. Christopher's work on the contested status of Nigeria as a failed state fully justifies the thematic preference of this present volume of *Orirun* to the critical global issues of peace and insecurity.

It is a delight to invite our prospective readers into the world of **ORÍRUN**, Volumes 3 and 4.

Tunde Decker

Editor-in-Chief, ORÍRUN, Volumes 3 & 4, 2022/23.

Revisiting the Ancient Sungbo's Eredo Ramparts in Ijebuland

Tunde ODUWOBI

Abstract

This paper revisits studies on the massive ramparts in Ijebu known in folklore as Sungbo's Eredo. The construction of the ramparts called Eredo is said to have been initiated by a woman known by the name of Sungbo. Two schools of thought emerged from earlier works on the ramparts. The first, based on oral traditions, is proposed by P.C. Lloyd, and it is to the effect that two successive centralised political systems constructed the ramparts. The proponent of the second is P. J. Darling, who, using archaeological evidence, suggests that it was the fortification system of an ancient civilisation of perhaps a matriarchal society. This paper considers available documentary and anthropological evidence and contests these two propositions. It submits that the construction of the Eredo is to be associated with the establishment of the Ijebu Kingdom in the second half of the fifteenth century.

Introduction

The earliest documented reference to the Ijebu Kingdom is a Portuguese source of late-fifteenth-century context, which reported "a great city, called Geebu, surrounded by a great ditch."¹ The document also mentions *Awujale*, the title of the king of Ijebu, as "Agusale," which presumably was a rendition of *Aghuzale*, the Bini form. The "great city" is undoubtedly the capital, termed Ijebu-Ode from the late nineteenth century.² The ditch refers to the ramparts locally referred to as Eredo.

In 1906, a British administrative officer reporting on the Eredo under the caption "The Great Wall" observed as follows:

The great wall round Ijebu-Ode was said to be the work of a woman named Sungbo, who being very rich and childless ordered her slaves to build it as a monument to herself. It was never apparently the boundary of the Ijebu country and could not have been the wall of the town. It may be seen on all the roads approaching the

town of Ijebu-Ode about 5 miles from Epe and Ejirin [to the south], 2 miles north of Oru on the Ibadan road [to the north], about 2 miles outside Shagamu [to the west] and 3 miles east of Ife on the Jebu-Erimo Road [to the east]. The wall has almost disappeared but the burrow hole on the outside is in many places over 30 feet deep so that the work entailed in construction must have been enormous. It is chiefly of value as giving a useful geological section of a large area of the country.³

Several local beliefs associate Sungbo with the Queen of Sheba of the era of King Solomon. The Bilqis of Islamic traditions, she is locally referred to as Bilikisu. There is a grove said to be her burial site in the town of Oke-Eri to which Muslims and Christians alike converge for intercessory prayers. However, it is clear that this association is an adaptation of Islamic and Biblical traditions following the establishment of colonial rule in Ijebu from 1892 when Islamic and Christian proselytism was permitted.⁴ There seems to be an attempt to draw a parallel between two wealthy and forceful female characters, Sungbo and Bilqis of Ijebu and Muslim-Christian folklores, respectively. This paper attempts to determine the antiquity and historical significance of the ramparts credited to Sungbo.

State Formation Process

In his study of the ramparts in the late 1950s, Lloyd considered they were constructed by two successive political systems. Cutting the ramparts into eastern and western halves, he avers that the eastern part was the work of the earlier of the two political systems, called Idoko. The western section was constructed by the successor political system called Ijebu.⁵ Lloyd's thesis is based on the traditions of an Idoko kingdom that was subsequently overtaken by the Ijebu Kingdom. This thesis has been challenged.⁶ On the other hand, a close anthropological examination of the area enclosed within the ramparts would indicate the process of state formation that subsequently led to the construction of the ramparts. The evidence suggests that the Ijebu Kingdom emerged in the fifteenth century in the central portions of Idoko which was a stateless society. The kingdom subsequently extended control over the rest of the Idoko territory to the south and west.

The Eredo marked the core of the Ijebu Kingdom, comprising the present-day Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Ijebu East, Ijebu North,

Ijebu Northeast, Ijebu-Ode, Odogbolu in Ogun State, and the Local Council Development Areas (LCDAs) of Eredo and Ikosi-Ejinrin in Lagos State. Basically, this area is distinguished by a religious centralisation in which the *Awujale* is the pivot. The organisation of the *Agemo* cult, the *Awujale*'s tutelary deity, typifies the phenomenon. As Oyin Ogunba's study on the cult indicates, the area is characterised by *Agemo* districts headed by a chief priest called *alagemo*.⁷ All the *alagemo* assemble at Ijebu-Ode for the annual *Agemo* festival (usually during July) for propitiatory rites and sacrifices to the deity to shower blessings on the *Awujale*. On the return of the *alagemo* to their respective districts, they organise a mini *Agemo* festival called *Ifobu*, which is attended by minor *Agemo* priests, styled *alase*, under their district headship.⁸

This religious centralisation was signified by the designation of *Oloja*. Thus, an *alagemo* was also usually referred to as *Oloja*; or as P. C. Lloyd has observed: "Where the village head has important ritual duties, notably at the installation or burial of the *Awujale*, he bears the title *oloja*."⁹ In other words, the significance of the title was conceived primarily in religious terms. However, outside the territorial zone signified by this religious centralisation, *oloja* was strictly a political title.

In an attempt to shed light on the meaning of the title and its applicability in southeastern Yorubaland, a British Colonial officer once remarked:

The meaning...is apparently "The owner of the town" and not, as it would seem, "The owner of the market." The [Yoruba] word "oja" is possibly a derivative of the Jekiri [Itsekiri] word "Aja" meaning a collection of houses or a village.¹⁰

O. O. Akinkugbe's study on the evolution of the Yoruba and other related languages suggests that the Yoruba *oja* and the Itsekiri *aja* are cognates for a settlement. And it is also instructive to note that among the Ijebu and some of their eastern neighbours (categorised as South East Yoruba by Akinkugbe), the indigenous term for the market is *obu* and not *oja* as among the Yoruba groups to the west.¹¹ Thus *oloja*, which is a contraction of *olu aja* or *olu oja* means town head, and it seems to have been the designation for community heads in pre-kingdom Ijebu.¹² Its conception in religious terms may therefore be explained as a feature of the institutional changes that marked the establishment of the kingdom.

An alternative political term, *olori ilu* (lit., town head), seemed to have been coined as a neologism for *oloja*.¹³ Indeed part of the institutional features marking this core area included the fact that the political designation of *Otonba* (lit. an *oba*'s descendant) was applied to scions of the *Awujale* dynasty who founded and headed settlements. Such settlements bore the names of their founders, with the term *Odo* (settlement) attached as a prefix.¹⁴ This phenomenon made an impression on P. A. Darling in the 1990s as he observed that "a plot of all the Odo settlements shown on the Federal Surveys map indicates that most of such settlements lie within the vast Eredo enclosure."¹⁵

The contention from the foregoing is that the features characterising the area embraced by the LGAs and LCDAs identified above, and which are typified by the presence of the Eredo, constituted the institutional changes (the process of state formation) that accompanied the foundation of the Ijebu Kingdom. The ramparts were constructed to delineate and protect the kingdom. This leads us then to the age of the kingdom.

The Age of the Ijebu Kingdom

It is perhaps rhetorical to state that a kingdom is as old as the times of its founder, especially if a king list with a chronology is available. However, most Ijebu published local histories do not provide dates for their king lists; they are therefore difficult to use to establish a chronological framework dating from the founder of the Ijebu Kingdom.¹⁶ In general, they adopt the dates in J. A. Payne's *Tables of Principal Events in Yoruba History*, which only starts from c.1760 said to mark the commencement of Gbelegbuwa's reign.¹⁷ An important exception is Badejo Adebonojo's *Itan Ido Ijebu* (A History of Ijebu). It covers the reigns of the kings from the primal dynastic ancestor known as Obanta with dates. It also gives genealogical connections of the kings. However, while Adebonojo does appear to have derived his dates from traditional sources,¹⁸ he adopted Payne's date of the commencement of Gbelegbuwa's reign in c. 1760 as the baseline from which he built his chronology up to Obanta (Table I). Yet, a critical examination of available relevant sources would suggest that the accession date of c.1760 ascribed to Gbelegbuwa is untenable. We may proceed with a consideration of the background to Payne's publication.

Payne was born in Sierra Leone on 9 August 1839. His father was a freed slave called Adepeyin, whose name he anglicised as Payne.¹⁹ Adepeyin was a son to Gbelegbuwa. Payne moved to Lagos in 1862 to begin a long


carrier in the administrative and judicial departments of the public service of the Lagos Colony, which was established in 1861. His appointment as a judicial officer from 1869 (till his retirement in 1899) inspired his publication of historical almanacs between 1874 and 1894 on events in Lagos and its environs. The *Tables of Principal Events in Yoruba History* is a compendium of the series.²⁰ Payne also drew close to the land of his father's birth, and twice in the mid-1870s was an emissary of the British government in Lagos to the Ijebu state authorities.²¹ The Ijebu king list with dates published in *Tables of Principal Events in Yoruba History* starts with the reign of Gbelegbuwa, his grandfather. Considering his contacts with the Ijebu authorities, Payne seemed to have made little attempt to obtain information on the predecessors of his grandfather. As his primary concern was the collection of datable data that could be deployed for judicial purposes, he does seem to have been more confident with the contemporary information available to him than making an exploration of the non-documented past.

In a genealogical chart submitted by the Gbelegbuwa Family to the colonial authorities in 1930, Adepeyin, Payne's father, was listed as the second eldest of the seven children born to Gbelegbuwa during his reign.²² Fixing Adepeyin's birth before 1780 would mean he was over sixty years old when he gave birth to Payne. On the other hand, if he was reckoned to be in his mid-fifties (i.e., born about 1784) when he gave birth to Payne in 1839 and if, as indeed it was likely, he was just a few years younger than his elder brother born to the throne, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that Gbelegbuwa's reign only began from about 1780. The dating of the commencement of his reign to "ca. 1760" could just as well have been derived from an overestimation by some two decades of the number of years presumed to have elapsed between Gbelegbuwa's accession and Payne's sources when he became acquainted with Ijebu in the 1870s. A slip on Payne's part is also not unlikely. The date could have been a backward extension covering the birth of Gbelegbuwa's eldest child before his accession to the throne. From the 1820s, it became the practice that only princes born to the throne could contest the kingship. The Gbelegbuwa Family lost its candidacy for the throne in 1854 due to the lack of an eligible prince. The suggestion that the commencement date of Gbelegbuwa's reign be extended to 1780 would therefore require a corresponding adjustment of Adebonojo's chronology of Gbelegbuwa's predecessors.²³


This adjustment means that Obanta, the Ijebu primal dynastic ancestor, reigned not earlier than the second half of the fifteenth century.²⁴ This contention would be consistent with the Portuguese source mentioned at the start of this paper of the kingdom's existence in the fifteenth century. Beyond that, however, Benin traditions associate the advent of the Ijebu dynastic ancestor with Ozolua either as a warrior-prince or warrior-king.²⁵ It seems likely indeed that the circumstances leading to the establishment of the Ijebu Kingdom were bound up with the early stages of Benin imperial expansion, which occurred during the second half of the fifteenth century. The Benin form for *Awujale* (*Aghuzale*) used by the Portuguese source may well reflect the Benin factor in the establishment of the Ijebu Kingdom.

The Eredo in Time Perspective

As a follow-up to Lloyd's pioneering effort in the 1950s, recent attempts have been made to map out the course of the Eredo more precisely.²⁶ A close glance at the configuration of the Eredo would show that it constituted an inner and outer ring. The Portuguese report of the fifteenth century cited above does appear to refer to the inner ring enclosing the vicinity of the capital. If, as suggested above, the kingdom was founded in the second half of the fifteenth century, this inner ring may well be associated with the nascent period of the establishment of the kingdom by the Awujale dynasty. It certainly would have been inspired by the Benin walls given the fact that the kingdom-founder was from Benin.²⁷ The second and outer ring entailed the ambitious programme of covering the budding kingdom, presumably during the first half of the sixteen century. It does seem that it was with the construction of the outer ring that Sungbo was involved. The context of her involvement can only be a matter of conjecture. The tradition that she was a childless wealthy trader with many slaves suggests an amazon—an influential and forceful character—who may have facilitated communal mobilisation for the construction of the northeast section of the Eredo of which Oke Eri is a part. The enduring image of her achievements and attributes found comparison in Bilqis (Queen of Sheeba) in current Ijebu traditions.²⁸ The point, however, is that the legend of Sungbo's accomplishments should be fitted within the institutional framework of dynastic Ijebu in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century, during which the outer ring Eredo was constructed.



Source: Chouin and Ogunfolakan, Ife–Sungbo Archaeological Project, 8.



However, the Eredo’s primary function of delineating the kingdom's boundary lapsed following its political expansion in the ensuing centuries—which of course, explains the British official’s observation above that the Eredo “was never apparently the boundary of the Ijebu country.” This expansion, resulting in the neglect and lack of maintenance of the Eredo, presumably began with the tenth king,

Obaruwa (1540–1549), traditionally remembered as a warrior-king who established the dynasties of the towns of Ode and Makun in Remo beyond the Eredo to the west.²⁹ The expansion of the sixteenth century is reflected in a contemporary Portuguese document of 1620 describing the kingdom as “small but very warlike.”³⁰ The epithet *Ajogun* (warrior) by which an *Awujale* is usually addressed is suggestive of the military proclivities of the early kings. Indeed, this militarism might have been inspired by and ran concurrently with Benin imperial expansion, which was at its zenith in the sixteenth century.³¹ Thus by the end of the eighteenth century, the Ijebu Kingdom had extended its political sway over the rest of the Idoko territory south and westwards. The area to the south retained the original name of Idoko, while that in the west came to be referred to as Remo.³² And so, an early nineteenth-century description of the kingdom was that it constituted a “territorial core bearing the name Ijebu” with Idoko and Remo as its “dependencies.”³³

Conclusion

Dates obtained by P. J. Darling from different sites on the Eredo have led him to the suggestion that the ramparts were already in construction by the eleventh century. He avers that the Eredo should be associated with a centralised political entity. He is sceptical that the Awujale dynasty initiated the Eredo as available king lists do not seem to support a date of such antiquity (the eleventh century) for the establishment of the dynasty. He contends that Sungbo should be conceived in more aggressive attributes than conveyed by the folklore, surmising that she presumably lived in a matriarchal society which enabled her to accomplish powers of establishing authority over a centralised polity.³⁴

The present paper aligns with Darling’s submissions to the extent that the Eredo is to be associated with a centralised polity and that Sungbo is to be conceived in more forceful terms. On the other hand, however, the submissions of this paper are that, first, the momentum that produced the Ijebu Kingdom emanated from the budding imperial state of Benin in the second half of the fifteenth century; second, the desire to demarcate and protect the emergent Ijebu state resulted in the construction of the Eredo; and third, Sungbo was a product of the energies unleashed by the incipient Ijebu Kingdom.

Quite erroneously, Darling had a timeless perspective of the Eredo’s significance as delimiting what came down to be known as the Ijebu Kingdom and as a fortification complex. He thus surmised, for example,

that “it was by not having their full defence at the right place on Sungbo’s Eredo that the Ijebu lost” to the British in 1892.³⁵ But the Eredo had by 1892 long since undergone a *volte-face*. It was no different in 1892 from what it was to be in 1906 when a British officer reported on it and in the 1950s when Lloyd examined it; and so as Lloyd observed: “In fact in its present state, covered with vegetation, it would form a feeble obstacle as one could easily fell a tree to make a bridge or swing across the ditch on a creeper.”³⁶ The point is, by 1892, the Eredo had for some two hundred years or more lost its *raison d’etre*.

Since the turn of the present century, there have been attempts to follow up on Darling’s endeavour on the Eredo. Results obtained have rather been disparate, some leading to suggestions of the Eredo as a pre-historic monument! Recent results offer a date range between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries for the construction of the ramparts.³⁷ It has been suggested that the differing returns may be explained by “insufficient stratigraphic and geomorphological understanding” of the monument.”³⁸ Certainly, a lot more scientific and holistic investigations still require to be done for conclusive and acceptable results, with special regard to the age and historical significance of the Eredo.

Table I: Adebonojo’s Chronology

S/N	Ruler	Period	Regnal Length	Dynastic Branch
1	Obanta	1430–1445	15	1
2	Obaguru	1445–1455	10	2
3	Munigbuwa	1455–1460	5	3
4	Obanla	1460–1470	10	1
5	Obaloja	1470–1482	12	2
6	Obalofin	1482–1496	14	3
7	Apasa	1496–1508	12	1
8	Obaganju	1508–1516	8	2
9	Tewogboye	1516–1520	4	3
10	Obaruwa	1520–1529	9	1
11	Ofiran	1529–1532	3	2
12	Lapeguwa	1532–1537	5	1
13	Owa Otutubiosun	1537–1540	3	3
14	Ajuwakale	1540–1552	12	3
15	Gbadisa	1552–1561	9	1
16	Obajewo	1561–1576	15	2
17	Obalewuileke	1576–1590	14	3

18	Obalumodan	1590–1620	30	1
19	Mase	1620–1625	5	2
20	Olotuneso	1625–1635	10	3
21	Mola (Omila)	1635–1642	7	1/4
22	Ajana	1642–1644	2	1
23	Ore (female)	1644–1654	10	2
24	Obaguwaja	1654–1660	6	1
25	Jadiara	1660–1675	15	3
26	Sapokun	1675–1687	12	2
27	Folajoye	1687–1692	5	4
28	Mekun	1692–1702	10	3
29	Gbodogi	1702–1710	8	2
30	Ojigi Moyegeso	1710–1725	15	4
31	Obaliyewe	1725–1730	5	3
32	Olope Oluyoruwa	1730–1735	5	2
33	Ojora (Ayora)	1735–1745	10	1
34	Fesojoye	1745–1749	4	3
35	Geje (female)	1749–1750	1	2
36	Saponuwa Rubakoya	1750–1755	5	2
37	Orodudujoye	1755–1758	3	1
38	Tewogbuwa	1758–1760	2	3
39	Gbelegbuwa	1760–1790	30	1

Table II: Revised Chronology

S/N	Ruler	Period	Regnal Length	Dynastic Branch
1	Obanta	1450–1465	15	1
2	Obaguru	1465–1475	10	2
3	Munigbuwa	1475–1480	5	3
4	Obanla	1480–1490	10	1
5	Obaloja	1490–1502	12	2
6	Obalofin	1502–1516	14	3
7	Apasa	1516–1528	12	1
8	Obaganju	1528–1536	8	2
9	Tewogboye	1536–1540	4	3
10	Obaruwa	1540–1549	9	1
11	Ofiran	1549–1552	3	2
12	Lapengbuwa	1552–1557	5	1
13	Otutubiosun	1557–1560	3	3
14	Ajuwakale	1560–1572	12	3
15	Gbadisa	1572–1581	9	1

16	Obajewo	1581–1596	15	2
17	Elewu Ileke	1596–1610	14	3
18	Olumodan	1610–1640	30	1
19	Mase	1640–1645	5	2
20	Olutoyese	1645–1655	10	3
21	Mola (Omila)	1655–1662	7	1/4
22	Ajana	1662–1664	2	1
23	Ore-Yeye (female)	1664–1674	10	2
24	Agunwaja	1674–1680	6	1
25	Jadiara	1680–1695	15	3
26	Sapoku	1695–1707	12	2
27	Folajoye	1707–1712	5	4
28	Mekun	1712–1722	10	3
29	Gbodogi	1722–1730	8	2
30	Ojigi Moyegeso	1730–1745	15	4
31	Boyejo ³⁹	1745	0	?
32	Oniyewe	1745–1750	5	3
33	Olope Oluyoruwa	1750–1755	5	2
34	Ayora	1755–1765	10	1
35	Fesojoye	1765–1769	4	3
36	Ore-Geje (female)	1769–1770	1	2
37	Sapenuwa Rubakoye	1770–1775	5	2
38	Orodudujoye	1775–1778	3	1
39	Tewogbuwa	1778–1780	2	3
40	Gbelegbuwa	1780–1790	10	1

References

¹ This is the now well-known work of Pacheco Pereira. See J. D. Fage, “A Commentary on Duarte Pacheco Pereira’s Account of the Lower Guinea Coastlands in His Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, and some other Early Accounts,” *History in Africa* (HA) 7 (1980): 65; Robin Law, “Early European Sources Relating to the Kingdom of Ijebu (1500–1700): A Critical Survey,” *HA* 13 (1986): 246.

² The original nomenclature was Ode or Ode Ijebu. See Tunde Oduwobi, *Ijebu under Colonial Rule, 1892–1960: An Administrative and Political Analysis* (Lagos: First Academic Publishers, 2004), 6–7, 21–22.

³ W. Stanley Hern, “A Report on the District of Ijebu-Ode for the New Civil Service List,” 1 October 1906, IjeProf.9/2, Letter Book, 1904–1908, National Archives, Ibadan (NAI),

⁴ The Ijebu aversion for Christian evangelization, in particular, is well documented in the contemporary and secondary literature. For first-hand accounts, see H. J. Ellis and James Johnson, *Two Missionary Visits to Ijebu Country 1892* (Ibadan: Daystar Press), 1974.

⁵ P. C. Lloyd, "Sungbo's Eredo," *Odu* 7 (March 1959): 22.

⁶ Oduwobi, *Ijebu under Colonial Rule*, 10–11.

⁷ Oyin Ogunba, "The Agemo Cult in Ijebuland," *Nigeria Magazine*, 86 (1965): 176–86; O. Ogunba, "Ritual Drama of the Ijebu People: A Study of Indigenous Festivals" (PhD diss., University of Ibadan, 1967), *passim*.

⁸ The sixteen *alagemo* at the beginning of the colonial period were (their respective towns and LGA/LCDA in parenthesis) the: *Tami* (Odogbolu: Odogbolu LGA); *Magodo* (Aiyepe Odogbolu LGA); *Moko* (Okun Owa: Odogbolu LGA); *Lasaowu* (Imoro: Ijebu North East LGA); *Serefusi* (Igbile: Odogbolu LGA); *Ogegbo* (Ibowon: Eredo LCDA); *Petu* (Isiwo: Ijebu-Ode LGA); *Nopa* (Imusin: Ijebu East LGA); *Bajelu* (Imuku: Ijebu North East LGA); *Lasen* (Oru: Ijebu North LGA); *Idebi* and *Lubamisan* (Ago-Iwoye: Ijebu North LGA); *Onugbo* (Okenugbo: Ijebu North LGA); *Posa*, *Ija* and *Ewujagbori* (Imosan: Odogbolu LGA). [See M. B. Okubote, *Iwe Ikekuru ti Itan Ijebu* (A Short History of Ijebu), Ijebu-Ode: Author, 1937), 63–64.]

⁹ P. C. Lloyd, *Yoruba Land Law* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 149.

¹⁰ J. H. Beeley, "Intelligence Report on the Owo and Ifon Districts, Ondo Province," 1934, 8, CSO. 26/3, File No. 29956, NAI as cited in Ade Obayemi, "The Yoruba and Edo-Speaking Peoples and Their Neighbours before 1600," in *History of West Africa*, 3rd ed., vol. 1, ed. J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder (London: Longman, 1985), 220.

¹¹ O. O. Akinkugbe, "A Comparative Phonology of Yoruba Dialects, Isekiri and Igala" (PhD diss., University of Ibadan, 1978), 34–37, 46–52.

¹² Thus, for example, Ijebu-Ode is associated with the title of *Ogbeni Oja* (community leader), whose holder acts as regent during interregna and presided over town meetings in pre-colonial times. [Oduwobi, *Ijebu under Colonial Rule, 1892–1960*, 18–19] *Ogbeni* means leader.

¹³ For *olori ilu* and the pre-colonial political institutions of the Ijebu Kingdom, see Oduwobi, *Ijebu under Colonial Rule*, 14–19.

¹⁴ Examples are Odogegbe (Regbe's settlement), Odosentalu (Sentalu's settlement), Odoyanta (Ayanta's settlement), etc. However, it is to be observed that the title of *Otonba* is now corruptly rendered as *Otunba* and that the latter form does not mean "the right-hand man of the *oba*" (i.e., the *oba*'s principal counsellor) as a literal translation might suggest. Cf. Jean Herskovits Kopytoff, *A Preface to Modern Nigeria* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 296: "Otunba is a contraction of *otun oba*, meaning the senior assistant and adviser of the *Oba*."

¹⁵ P. J. Darling, "Sungbo's Eredo: Africa's Largest Monument," *Nigerian Field* 62 (1997): 126.

¹⁶ See, for example, Odubanko Odutola, *Iwe Kini Ilosiwaju Eko Itan Ijebu* (A Study of Ijebu History, Book I) (Ijebu-Ode: Eruobodo Press, 1946), 5–6 and J.A. Olusola, *Ancient Ijebu-Ode* (Ibadan: Abiodun Printing Works, 1968), 36–37.

¹⁷ J. A. Payne, *Tables of Principal Events in Yoruba History* (Lagos: A. M. Thomas, 1893), 40.

¹⁸ In Ijebu, there was the practice in which carved statuettes of deceased kings called *okute* were celebrated in an annual event called *Osu* festival during December. The number of years a king reigned was recalled by the number of times he celebrated the festival. A proportion of the regnal dates offered by Adebonojo would thus appear to have rested on some traditional basis.

¹⁹ See Lloyd Gwam, “John Otunba Payne,” *Sunday Times*, 29 November 1964, 11 and 12; J. H. Kopytoff, *A Preface to Modern Nigeria* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 296; O. O. Ayantuga “Ijebu and Its Neighbours, 1851–1914” (PhD diss., University of London, 1965), 195; G. O. Olusanya, “John Augustus Otonba Payne and the Establishment of Colonial Rule in Nigerian,” in *West African Colonial Civil Servants in the 19th Century*, ed. Kwame Arhin (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 1985), 44–56.

²⁰ Echoing the motivation underlying Payne’s historical compilations, a newspaper review observed that the *Tables of Principal Events in Yoruba History* was intended “to enable Judges, District Commissioners, local practitioners and others, to ascertain dates and events mentioned by witnesses in their examinations in court, and so to facilitate the labours of both Bench and Bar in the discharge of their duties” [*The Colonies and India*, August 11, 1894, 20].

²¹ See Ayantuga, “Ijebu and Its Neighbours,” 170–94.

²² The seven were Kuye, Adepeyin, Adekomaiya, Onagolu, Sheelu, Okusape, and Awomade [See IjeProf 2, file no. C.17/4, NAI].

²³ See Table II. The Ijebu dynastic chronology is examined in detail in Tunde Oduwobi, “The Age and Kings of the Ijebu Kingdom,” in *History and Diplomacy: Essays in Honour of Ade Adefuye*, ed. R .T. Akinyele (New Jersey: Goldline and Jacobs, 2017), 55–60.]

²⁴ See Table II.

²⁵ As a warrior-prince see P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria*, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (London: Frank Cass, 1969), 218; as a warrior-king, J. U. Egharevba, *Some Tribal Gods of Southern Nigeria* (Benin: Author, 1951), 12.

²⁶ Darling, “Sungbo’s Eredo,” *passim*; Gerard L. Chouin and Adisa B. Ogunfolakan, Ife–Sungbo Archaeological Project: Preliminary Report on Excavations at Ita Yemoo, Ile-Ife, Osun State and on Rapid Assessment of Earthwork Sites at Eredo and Ilara-Epe, Lagos State, June–July 2015.

²⁷ Lloyd generally describes the ramparts as comparable only to those of Benin [Lloyd, “Sungbo’s Eredo,” 15].

²⁸ Indeed, Sungbo also brings to mind the character and exploits of Jeanne d’Arc (Joan of Arc) of fifteenth-century France. And just as Jeanne ended up canonized, Sungbo became hallowed.

²⁹ D. O. Epega, *Iwe Itan Ijebu at Ilu Miran* (A History of Ijebu and Some Other Towns), 2nd ed. (Lagos: Ife-Olu Printing Works, 1934), 20-21; Ellis and Johnson, *Two Missionary Visits to Ijebu Country*, 8, 34.

³⁰ “Relacao de Garcia Mendes Castello Branco,” Brasio, *Monumenta Missionaria*, 6: 471, quoted in Law, “Early European Sources,” 248.

³¹ As is well known, Benin had seized control of Lagos Island by the end of the sixteenth century. See, for example, Robin Law, “Trade and Politics behind the Slave Coast: The Lagoon Traffic and the Rise of Lagos, 1500–1800,” *Journal of African History* 24, no. 3 (1983): 327–31.

³² The nomenclature of Remo seems to have been derived from the fact that the area retained proto-Idoko phonological features. For example, the proto velar fricative /gh/ preserved in Remo shifted to /w/ in the rest of the group—for example, *orugbo/oruwo* for head. The expansion of the Ijebu Kingdom to the south and west must have occasioned the need to apply distinct identification labels to the two blocs of territory.

³³ Lloyd, “Osifekunde of Ijebu,” 249, 256. See the map at the end of this paper.

³⁴ Darling, “Sungbo’s Eredo,” 113–29.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 187. Also incorrect is his statement that “during the nineteenth century Jihad (holy war) the Eredo became a place of refuge from bands of marauders, and it served to keep the Ijebu people united.” Not only was Ijebu untouched by any form of jihad in the nineteenth century, but there are also no received or documented memories of the role of the Eredo in the armed conflicts between the Ijebu and their neighbours during the nineteenth century.

³⁶ Lloyd, “Sungbo’s Eredo,” 18.

³⁷ See G. L. Chouin and O. B. Lasisi, “Crisis and Transformation in the Bight of Benin at the Dawn of the Atlantic Trade,” in *Power, Political Economy, and Historical Landscapes of the Modern World*, ed. Christopher R. DeCorse (New York: State University of New York, 2019), 293–96.

³⁸ Chouin and Ogunfolakan, Ife–Sungbo Archaeological Project, 9.

³⁹ Features in some other king lists, but he is reported to have had a brief reign, dying heirless. See Epega, *Iwe Itan Ijebu at Ilu Miran*, 44.

“Security” in Nigeria: The Challenge of the Humanities¹

Adoyi ONOJA²

Preamble

In December of 2019, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) dragged Mr. President into unveiling and presenting the so-called revised and updated *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The NSS is the second in the history of the ONSA and Nigeria. The first one was launched in 2014. In the order of public sector governance, the ideal is for strategy to follow policy. In other words, the “vision” comes before the “mission”. Therefore, the NSS is the MISSION of “security”³ in Nigeria. However, the crucial platform for the mission of security is missing. This is the VISION or POLICY of “security” in Nigeria. In simple term, for there to be strategy, there should be policy first. The policy or vision should contain three answered questions. They are: what is security, whose security and what is security issue. The strategy or mission should contain one answered question. This is how can security be achieved. The vision and mission or policy and strategy collectively summed up what I called Governance of Security and Security Governance. In 2014, when the first *National Security Strategy* was launched, it was not based on policy. Arguably therefore, the biggest challenge confronting the humanities in Nigeria is the lack of policy/vision or governance of “security.” Unless the humanities know the policy/vision or governance of “security”, it cannot research, teach and do community service on “security.” The humanities’ interventions include combing the vision and mission or policy and strategy of security to determine its effectiveness in meeting the needs and expectations of most people. This paper, using diverse methods and sources, examined

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³ I use quotation marks to designate the security type in Nigeria which is uncharted, undefined and ungoverned.

the challenge bedevilling “security” in Nigeria, and the consequent lack of synergy between the Gown and the Town on “security.” “Security” is the known unknown in Nigeria and unless the humanities know “security”, the humanities cannot begin to research, teach and talk about insecurity in Nigeria.

Introduction

“Security” and “Insecurity” are two familiar words in Nigeria of the mid-1980s to date.⁴ Of the two, security is the known unknown. This is because most if not all Nigerians claimed they know security. If one was to conduct survey⁵ to validate this view, the result will come positive as out of one hundred persons, over sixty will claim they know security. The reason for this is not farfetched. In the last thirty to forty years and in particular in the last twenty of these years, security and insecurity have become daily buzzwords.⁶ They have become common terms owing to international and domestic developments with entirely two differing interests and motivations.

The first or international development began with the end of the Cold War beginning in 1989 and climaxing in 1991 and the instability that characterized the world subsequently. This instability would result in the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the war on terror by the United States of

⁴ For a perspective, see Adoyi Onoja, “Regime Type and the Established Notion of Security in Nigeria: Towards a Human Centred Security for Nigerians”, In Olayemi Akinwumi, Mamman Musa Adamu, Patrick Ukase, *Nigeria at 50: The Challenges of Nation Building*, Zaria: Historical Society of Nigeria, 2012, 83-108; “Defining and Situating Insecurity in the Nigerian Context: A Glimpse at Everyday Insecurities”, In P.U. Omeje and U. Okonkwo, *New Perspective on West African History: A Festschrift in Honour Prof S.C. Ukpabi*, Enugu: Madonna University Press, 2013, 437-474; ____ “Shrinking State, Deepening Insecurity and Resurgent ‘Culture’ Expression in Nigeria: A Post Military Perspective”, In *Politics, Culture and Development in Nigeria: A Festschrift for Gabriel Olatunde Babawale* by Akin Alao (ed.), Lagos: CBAAC, 2011, 290-312; explore the sub links “stripping”, “buzzing in town”, “aoviews” and “adonostra” on <http://adoyionoja.org>

⁵ I have conducted survey among students at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels in the Department of History and since 2015 on students of the graduate programme of security and strategic studies at the Institute of Governance and Development Studies of the Nasarawa State University, Keffi. My surveys support this claim. This is especially at the commencement lecture of the MSc and PhD classes on the courses “fundamental of security studies” and “seminar on national security policy”. The so-called elite of “security” – military, intelligence and law enforcement (MILE) and establishment people claimed they know security at the beginning of the classes only to begin to buckle and/or doubt their knowledge midway and towards the end of the classes.

⁶ There was the frenzied use of “security” and “insecurity” in the past couple of weeks with Boko Haram, militancy, kidnapping, banditry etc. representing the latter and the national assembly’s call for the sack of service chiefs, military, intelligence, law enforcement responses, launch of Amotekun, Shege Ka Fasa etc, summits such as the Northern Security Meeting, National Security and Insecurity in Nigeria: the Role of Traditional Rulers, South East Security Summit, and Women Interfaith on Security etc. representing the former. Or so these people and most Nigerians thought!

America. The second or domestic development was the era of rapacious military rule in the country that occasioned intense dissatisfaction of most nationalities, the consequent disorder that characterized the polity and the nexus between domestic and international developments of the period. As a result, security and insecurity were used and are used to describe these developments. The currency of the terms caught on among most Nigerians.

However, this is where the similarity stopped in comparison with the international usage of security and insecurity. When the United States uses security and insecurity, it is to describe its ability and the threat to its ability to access economic and strategic resources in different parts of the world in order to enrich its homeland. This has been the practice since the founding of the United States beginning with the pioneers that left England in 1607 for Virginia moving further westward to colonise all of the United States, the whole of Americas and most parts of the world.

The realisation that the world outside the United States is the theatre where security reside began actively with the superlative performance and dominance of the United States during and following the end of the Second World War. This necessitated the creation of the National Security Act of 1947.⁷ The Act supported the philosophical, military and legal frameworks of National Security. The idea of National Security is thus quintessentially American. Security and Insecurity is exogenous and endogenous as the United States goes out in search of security and quells the insecurity threatening the search for this security.

To this end, the National Security Act created and/or designated dozen bureaucracies⁸ to the pursuit of National Security anywhere and everywhere in the world. They included the United States military made up of five services, the Intelligence Community (IC) made up of seventeen agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) described by Douglas Valentine “as the organized crime branch of the United States government”,⁹ the State, Defence and Treasury Departments, National Security Council amongst others.

⁷ See “National Security Act of 1947”, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act> accessed 09:02:2020

⁸ Check the Act in Ibid

⁹ Read the interview by Lars Schall titled “the CIA: 70 Years of Organised Crime” with Douglas Valentine, the author of the *CIA as Organised Crime: How Illegal Operations Corrupt America and the World*, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/09/22/the-cia-70-years-of-organized-crime/> accessed 24:01:2020

The United States security type informed the philosophy or nature, meaning and purpose of security and insecurity for countries of the West and most discerning developed developing countries. What is the nature, meaning and purpose or philosophy of security in Nigeria?

I chose to tackle “security” and not “insecurity” because unless one knows “security” one cannot be able to understand “insecurity”. Both “security” and “insecurity” are two sides of the same coin.¹⁰ This is similar to Booth’s view that people understand what security is by knowing how insecurity feels.¹¹ Therefore I shall address “security” and its governance from two perspectives. The first perspective of governance involves the state and/or government and covers the questions of philosophy, legislation, policy and strategy.

The second perspective of governance is about the humanities. The humanities’ intervention through research, teaching and advocacy is to attempt to hold government and governance to account on the ground of their declare vision and mission on “security”. The first perspective is important because without the state/government view on “security”, the humanities cannot be able to tell what constitute “insecurity” and cannot be able to investigate and interrogate “security” in its entirety.

My point therefore is that the humanities’ intervention in investigating and interrogating “security” and “insecurity” has no foundation in Nigeria’s philosophy, legislation, policy and strategy. This explained the lack of direction in the discourses on “security” and “insecurity” in the humanities generally. Thus, for most scholars in the humanities writing on “security” and/or “insecurity”, the intellectual and practical platforms for discourse is western security philosophy. However, western security philosophy was constructed out of western histories, experiences and realities and not Nigeria’s history, experience and reality (HER).¹²

The paper is divided into sections including examining the prevailing conception of “security” from its emergence in Nigeria; the failed and failing “security” because of its divorce and lack of foundation in Nigeria’s

¹⁰ Read my perspective of security in the article “ Security: Three Perspectives from the Four Fundamental Questions (4FQs)” on the sub link “stripping” <http://adoyionoja.org>

¹¹ Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 101

¹² The concept of History, Experience and Reality (HER) is one of the methodological tools I developed in my engagement with security and security studies in Nigeria in the absence of one. See the sub link “stripping” for the article “A Security Theory Based on Nigeria’s History, Experience and Reality (HER)” on <http://adoyionoja.org>

history, experience and reality (HER) and studying, thinking, observing and comparing (STOC); the need for the legislatures to intervene in providing governance of security; governance of security – the state/government; governance of security – the humanities and; the conclusion.

The Nigerian Phase of “Security”

Security has a history everywhere. Nigeria is not an exception. Nigeria is an exception for imitating other cultures security for its own rather proceeding to creating its own security type founded on its history, experience and reality (HER). Security’s history included the common type that associated security as noun and verb;¹³ the type linked to the founding¹⁴ of the United States of America that seemingly took on the Peter Ekeh’s two publics¹⁵ – civic and primordial - with the civic public the internationalised security as noun and verb type; the type linked to security’s Latin and English etymology in “securus” and “secure” to its transformation from the 15th century onward to “free from care”, “being secure”, “something which secures” and from 1941 as “safety of state and/or people”;¹⁶ Buzan and Weaver’s three orders of security with the first order as dealing with actual challenge, the second order defining issue in particular way in order to tackle it or securitisation and the third order as arena for state to seek recognition;¹⁷ the Israeli/Pakistani/Iran etc. security perspectives¹⁸ and; to what I argued should be the three routes to security’s evolution in Nigeria first from security as security or all-encompassing security, second security as governance and third security as law and

¹³ Security as noun is the collective name used for the institutions that secure – the army, navy, air force, intelligence, police, civil defence etc. and security as verb refers to the work schedule of the institutions

¹⁴ Those who founded United States left England in 1607 for Virginia, moved westward and thence the whole of the States, the Americas and the rest of the world, in search of what Williams called the “routine lust for land, markets or security...” See William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Present Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, 62 and the most of the thesis of Oliver Stone, Peter Kuznick, *The Untold History of the United States*, London, Penguin, 2019. The heart of America’s security – land, markets and strategic resources – represent the primordial public of Ekeh’s two publics shielded from the perception of countries including Nigeria that imitates most things America and only the civic public or the use of military, intelligence and law enforcement - vehicle for accessing security or land, markets and strategic resources – fascinates countries such as Nigeria.

¹⁵ For this theoretical perspective, read Peter P. Ekeh. “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no. 1 (1975): 91-112.

¹⁶ See “security (n.)”, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/security> accessed 27:01:2020

¹⁷ Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 408

¹⁸ Read Adoyi Onoja, “Presenting Models of Security Constructed Off Some Countries’ History, Experience and Reality (HER)” on the sub link “aoviews” on <http://adoyionoja.org>

order¹⁹. These perspectives carried and should carry the history, experience and reality (HER) of these societies.²⁰

“Security” has a history in Nigeria.²¹ For those that are older in this hall, the talk of “security” as daily word in the vocabulary of most Nigerians is recent development. The commonisation of security is not more than twenty to thirty years. If one takes the thirty years period, it coincided with the virulence of military rule on the one hand and the events tied to the beginning of the end of the Cold War on the other hand. The Cold War development provided impetus for domestic usage of security in every day affairs. If one takes the twenty years period, this is connected to the return of civil rule and the seeming division of responsibility with the military, intelligence and law enforcement assuming the role of “security”.

The virulence of military rule was not so much associated with the elongated regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. It was the genre that was headed by his successor General Sani Abacha that stood as a class on its own. In what was the desire of General Abacha to purge the military of doubtful elements within its rank and, in the process clear the path for his so-called self-succession, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) headed by Brigadier General Ibrahim Sabo presided over the sweeping search for regime enemies. “Security” became the buzzword of the period.

Of the two types of security available – security as “the routine lust for land, markets or security” and the instrument – military, intelligence and law enforcement (MILE) - that facilitate the quest for these resources, Nigeria was and is obsessed with the instrument and not the substance that constitute security. Thus what constitute security for the west, most developed societies and discerning developing countries include primarily economic and strategic resources in territories beyond their shores. The military, intelligence and law enforcement are the instruments that facilitate the quest and acquisition of these resources in distant lands in the absence of international governance.

¹⁹ Adoyi Onoja, “Security: A Brief Encounter in Nigeria”, Unpublished manuscript, Department of History, Nasarawa State University, Keffi; Read Adoyi Onoja, “Defining and Charting Security Routes for Nigeria”, on the sub link “aoviews” on <http://adoyionoja.org>

²⁰ See my article on the concept/tool/theory of security based on History, Experience and Reality (HER) on <http://adoyionoja.org>

²¹ For Nigeria’s perspective, see Adoyi Onoja, “Regime Type and the Established Notion of Security in Nigeria: Towards a Human Centred Security for Nigerians”, In Olayemi Akinwumi, Mamman Musa Adamu, Patrick Ukase, *Nigeria at 50: The Challenges of Nation Building*, Zaria: Historical Society of Nigeria, 2012, 83-108

For Nigeria and other less discerning developing countries without interest and/or with symbolic interest to pursue beyond their shores, security is the use of the instrument of the military, intelligence and law enforcement for domestic purpose such as the consolidation of the hold of the ruling oligarchy on power, the suppression of the aspirations of most of its nationalities and the intimidation of the opposition.

Security itself originated in the western thought and was developed, refined and consolidated in the course of the west evolution²² and search for its material prosperity or security worldwide. The United States of America is credited with the development of security into statecraft with the passing of the National Security Act of 1947. The routine lust for land, market or security as William Appleton Williams noted was innate to the founding philosophy of the United States. This can be seen in the movement from England in 1607 to Virginia and the continued westward advance in search of land, market or security. This process continued with the colonization of the Americas.

America's quest for global dominance was perfected with its performance in the Second World War. The making of the "vicious beast of imperialism" as President Maurice Bishop of Grenada described the United States had been propped up by such doctrine and advocacy from as far back as Henry Luce's "American Century" to as near as the "Project for the New American Century". The vast military and intelligence apparatus scattered all over the world since the end of the Second World War was geared towards advancing and protecting this security or the routine lust for lands, market or security.

Painting one phase of the picture of security for the United States succinctly was Congressman Dennis Kucinich on the Persian Gulf:

Oil is a major factor in every aspect of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. Ask yourself: What commodity accounts for 83 percent of total exports from the Persian Gulf? What is the U.S. protecting with our permanent

²² Emma Rothschild, "What is Security?", *Daedalus*, Vol. 124. No. 3, 1995, 53-98; David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1997, 5-29; Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner, 1998; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War*, Harvester, Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991; Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1983, 129-53; Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1991, 211-39; Han J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Fifth Edition Revised, New York:, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978

deployment of about 25,000 military personnel, 6 fighter squadrons, 6 bomber squadrons, 13 air control and reconnaissance squadrons, one aircraft carrier battle group, and one amphibious ready group based at 11 military installations?...the disproportionate troop deployments in the Middle East aren't there to protect the people, who constitute only 2 percent of the world population.²³

The bureaucracy that operates one of the instruments or the military that support the search for security or land, market or economic and strategic resources anywhere and everywhere in the world is the Department of Defence which is housed in a building shaped like Pentagon and known by that name. Pentagon is reputed as the world's largest office building. The Pentagon has over 1,000 bases in some 130 countries that spanned every continent but Antarctica, plus 6,000 bases in the United States and its territories. The Department of Defence remain one of the world's largest 'landlords' with a physical plant consisting of more than 545,700 facilities located on more than 5,400 sites, on approximately 30 million acres. Its thirteen carrier strike groups patrolled the oceans and seas²⁴ of the world. This is used to support the search for security or economic and strategic resources.

However, for Nigeria, the military, intelligence and law enforcement is security and/or national security. For the United States, Europe and discerning developed developing countries, the military, intelligence and law enforcement is only an instrument for advancing, accessing and protecting security anywhere and everywhere in the world.

Failed and Failing “Security” in the absence of Security Based on History, Experience and Reality (HER)²⁵ and (STOC)²⁶

For the period Nigeria was governed by the military, this “security” seemingly worked. This “security” worked to the extent that Nigerians

²³ See Stone and Kuznick, *The Untold History of the United States*, 497, Dennis Kucinich, “Obviously Oil”, March 11, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15359

²⁴ Stone and Kuznick, *The Untold History of the United States*, 543

²⁵ For the concept of History, Experience and Reality (HER), visit the sub link “stripping” for the article “A Security Theory Based on Nigeria’s History, Experience and Reality (HER)” on <http://adoyionoja.org>

²⁶ For the concept of Study, Observe, Think and Compare (STOC), visit the sub link “adonostra” for the article “Retooling and Rearranging the Tool “Read, Observe and Think/Think, Observe and Read” (ROT/TOR) to “Study, Think, Observe and Compare” (STOC) on <http://adoyionoja.org>

knew better than to challenge the military authority on matters of the effective and efficient utilisation of human and material resources for the benefit of most Nigerians.

This “security” driven by the military, intelligence and law enforcement, whose task, based on their founding laws,²⁷ was not described as security but as defence and law enforcement began to unravel with the commencement of civil rule in 1999. With the lifting of the restraint that military rule imposed on the citizens’ ability to express their views on the state of governance, the polity was engulfed by different agitations including the need to improve livelihood, control resources and devolve power tasking the resources of defence and law enforcement agencies.

Most Nigerians complained of “insecurity” in their lives and demanded for “security”. The security most Nigerians demanded was different from the type the military presided over. Most Nigerians were dissatisfied with the military-type security hence they joined the internationally-inspired effort to restore civil rule and improve security in their lives by driving the military back to barracks.

There is the need to investigate the type and source of the “insecurity” and the “security” the military governed in their tenure. There is the need to investigate the type and source of “insecurity” and “security” most Nigerians hoped and worked for in the new dispensation. The inability, unwillingness and/or insensitivity of the civil rule governing authorities to re-examine “insecurity” and “security” as should apply with the civil rule governing ideals necessitated the reenactment of the military-type security as the solution. Critically, this is the result of their lack of appreciation of Nigeria’s history, experience and reality (HER) and the necessity of studying, thinking, observing and comparing (STOC). Both HER and STOC are sine qua non to understanding “security” and constructing security for most Nigerians and Nigeria.

Since 1999 to date, Nigeria has been grappling with what the military described as “insecurity” in their period of governance. The military-type solution to “insecurity” or the deployment of personnel to crisis areas has not been able to solve the problem. Thus “security” failed, is failing and continues to fail calling for the review of the situation.

²⁷ See sections 215 and 217, the *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended* and other enabling laws

When the military, intelligence and law enforcement issue statement, usually when something happened affecting their schedule and/or when there is meeting most likely with Mr. President, informing the public that they are adopting new strategy or re-strategising to address the issue in order to improve “security”, the statement is empty. There will be no new strategy or re-strategising anywhere anytime. They – the Mr. President and the MILE - will go home to business as usual.

When Mr. President issue statement – he has issued countless statements - usually after an attack, first condoling the victims and their families, and subsequently directing the MILE to fish out the perpetrators, the value of the statement ends with the pronouncement. As with the agencies (MILE) expected to carry out the directive to fish out the perpetrators and to beef up “security”, Mr. President goes to sleep and await another attack for the same set of statements to be re-issued.

When Mr. President meets with the National Security Council (NSC), amongst the agenda on the table aside from reviewing the “security” situation of the country is to request for extra or fresh fund to fight “insecurity” and address “security” challenges. The National Security Council has no schedule that preoccupies it every day as is the case with the United States National Security Council. Beyond being on paper, the Nigerian NSC has no agenda and no everyday use until there is need for another review and/or request for fund.

Mr. President is the chief “security” officer of the country and the governors are the chief “security” officer of the states. However, seldom would one find any interaction with the so-called chief “security” officer of the states whence statement such as credited to Mr. President is issued. Clearly, the perception of security as the military, intelligence and law enforcement falls within the exclusive list of legislation and to butt the governors do not feature in this and hence carry a rather honorific title with no substance. There is only one commander-in-chief and thus chief “security” or should I say defence officer in Nigeria.

Mr. President and the Governors are not in the business of “security”. They are in the business of defence and law enforcement that is the primary task of the MILE which Mr. President alone superintends over. As to the statements credited to Mr. President and the MILE, the latter’s task is defence and law enforcement. The latter’s task is not security.

The reason for all the confusion is that Nigeria has no security philosophy. The Constitution mentioned security first in Chapter II Section 14 2b²⁸ and second in associational form in several other places in the Constitution. There is also the National Security Agencies Act²⁹ which replaced Decree Number 19 of 1986 creating the agencies of security. Both the Constitution³⁰ and the NSA Act did not contain any explanation of what security meant beyond the noun and verb it represented in the popular culture.

As such, Nigeria and its authorities have no idea of what to put on the table of “security”. What I am saying is that “security” begins and ends at the tactical level. There is nothing strategic about “security”. This explains the lack of depth of “security”. In the matter of security, the authorities in Nigeria take forest for tree.³¹

Need for Legislatures Intervention to Provide Governance of Security

Clearly there is the need for the intervention of the legislatures to provide for the governance of security in order to enable security governance. Governance of security is the construction of security under civil rule. It is the provision of philosophy, legislation and policy that answers the questions what is security, whose security, what is security issue and how can security be achieved.

“Security” failed, is failing and continues to fail because there is no difference between “security” and “insecurity” under civil rule and military rule. There is need for distinction of the two dispensations and hence the construction of security to fit the civil rule enabling environment. Nigerians drove the military back to the barracks because they were emblematic of insecurity. This was to give opportunity to civil rule to secure their lives.

²⁸ See the *1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with Amendments 2011*, LL26-27

²⁹ Read “National Security Agencies Act”, <https://nlipw.com/national-security-agencies-act/> accessed 09:02:2020

³⁰ As I argued in one of my articles, security is amorphous in the Constitution. Read Adoyi Onoja, “Security is Amorphous in the Constitution”, on the sub link “stripping” in <http://adoyionoja.org>

³¹ To demonstrate the uniqueness of national security and defence and the difference and relationship of two in the United States of America, there is cabinet level position in the Defence Department responsible for national security policy. It is Assistant Secretary of Defence for National Security Policy. See Oliver Stone, Peter Kuznick, *The Untold History of the United States*, London, Penguin, 2019. In page 442, there is a reference to Richard Perle, who was Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger’s Assistant Secretary of Defence for National Security Policy in President Ronald Reagan administration.

To retain the so-called military-type solution to “insecurity” oblivious of the facts on the ground amount to insensitivity, ignorance, collusion and/or all between the civil political elite and the MILE elite directed at perpetuating their interests to the detriment of most Nigerians. Of the legislatures and the executives, the legislatures are in the position to drive the need for the provision of governance of security.

Since the practice in Nigeria did not constitute security owing to the fact that it represents the defence practice of the armed forces, it is necessary to provide for security. In providing for security, it is necessary to have a policy-legislation that answer the questions what is security, whose security, what is security issue(s) and how security can be achieved. I argued that the responsibility of the governance type in place since 1999 included providing the country with a security policy-legislation. I also argued that the practice in place did not constitute security hence it has not been able to provide security for most Nigerians. Indeed, most Nigerians have no idea of security except the political and MILE elites. Their security failed, is failing and continues to fail.

Indeed, as I noted there was no difference in the perspective of the armed forces (military) and the civil elected on security. Nigerians knew the perspective of the armed forces on security. After twenty years in power, it is time the elected civil authority give Nigerians their perspective on security. While the basis for the armed forces perspective on security is their defence role in the Constitution. The basis for the civil elected authority is their governance role as contained in Chapter II or Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of the Constitution. Section 13 to 21³² clearly provide for this governance role.

The central issue in the advocacy for security policy-legislation is governance. The focus of security policy-legislation should be on governance of security and security governance. Governance of security entails processes and procedures while security governance entails the utilisation of human and material resources in order to secure the lives of most Nigerians.

³² See the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with Amendments 2011

Of the legislatures and executives elected into power, who is better suited to provide a security policy-legislation for Nigeria? I am of the view that the legislatures are better suited since their role is to legislate or provide policy framework. As I argued the policy should answer four questions. Of these questions, the legislature should address the first three questions of policy. They are: What is security? Whose security? What is a security issue (s)?

I am also of the view that the provisions in the policy framework should differ from those of the western world in view of Nigeria's propensity to imitate. It was imitation that created the prevailing security reality in Nigeria. It is important that the western model serves as guide only. Their security enabling environment is different. This is because their history, experience and reality differ. I had advocated for the construction of security based on Nigeria's history, experience and reality (HER).

The implication of security policy-legislation for Nigeria is two folds. The first is that it will streamline security away from the view of one institution i.e. the MILE to what it should be within the context of the governance role of elected representatives. In this instance, the policy will delineate security from defence. I used the metaphor of umbrella or forest to describe security. To this extent, every other issue including defence will be accommodated inside the security umbrella or forest.

The second implication is on scholarship and scholars.³³ At the moment, there is no map for any engagement on security as a field of study in tertiary institutions. With a framework that answers the questions what is security, whose security, what is security issue(s) and how security can be achieved, the policy set the direction or guide for academic exploration and discourse on security in Nigeria. The absence of security policy-legislation currently hampers scholarship as academics rely on external inputs in their intervention in theories, concepts, issues etc. around security. Their discourses will reference the policy-legislation and hold the government accountable.

³³ I addressed this issue in the Sokoto Historical Society of Nigeria conference in 2017. See Paper prepared for the 62nd annual conference of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN) on the theme "Institutions and Nation Building in Nigeria since Independence", Sokoto State University, Sokoto, 4th - 8th June, 2017

As the legislatures deals with the first three questions of policy, the last question how security can be achieved or strategy should be the responsibility of the executive. This is what governance of security and security governance entails.

Governance of Security: the State/Government Perspective

It is the state that begins the conversation on issues of public importance through the making of legislations and policies in this direction. The legislation/policy contains the vision and mission of the state on the specific issue under consideration. Since the enthronement of representative rule in 1999, it is the task of elected officials at both the executive and legislative levels to initiate the process of reviewing and updating old ideas as well as generating new ideas in tandem with the needs of the people into legislation and policy to enable governance.

Nigeria had been ruled by the military in ways that abuse the norm of policy making over the course of several decades. It is therefore necessary that elected officials begin to distance themselves from the method of the military through the adoption of methods within the present framework. One of the areas that require this approach to providing governance is security.

As the governing elite, the military had taken the literary perspective of security and socialised most Nigerians including the political class into this perspective. This literary perspective of security was no less circumstantial when considered in the context of the end of the Cold War and the disorder that followed. The security interest of the United States and other global powers were threatened and they were compelled to use their bulwark – the military, intelligence and law enforcement – to address the situation. This was one dimension to the popularisation of the literary security that fascinated the Nigeria military as the ruling elite and the professional institutions responsible for this security.

The second aspect that gave birth to and popularised this literary security for the military regime in Nigeria was the deteriorating domestic condition. The military government was unable to provide for the needs of the people amidst the growing agitation for the end of military rule within an international enabling environment supportive of the clamour. Democracy and human right were the buzzwords in the relation between the west and Nigeria. The growing agitations, demonstrations, protests and in some cases the emergence of militants and secessionists increasingly compelled

the military authorities to use their resources in order to restore “security”. This was the genesis of the popularity of security in Nigeria.

This “security” did not emanate from any legislation and policy designating this as security. This “security” is illegal to the extent that the statutes, laws and acts creating the military, police etc. did not describe their work as security. This security, copied from the often-referenced international situation, as it affected the interest of the United States etc. was used to describe the role of the military, intelligence and law enforcement, in their attempt to restore order occasioned by the dissatisfaction and disgruntlement of most people with their rule. This is the basis for “security” and “insecurity”. These descriptions served their purpose under military rule. They have since unraveled since the beginning of civil rule in 1999 as they successfully failed woefully.

Since 1999 “security” pursued within the framework of the military failed, is failing and will continue to fail necessitating the need to revisit the “security” in question under the civil rule enabling environment. Most Nigerians drove the military back to the barracks because they lacked security in their lives. Security as I defined it is wellbeing and welfare of the individual and people.³⁴ The type of security the military offered did not address their wellbeing and welfare. Most Nigerians therefore gave their elected representatives since 1999 the mandate to provide them security or wellbeing and welfare. This is where the role of the legislature as the generator of ideas in democracy should come into play.

There is the need for new security framework within Nigeria’s history, experience and reality (HER) leveraging on studying, thinking, observing and comparing (STOC) that addresses the expectations of most Nigerians. The reason nationalities fought and are fighting each other that required the MILE type “security” intervention is because they were and are dissatisfied with their wellbeing and welfare or material condition. The security that should address this inadequacy in order to prevent the resort to the MILE type “security” should be constructed by the legislatures in Nigeria. The legislatures have the statutory mandate, time and resources to examine security in order to come up with one that works for most Nigerians.

³⁴ This is similar to the Ken Booth’s theory of world security. See Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007

This is the governance of security that is lacking. This is the governance of security that if provided will unleash security governance in all sector of Nigeria's public life. This is because once there is security legislation defined as the wellbeing and welfare of the people and the security legislation is made the *centrum autem gravitatis* of all policies ensuring that every other public policies has security objective taken from the security legislation for accomplishment, Nigeria will not require the MILE type security as every public policy will pursue wellbeing and welfare of the individual in its spheres of influence.

There are four questions that should be address to constitute philosophy, legislation and policy of security in Nigeria. They are what is security, whose security, what is security issue and how can security be achieved. The answer to these questions becomes the basis for the humanities intervention in investigating and interrogating security and insecurity in Nigeria.

Governance of Security: The Humanities Perspective

The humanities deal with human being and being human. The humanities study the human condition. "Security" and "Insecurity" are ideas woven around the human condition that has not been philosophised or natured, meant and purposed in Nigeria on the one hand and/or domesticated, investigated and interrogated within the history, experience and reality (HER) of Nigeria through studying, thinking, observing and comparing (STOC) on the other hand by the disciplines within the humanities.

As academics of the humanities – history, languages, linguistics, archaeology, philosophy, religion, theatre, culture, music etc. - we have three schedules of duty. They are to research, to teach and to perform community service. We are to investigate and interrogate phenomenon in the community. Using the qualitative/inductive methodology, the humanities, as Charmaine Pereira³⁵ opined, was eminently placed to illuminate the human condition. Academics do not and should not take the human phenomenon on its face value. It was with this in mind perhaps that prompted Wole Soyinka to argue that the humanities' duty

³⁵ Charmaine Pereira is an independent scholar. She made this point as the chair of the Roundtable on trends in current Humanities scholarship on "Academic cultures in the humanities in Nigeria: segmented by religion and ethnicity?" African Humanities Program Regional Assembly Abuja, Nigeria, February 11th -13th, 2020

was to interrogate issues however remote.³⁶ If the phenomenon is working, we investigate and interrogate the reason it is working and we disseminate this information. If the phenomenon is not working, we investigate and interrogate the reason it is not working and disseminate the information. In the three schedules, community service is the product of research and teaching. The relevance of the academic enterprise is measured by the degree to which it serves the community or the town.

As members of the humanities, the relationship of the three schedules should guard and guide our interface with the Community or the Town or else we will go into irrelevance. We are to hold power, authority and wealth to account in the research, teaching and community service we carry out as power, authority and wealth seek to perpetuate its vision and mission often and almost always against the interest of the majority in the community.

If we accept this as the charge of the humanities' academic community, is this what we are doing in relation to "security"? Have we investigated, interrogated and understood "security" to enable our determination of that which constitutes "insecurity" in the community? What is the humanities investigating and interrogating in "security" when it has no idea of "security" and "insecurity" in Nigeria from the basis of philosophy, legislation and policy?

To understand the import of this first question, let me bring in the view of G.W.F Hegel at the point when there was not African History from the point of view of philosophy or nature, meaning and purpose. It was Hegel's view that "at this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the world: it has no movement and development to exhibit".³⁷ As recent as the 1960s, Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper reechoed similar view that "perhaps in the future, there will be some African History to teach. But, at present there is none: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness..."³⁸ According to Professor Ali Mazrui, the controversy dwells on what must

³⁶ Wole Soyinka, keynote Address, African Humanities Program Regional Assembly Abuja, Nigeria, February 11th -13th February, 2020, NUC Auditorium

³⁷ See this quote, see <https://www.coursehero.com/file/p3ht580r/For-it-is-no-historical-part-of-the-World-it-has-no-movement-and-development-to/> accessed 24:01:2020

³⁸ See Geoffrey Wheatcroft "Unscrambling Africa", <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/17/books/unscrambling-africa.html> accessed 24:01:2020

be present for a society to have a "history", Trevor-Roper arguing that it required documentary evidence.³⁹

What Hegel and Trevor-Roper meant was that Africa had no history worth studying because Africa had no writing. The only history in Africa was the history of Europeans in Africa. Comment such as those represented by Hegel and Roper presented challenges to early historians of Africa descent the resolution of which would lay the foundation of African historiography by African historians.

This became the foundation for the beginning of African history complete with its methods and methodology. African historians have since set out to answer the four fundamental questions constituting philosophy and policy of African history. These four questions constituted the core of the two issues of governance. The first is the Governance of History and it entails questions of Philosophy and Policy to include what is history, whose history and what is history issue. The second question is that of History Governance or Strategy and it entails how history can be realized. One of the landmark works within this tradition was Professor Kenneth Onwuka Dike's *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta*.

Unless the humanities begin to pose questions around these areas in relation to the governance of security and security governance, its intervention will be merely academic and limited to the consumption of members of the Gown only. Their intervention will not reach out to and impact members of the Town. It is important for those interested in security and security studies to begin by studying the philosophy of security as constructed and practiced by the west from where security and security studies emerged.

The questions to ask apart from the foregoing is why has "security" failed and is failing spectacularly in the last twenty years of the Nigeria's history? Is the vision of "security" derived from Nigeria's nationalities' histories, experiences and realities (HER)? Did this "security" benefits from the concept of studying, thinking, observing and comparing (STOC) with other security experiences including from where "security" began? Should the humanities not ask why most Nigerians drove the

³⁹ Ali A. Mazrui, "European Exploration and Africa's Self-Discovery", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 7, no. 4 (1969): 661–676.

military back to the barracks implying the repudiation of their type of “security”? In driving the military back to the barracks, what security did most Nigerians hope to get from their elected representatives on a short, medium and long term basis? Should the humanities not tell the elected officials to distance themselves from the military type of “security”?

Should the humanities not ask the elected legislatures responsible for making laws and policies to generate ideas consonant with what should be “security” for the people that elected them? Should the legislatures distinguish their type of “security” i.e. wellbeing and welfare which they pursue through persistent appropriation of money for “security” i.e. the type represented by the MILE which they purportedly provide for most of the people? Is twenty years of failed and failing “security” not enough time to convince the legislatures that something is not right with “security” in order to jettison the failed and failing “security” for the type of security they persistently pursue for themselves and which is representative of the representative rule enabling environment?

Should the humanities not ask why the executives and legislatures battle each other over “security”? Should the humanities not ask why Adedibu and Ladoja, El-rufai and Dogara, Obasanjo and Okadigbo fought over “security vote”? Should the humanities not ask what “security vote” is? Should the humanities not ask why the legislature and agencies of the executive took turn in convening conferences, workshops, seminars and symposiums on “national security” whose focus was “how” and not “what” was “security”? Should the humanities not ask why the legislature and executive are united in matters of the occasional issuing of the so-called “security” threat as precursor to seek for fund to mitigate the so-called threat or their own threat?⁴⁰

Should the humanities not ask why few days after the public presentation of the *National Security Strategy* by Mr. President, there was warning that Boko Haram planned to use biological, radiological, chemical and nuclear weapons in its war against the state?⁴¹ Should the humanities not use the revelations from the expenditure of the over \$2 billion of “security” that ended in the pockets of political and MILE bosses as

⁴⁰ See my article “Security” Nigeria’s Permanent Political Economy?” on the sub link “stripping” on <http://adoyionojo.org> I wrote this piece in response to this announcement: “FG raises alarm over Boko Haram’s threat to attack Nigeria with nuclear weapons”, Pulse Nigeria/Bayo Wahab.

⁴¹ See “Security” Nigeria’s Permanent Political Economy?” on the sub link “stripping” on <http://adoyionojo.org>

pointer to what is security – wellbeing and welfare of individuals? Should the humanities not use this revelation as pointer to the occasional issuing of the so-called “security” threat as opportunity to siphon fund into public officials’ pockets? Should the humanities not ask why nationalities are restless owing to the decline in their wellbeing and welfare or security as the issue worth addressing? Should the humanities not go studying, thinking, observing and comparing (STOC) in order to ascertain security for other countries particularly western countries and note the reason for the failure of “security” in Nigeria? Should the humanities not ask all of these questions and more?

The humanities should ask why Euro-America invokes security mostly in its foreign relations and Nigeria invokes “security” only in its domestic affairs. The humanities should ask why Euro-America mentions security mostly in its foreign relations governed as it were by William Appleman Williams’ “routine lust for land, markets or security”. The humanities must ask these questions in its interface with the Town.

The humanities should enquire the reason the political class and the officer class of the MILE since 1999 and especially from 2007 to date seek security in siphoning public fund meant for the provision of safety or “security” for most Nigerians, getting percentages of all contracts sum or pocketing the money in its entirety without doing the job, buying property at home and abroad, stashing hard currencies in boxes, graves, tanks and buildings and investing in stocks while peddling inadequate guns and boots as “security” for most Nigerians.

Above all else the humanities must hold the legislatures to account on the need for them to review and update old, archaic and out-of-date laws and evolve novel ideas into laws and policies for the governance of the people that elected them. Of these the one that requires urgent attention is security. From etymological, epistemological and philosophical perspectives, security is wellbeing and welfare of individual and people. Using creation and/or evolution theories, the first act of humankind on earth was to secure self by feeding and sheltering from the elements. It was from feeding that humankind derived the strength to fight. The first act of humankind was not to fight. When the need to fight arose, it was directed at protecting and/or advancing food sources. This has not changed since creation and/or evolution and will not change as long as humankind lives on earth. This is security.

The etymological perspective of security chimed with the foundational perspective of security. The Latin ‘securus’ or English ‘secure’ is the etymology of security. It means “free from care”, “being secure”, or “something which secures”. The meaning of security has changed over time. In the mid-15th century, security is “condition of being secure”; from the 1580s, security is “something which secures”; from 1941 onwards, security is “safety of a state, or person etc.”⁴²

Security as the safety of the state from 1941 onward tallied with the inroad of the United States as world power and the beginning of the globalisation of American ideas. There are two dimensions of security for the United States. The first is security as economic and strategic resources. The second is security as the safety of the state in its search for these resources anywhere and everywhere in the world. As United States takes on global role driven primarily by the search for security or economic and strategic resources, the bulwark of this security – military, intelligence and law enforcement – became the recognised face of security for most countries of the world.

For America that promoted the idea of security in theory and practice, security is about the wellbeing and welfare of corporate America if not most Americans. Beginning with the first settlers that left England in 1607 to Virginia to begin the foundation of the United States of America, security or the lust for land and markets was about the search for new land, resources and opportunities. Their movement continued westward until the entire United States of America was no longer sufficient for their security. They moved out into the Americas. When they got involved in the First and Second World Wars, it was to get resources to advance the wellbeing and welfare of Americans. Doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, American Century, Monroe Doctrine, Exceptionalism, New American Century and Full Spectrum Dominance were supportive of the quest for security or land, markets and opportunities at various times in the history of the United States of America.⁴³

Security is invoked in external relations and the role of the military, intelligence and law enforcement (MILE) is that of the bulwark for this

⁴² See “security (n.)”, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/security> accessed 27:01:2020

⁴³ See Introduction Root of Empire: “War is a Racket”, Oliver Stone, Peter Kuznick, *The Untold History of the United States*, Random House, Penguin, 2019

enterprise in an ungoverned international environment.⁴⁴ It takes the strength of the artilleries, warships and fighter jets to navigate the hostile and competitive international environment and only the MILE can support this. This is the role of the United States MILE in the enterprise of security. The United States MILE is not security itself. The United States MILE supports the quest for security. Security is lands, markets, opportunities and strategic resources anywhere and everywhere in the world.

When the Congress of the United States passed the National Security Act in 1947, two years after the United States emerged as a world power following its superlative performance in the Second World War, the Act was to give legal effect to what is America's National Security – the quest for resources anywhere and everywhere – using the instruments of its military, intelligence and law enforcement (MILE). The Second World War, the post war Marshall Plan for Europe, the birth of the United Nations and the subsequent creation of the prevailing world order with the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – the former development oriented and the latter finance oriented – and America's insistence that the dollar and gold standard should be the currencies of the world signal the emergence of pax Americana. All these institutions and many others are devoted to serving the national security of the United States.

Since 1947 to date, presidents and administrations have come up with their national security strategies in pursuit of the National Security policy act. The latest is President Trump's America First National Security Strategy which the administration is vigorously pursuing. They included the reversal and/or review of most protocols thought to be detrimental to America's national security including the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iran Deal, China-America Trade War etc. All these were targeted towards the wellbeing and welfare or security of the United States.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ For security theories, see Paul D. Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, Routledge, London and New York, 2008. The theory of realism supports this view.

⁴⁵ Ironically, President Trump that has been credited with doing so much for U.S national security was impeached, tried and acquitted for endangering the United States national security. The particular charge relating to national security was not releasing over \$400 million of military aid to Ukraine. The national security connection is the economic and geopolitical implications of withholding the aid for United States wellbeing and well-fare.

As members of the humanities interested in security and engaged in research in security, we should be interested in the reasons countries of the United States, Britain, Europe etc. should lose sleep over crisis in the Niger Delta, North East and Middle Belt. As members of the humanities, we should ask ourselves the reason the United States and Europe are the ones initiating security cooperation and not Nigeria and other African countries. Even in the limited areas of “security” i.e. the military, intelligence and law enforcement Nigeria claimed to be familiar with, we have not been able to initiate cooperation with neighbouring countries at the height of the Boko Haram attacks until the intervention of France. French intervention was directed at the security that is oblivious to Nigeria’s ungoverned security space i.e. uranium and strategic interests in the region.

The reason is simply that Nigeria has no security philosophy of its own to be in the position to know when its security is threatened and require strengthening through initiative such as security cooperation. “Security” is strictly military, intelligence and law enforcement deployed to protect the government in power.

Why do the United States, Britain, Europe etc. focus their security cooperation in the area of training and equipping of the MILE only? Why should they prefer this role for the MILE? What does the MILE accomplish for the security interest of United States, Britain and Europe? As one Hausa proverb succinctly put it: “woni na rike kaho wani na tace nono”. When situated in the context of this paper, the MILE is trained and equipped to hold the “horn” to enable “milking” the cow. “Security” for Nigeria is the “horn” and for the United States, Britain, Europe etc. the “milk”.

This is the situation for the United States, Britain,⁴⁶ Europe and other countries as far as their “security” is concerned. In the competitive world of the search for this security, countries belonging to the first world within the third world category have unveiled their own security model in order to stake their spheres in the gullible and pliant “horn” and the “milk” analogy. Thus we have had the China-Africa summit, India-Africa summit, Russia-Africa summit, Saudi investment summit in 2019

⁴⁶ Britain convened its own summit in January 2020 on the heels of the successful elections that strengthened the hands of Premier Boris Johnson and his Conservative party as they take Britain out of Europe. The idea of Brexit is about this security – Britain going it alone and having all the economic advantage accompanying this in its relations with other countries.

and the British equivalent in January of 2020. These summits were convened by these countries and they represented their strategy of securing themselves. In these summits, Nigeria and other third world countries were offered different types of “horn” to hold while these countries “milk” their cows.

Where is the Nigerian equivalent of security legislation/policy that is the basis of the strategy? On which security legislation cum policy was the recently launched *National Security Strategy* based? What is the situation with “security” in Nigeria in comparison with the United States of America? Has Nigeria asked, answered and provided for Governance of Security and thus engender Security Governance – what is security, whose security, what is security issue and how can security be achieved? This is the task before the humanities to investigate, interrogate and make recommendation.

Security is wellbeing and well-fare of the individual and group.⁴⁷ Using this definition, the humanities should debate the validity and utility of the economic foundation of security versus the MILE foundation of security by considering and comparing the attitude as well as the practices of the West and Nigeria on the issue of security. They should do this by remembering that on the shoulders of the economy rest every structure and institution – political, social, cultural, defence and/or what I called the military, intelligence and law enforcement (MILE).

Without the economy as Marx opined, the superstructure is useless. Why should anyone convince the humanities that security is in the military, intelligence and law enforcement? Only the state and those who benefit from the state and the structure in place will argue that the MILE is security. The reason is because with their control of the MILE they will be able to perpetuate their economic and political dominance. The humanities should stop seeing,⁴⁸ thinking and writing like the state in their research, teaching and community service.

The point is that the humanities must first equip itself with the knowledge required or it will not be in the position to ask, answer and

⁴⁷ Read the article “Security: Three Perspectives from the Four Fundamental Questions (4FQs)” on the sub link “stripping” <http://adoyionoja.org>

⁴⁸ See James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998. The thesis of the book is a metaphor for this type of thinking.

make suggestion to the Town. Unless these questions are asked and addressed, the challenge confronting the humanities will persist including the varying contributions of the numerous participants in the conference on what constitutes “insecurity”. The contributions may not address the issues as they lacked basis in a made in Nigeria security philosophy, legislation and policy.

Conclusion

These questions and insights collectively summed up the 4FQs on security that is lacking in Nigeria’s narrative of “security”. What is security? Whose security? What is security issue? How can security be achieved? We have no idea of security from the point of view of philosophy, legislation and policy. Therefore, we have no idea of insecurity. What is insecurity? Whose insecurity? What is insecurity issue? How can insecurity be addressed?

While these questions and answers are not ambiguous when it concerned the United States of America particularly since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 for example, the questions are ambiguous when it comes to Nigeria. These are the questions that asking and answering by the Nigerian state and government will constitute governance of security and security governance and will set the stage for the ability of the humanities to engage the issue of security and insecurity.

In the present civil rule dispensation, the military should not be put in charge of “security”⁴⁹ of their own vision and mission. However, the military is in charge of “security” of its vision and mission for now. This is for the sole reason that those elected have been unable and/or unwilling to construct their own vision and mission of security, development and peace. Out of self-interest, they have chosen to collude with the military, intelligence and law enforcement (MILE) in retaining the prevailing “security” even as it is demonstrably clear that this “security” failed and is failing all the time.

⁴⁹ See the article “understanding peace and security as critical factors in national development”, where I proffered perspective of peace and security outside the box of peace and security as commonised today. Text of paper presented at the workshop on the theme “Training on Cultural Differences, Conflicts and Its Resolutions for Peaceful Coexistence” organised by National Institute of Cultural Orientation (NICO), Assembly Hall, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 5th- 6th December, 2019, on the sub link “aoviews” on <http://adoyionojoa.org>

There cannot and should not be military oversight of the security I proposed for Nigeria especially Nigeria since 1999. This is security as wellbeing and well-fare of the individual and group. Wellbeing and well-fare or security of the individual and group should be the prime task of every public policy.

This is the reason it is necessary and urgent for the philosophical and legislative construct of security by the legislatures. This security is sine qua non to the making and/or remaking of the state⁵⁰ in Nigeria. The new state that will emerge will be imbued with Nigerian idea capable of governing its institutions which will in turn control its territory. This is the type of state that contains the prospect for Nigeria's continuation and survival.

It is time the humanities assume responsibility for the policy and social implications of their research, teaching and advocacy on "security".

This is the agenda before the humanities.

⁵⁰ At the moment, the state in Nigeria lacks and/or does not enjoy the complement of the three components that make a state. They are idea, institutions and physical base. Nigeria has never had a governing idea; the institutions replete in Nigeria are not governed by idea; the physical base or territory does not function on the basis of idea and institutions. Thus Nigeria does not enjoy empirical sovereignty or sovereignty base on the will of its peoples. Nigeria enjoys juridical sovereignty or recognition by people or state outside its borders. The state called Nigeria exists not because of the will of its people. The state exists because it is recognised by the prevailing international state system. For the concept of state as idea, institutions and physical base, read chapter 2 "national security and the nature of the state", Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991

Inevitable Interactions: Fostering Peace in the Context of Culture and Religion⁵¹

Akintayo OLAYINKA

Abstract

The inevitability of interactions among the Yorùbá as a community of people regardless of their religious differences is the focus of this paper. Here, the author presents how the Yorùbá have displayed substantial evidence of freedom of religion and understanding of their neighbours to manage conflict and sustain their peace. One of the ways in which religion has been useful to maintain good relationships among the Yorùbá is its focus on tolerance, patience, and other virtues that heads of families and community leaders teach their members. Their social interactions at home and within their community are inevitable, and these helped to keep the Yorùbá in harmony and to settle conflicts and disputes more often than would have thought of in other communities.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Christianity, Islam, Marriage, Yoruba.

Introduction

Many works have been written on conflict theories,⁵² attempting to address the unhealthy situations in human societies to bring about peace and normality. Despite such ventures being credible and worth pursuing, the author pays attention to seeking to understand relatively peaceful societies as being established by scholars like Bonta, Fry, and Melko et al⁵³ and how such communities retain their peacefulness. Some refer to this as the use of peace lens or described as peaceful societies (PS) in anthropology. This type of study is necessary because when harmonious relationships are not kept, the peaceful communities might begin to erode

⁵¹ This paper is a part of the author's research findings and contains some of chapter seven of the dissertation with a few amendments to suit this journal article requirement

⁵² A. E. Barsky, *Conflict Resolution for the Helping Professions: Theory, Skills, and Exercises*. Second edition. ed.: New York: Oxford University Press, 2014; Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3, 1969.

⁵³ B. D. Bonta, "Conflict Resolution among Peaceful Societies: The Culture of Peacefulness." *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4, 1996; D. P. Fry, *Beyond War: The Human Potential for Peace*. Oxford; New York: Oxford, 2007; M. Melko, "The Qualities of Peaceful Societies." *Peace Research* 4, no. 1, 1972; M. Melko, John K. Hord, and Richard D. Weigel. "Peaceful Societies Revisited." *Peace Research* 15, no. 3, 1983.

into violence. The paper focuses the southwest Nigerian Yorùbá with attention on their religion(s) and cultural interests. So, what laudable features do the Yorùbá religious community possess to encourage peacefulness in their societies?

Methodology and Findings

This paper is a part of chapter seven of the author's primary research. It focuses how the Yorùbá de-escalate tension to keep their peace. The study employed thick description method with a short electronic survey (ES), three focus group meetings (FGD1, FGD2, FGD3) and interviews (FI) to generate the data. The data were processed with NVivo pro 12 to generate nodes and subsequent themes among which is: the inevitability of interactions that foster peace among the Yorùbá.

Religion is a major theme mentioned in the data generated from this study as a source of support for the Yorùbá in times of provocation, and useful for de-escalating conflict and sustaining the peace in their community. Among other themes that emerged are their culture and social interactions within their communities.

(a) Religion as an Inevitable Point of Interaction among the Yorùbá

Religion as presented in this study is further sub-classified into several units shown in the mind maps figures below as derived from the nodes generated from the NVivo pro 12 used in the data analysis. Some of the interconnected sub-themes that influence religions and how it is played out are: a personal belief, freedom of religion, religious consciousness, knowledge of religion, leaders' roles in conflict management, formal and informal dialogues, love and tolerance, interdependency, and dynamics in religious interaction or interpretation.

Figure 1 *mind map* that originated from a simple survey (ES) shows the relevant sub-themes connected with the display of positive religious values among the Yorùbá summarised as harmony and responsible religious leadership. The Figure 2 shows the themes connected with religions and value system from the focus group discussion (FGD1) among a community considered as peaceful in Yorùbáland, summarized as indivisible mutual multifaitth community life. Figure 3 shows the connections with religious values from the third focus group (FGD3) at a location that once had conflict, but had it resolved. Being the last focus group to be conducted, it brought in focus what had been learnt in connection with religious values, which are: religious: - tolerance,

consciousness, freedom, religious/cultural management of mixed marriages as well any emerging conflict. Figure 4 shows the religion and its related values obtained from the interview (FI) with the connected sub-themes like those in figure three but more emphasis on family. In addition to religion, social interactions, and culture feature in the data.

(b) Social life and Culture as Inevitable among the Yorùbá

Social connections play a significant role in the life of the Yorùbá. The themes generated from the data also show the interconnectivity between the Yorùbá culture and their social life along with several other sub-themes as presented in the ES – survey, FGD – focus group and the FI – interviews. Figure 5 shows the connection between the community, family, and the effort put in place to keep the peace in a social context. Figure 6 displays the community life and support in kind and cash towards the wellbeing of the society. Figure 7 shows the community support and conflict resolution effort obtained in the FI – interview, which resembles the ones obtained in FGD1 – focus group one. Figure 8 shows family, communication style and sense of community belonging from my FGD3 – focus group three.

These together form channels of inevitable interactions that strengthen the harmony among the Yorùbá. This paper, therefore, is an illustration of how religion(s) and social life embedded in the culture have helped to keep their communities in harmony.

Discussion of Findings

Dayo and Wole in FGD3 (2016) illustrate good community relations as helping to de-escalate conflict and retain their harmony. Wole mediated in a complain procedure and *peacemaking* during a grievance lodged by a Christian lady against the Muslims' early morning 'loud' call to prayer, and both parties were reconciled to retain their initial peaceful neighbourhood in Ibadan. A survey (ES) participant describes the idea of *sabr* (which means patience), the Islamic tradition taught among the [Yorùbá] Muslims to help in de-escalating conflict. The Christian counterparts in the ES refer to the Bible teaching that Christians should live in peace with others, with a reassurance of the promise of eternal life.⁵⁴ The religious teachings of the Yorùbá Christians and Muslims coupled with their Yorùbá culture contribute to the way they respond to

⁵⁴ Hebrews 12:14.

provocation and the resultant effect on how they sustain or return to a harmonious living after a crisis.

Considering the elders' roles, Ismaila, a Yorùbá Muslim participant in FGD3 underscores the uniqueness of the prevailing culture among the Yorùbá, which became obvious to him while working outside of the Yorùbáland in Kebbi northern state as an NYSC staff. NYSC stands for the National Youth Service Corps, the Nigeria Federal government programme for university graduates under the age of 30 to work in a State often, other than their own to learn more about the country and serve their people with less wages. Ismaila said that he observed less respect shown for elders in a local Kebbi community when compared to the practices of the Yorùbá, where elders can settle disputes. Since both Islam and Christianity are practised in the Kebbi northern state and the Yorùbá southwest Nigeria, the contents of both cultures and religious teachings of the two regions must provide an explanation for the harmony enjoyed by the Yorùbá community in religious sphere.

Going by secondary sources, Lateju⁵⁵ argues that the leadership style in northern Nigeria is different from that which is seen in the southwest and eastern Nigeria. The reason he gave was that while the north exclusively adopt the Arabic culture expressed in Islam, the Yorùbá has culture that provides an alternative feature that complement both Islam and Christianity which the Yorùbá admire. An example that comes to mind is, while Muslim north criminalize the conversion from Islam as apostacy warranting death, the Yorùbá southwest cherish life and often accuse occultist who kill humans for rituals as being outlaw and Yorùbá Muslims will not support the murder of an apostate. Blood or human's life is precious to the Yorùbá in general. However, there are examples of violence among the Yorùbá, especially during election political campaigns that many are ashamed of referencing. Yet, non-occult religious violence leading to death is rare.

In this study, while Saratu (FGD3), a secondary *ethnie*, considers the Yorùbá's peacefulness as timidity, Meriani (FGD3), another secondary *ethnie* calls it love in line with FGD1 responses. The Yorùbá's action and inaction requires thick description here. Meriani regards the Yorùbá as her brothers and sisters claiming that the Yorùbá do not often want to

⁵⁵ F. T. Lateju, "Religious Conflict and Peace Building Initiatives in a Multi-Religious Nigeria." In Christian-Muslim Relations in West Africa, edited by Fola T Lateju, Nathan Samwini and Deji Ayegboyin. Ibadan: West African Association of Theological Institutions WAATI, 2012

offend people. She suggests: ‘The Yorùbá have good values and respect and we like to keep ourselves and our names out of trouble’. Meriani includes herself as a Yorùbá, using a possessive plural pronoun ‘ourselves’. She added that the Yorùbá have certain values, such as the desire to maintain a good name and wanting to distance themselves from trouble in an ideal situation. This is like the thoughtfulness Wole mentions in FGD3. It is, therefore, necessary to closely examine how the Yorùbá maintain a harmonious community. As it appears, the interaction among the Yorùbá of different religions, Christians and Muslims especially are inevitable. The Yorùbá indigenous religion contribute to this harmony being the host by providing a base for the culture they all share.

(a) Culturally Based Ethics and its Influence on Religions’ Interactions

The motivation for the Yorùbá’s religious interaction is their belief in and consciousness of Heaven, or life after death, which has a strong ethical dimension for Yorùbá Christians, Muslims, and the indigenous Yorùbá religion worshippers. The cultural connection with their religious beliefs encourages them to interact at a social level based on convictions relating to their worship, the idea of the divine, funerals, the new-born, and weddings cumulating in the social progress (*áárěmisé*) periodically celebrated in their community. *Áárěmisé* is a saying that encourages people to actively participate in a social function with the understanding that such will be reciprocated in due course. They use ethical common ground such as love, prayer, scriptural teaching, fasting, heterosexual marriage, modesty, and honesty to strengthen this relationship and interaction. They sometimes challenge one another by asking an erring person: ‘does your religion allow you to do that?’ Such ethical question brings shame on the erring individual even while among non-members of his/her religion.

Considering secondary sources, Parrinder noted the harmony and commitment to sustain such among the Yorùbá community at large:

One has heard it asked whether a Muslim may act as sponsor at a Christian baptism? Among the Yorùbá it is not uncommon to find Christian, Muslim and Animist in the same family [...] Many Christians teach in Muslim schools, and innumerable Muslims children attend Christian schools [...] ⁵⁶

⁵⁶ E. Parrinder, "Islam and West African Indigenous Religion." Numen 6, no. 2, p. 1959, p. 134

This interaction and willingness to render help is not uncommon among the Yorùbá. Although the details of each religious practice may pose difficulties for the others' beliefs, they have learnt and keep learning to respect one another's choices in different contexts and sometimes embark on dialogue for a better understanding of their different beliefs and practices.

To illustrate the interaction amongst the Yorùbá, Lateef, in an interview (FI) commented about Muslim men wearing hats at their worship centres (Mosques) while Christian men do not in their churches. It is a common understanding that Christians patronize Muslim abattoirs and buy their produce. About handling strained relationships, some Christians politely decline the meals offered during the *Eid Al-Adha* feast, while others do not mind eating at the feast as evidenced in FGD1 and FGD3. This offers some clues to their level of deep interaction, understanding, freedom, and tolerance. Deficient understanding, in contrast, could be one of the causes of the violence experienced by troubled multireligious communities. According to Lateef:

Yorùbá people often try to avoid conflict so that there would be tranquillity in the society [...] If you study the geopolitical zones of this country, there is a low rate of conflict in Yorùbáland compared with other regions of Nigeria'.

On the human potential to cause violence, Lateef observes the violence seen in northern Nigeria:

When you see violent people, it is important to see beyond the religion to that person's personality ... The Yorùbá are very slow to react to anyone who offends them, whereas, in other cultures, once they are offended, immediately attack without thinking of the consequences. If a person is a Muslim, they will say it is his religion, whereas such reactions are due to cultural upbringing.

Lateef's argument for a 'peace culture' among the Yorùbá is substantiated in FGD1 and FGD3 in two different towns in this study. As the author has lived in northeast Nigeria, he ascertains the presence of peace-loving people among the northern local communities, especially when politics is not involved. His wife, Remi, narrated an experience at the Monday Market in Maiduguri (2003 – 2006). This is an international

market with people from Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon coming to Nigeria to trade. Remi was holding two bags in her two hands and her baby on her back. This is an African way of keeping the baby warm and secured to the mother's back while on the move. Remi accidentally brushed past a man with one of her bags while walking along the market's narrow paths. She stopped to apologise, but the gentleman looked at her, smiling and asked her to keep going and not to worry, as she was 'doing more than enough.' A man with an 'unfriendly culture' would demand an apology before the woman could even speak, but this gentleman, an indigene of northeast Nigeria Maiduguri showed understanding and empathy. This is one example of peace-loving northern individuals that constitute the backbone of the supposed northern 'peace culture'. Yet, one can also ascertain that the upbringing, the content of the promoted culture as well as religion have corresponding influence on a person's behaviour. Nonetheless, Lateef's claim about the north not being peaceful because of their culture cannot be held absolutely.

What determines a community's peacefulness is whether peaceful contents of a culture or religion is being taught and how much effort is placed on its propagation to become an acceptable norm in such a society. The contents of a culture and religions as being taught in turn frames how loving and caring the people will be. By comparison, in Senegal, the Sufi Muslims 95% and the Christians 5% speak many languages, belong to different religions yet live harmoniously.⁵⁷ Peace or violence, thus, has to do with what has the upper hand in a community at a given time: a culture of peace, tolerance and empathy or aggression and intolerance. In addition, an interpretation of a religion based on the promoted contents geared towards love, or hatred geared towards violence and the level of support given by their promoted culture and leadership are relevant to a society's peacefulness. If Lateef was right that the Yorùbá culture helps to facilitate harmony as suggested by some scholars like Lateju, it implies that the people and their leadership support peacefulness to make it work in favour of their community at that time and space as they teach it regularly to keep the custom. If they relax the keeping of the tradition of teaching and mentoring, the people will obviously follow other traditions or unhelpful behaviour to produce a culture of violence.

⁵⁷ Senegal-UW-Collaboration, "'Senegal: Model for Interfaith Peace', 2009

The roles of religious and cultural teachings in the making of the individuals' behaviour, the community, and corresponding responses to disputes and conflicts cannot be over-emphasized. Culture and upbringing must have contributed to the Yorùbá people's application of their religious teachings to the existing social context, making them responsible neighbours. The level of tolerance expressed within the Yorùbá culture and the people's religious maturity underpin how the Yorùbá manage their disputes and crises to maintain harmony in various contexts.

The cultures are not always constant, as new settlers will either lose their own cultures ('detrribalization', as the host becomes dominant) or mix with the host to form a hybrid of cultures ('retribalization'), as suggested by Wiberg⁵⁸ and reinforced in this research by Ifa in the focus group three (FGD3). Ifa [or Ifá] claims that the Yorùbá Christian and Muslim population have supported one another over the centuries. Ifá suggests the Yorùbá Muslims have early morning prayer around 5.00 am, and the further calls to prayer in the afternoon, which have possibly motivated some Christians to pray more often, while the Christians' night (vigil) prayer has also inspired the Muslims to hold night prayers. The Christians emulating Muslims for a regular prayer may be particular to the area where Ifá lives in Ilorin, as many churches in Nigeria have early morning prayers with the Christian daily devotional⁵⁹ at homes and churches. Yet, one cannot rule out the possible mutual social implication or benefit of seeing one another going for prayer. In addition, Ifá suggests some Christian girls cover their heads when going to church, as their Muslim female counterparts (with the hijab) do because the Christian women see this as acceptable both in their Yorùbá culture and according to some interpretations of their scripture (1 Corinthians 11:1-16). This leads to mutual interactions and understanding between the Yorùbá Christians and Muslims. Sharing and borrowing from their respective religious cultures, according to Ifá, enhances peace, making the Yorùbá culture-positive and advantageous for community harmony, without necessarily being syncretistic.

Understanding the culture and values of a people thus plays a significant role in the maintenance of harmony and good relationships with

⁵⁸ H Wiberg, "JPR 1964-1980 – What Have We Learnt About Peace?". *Journal of Peace Research*, 18, 1981.

⁵⁹ There are the locally published *Seek Daily*, the *Daily Bible Reading*, and other foreign publications like *Our Daily Bread* which many Christians use for their daily devotions.

outsiders. In the Yorùbá context, Christians and Muslims adapt the ethics of their religions to their host Yorùbá culture and are thus able to get along. They both participate in joint programmes that allow participants to pray in their own individual ways like the parents' and teachers' association in schools and at community meetings. They seek to avoid syncretism and endorse freedom as much as their religious dogmas permit. The level of permissiveness among the Yorùbá Muslims is discussed by the author under *Kòyídà* in another article titled '*Religious Hermeneutics as a Means of De-escalating Conflict and Sustaining the Peace*'.

Three Yorùbá pastors among the interviewees – Akan, Ayo, and Diran (2016) – present their views regarding peaceful relations among the Yorùbá people. Akan (FI) lived in northern Nigeria for many years before returning to southwest to train as pastor sees the Yorùbá as accommodating. He observes that the Yorùbá often think and weigh consequences of what they want to do before acting unless they are under the influence of peers, alcohol, or have an ulterior motive. This comment is in line with Lateef's assessment of the Yorùbá's temperament in time of conflict, Omobo [or Ọmóbò] (FI) and Wole's concept of *alàròjinlẹ*, (deep thought).

Ayo, a secondary *ethnie* with a Ghanaian mother and Yorùbá (Nigerian) father, has been fully integrated into the Yorùbá community. He trained as a Baptist minister and is currently a pastor at a Yorùbá-speaking church. Ayo is pleased that he was accepted into the Yorùbá community and not discriminated against for his mixed blood. He considers the Yorùbá to be welcoming and loving. This is in line with Ade and Odu's (FI) assessments of the Yorùbá communal life and generosity towards visitors or settlers. This idea of generosity is reinforced by Ìyabò's assessment of the non-biological family concept of *Ẹbí* among the Yorùbá during the interview (FI).

Similarly, Diran pastored a church in northeast Nigeria for over six years and then relocated to Kwara State in the southwest. Diran, who has lived in Yorùbáland throughout, except while on a pastorate in northeast suggests that the Yorùbá are accommodating and generous, always ready to provide space for others. They are not easily provoked to indiscriminate violence. This mirrors Lateef's thoughts and Wole's view of *alàròjinlẹ*.

Diran and Akan have non-Christians in their extended family and relate well to one another. Ayo, Akan, and Diran all suggest that outside influences and unacceptable behaviour have begun to creep in through violent non-indigenous people like the *Bororo* Fulani herdsmen, and unethical internet activities such as movies featuring pornography, gun violence, and robbery. Diran suggests such non-ethnic behaviours could be controlled at the local family level to ameliorate the situation.

Wole (FGD3) emphasizes the religious consciousness and Yorùbá cultural moral ideals/values as being strongly associated with life after death and eternal judgement, a doctrine the three religions have in common – Islam, Christianity, and indigenous Yorùbá religion. He further suggests that the indigenous oath-taking is potent and often kills people mysteriously, thereby instilling fear and providing easy access to fair justice. Olupona⁶⁰ supports this belief. This is not far from the idea of karma in the south and southeast Asia tradition,⁶¹ but believed to work faster among the indigenous Yorùbá religion's practitioners. FGD2 also alludes to this idea, while a Christian interviewee (in Sèpètèrì) attests to some violent Muslims dying mysteriously while a sympathetic Muslim cleric was spared through God's personal intervention to defend innocent people during a conflict in their town. The interview with the Muslim cleric mentioned in this narrative reveals similar understanding. Ade (or Adé) mentions something similar concerning some Yorùbá Sunni Muslims cautioning their youth against the violent activities of some youth they considered to have 'the Shi'ite' tendencies who had antagonised the local Muslim leaders. It is not clear if those youth were Shi'ites or nicknamed as such by the peace-loving Yorùbá Muslim parents. There are no intentions to relegate the Shi'ites or any religious group in this study, but only presents the views of some Muslim parents. According to Adé, the violent youth leader later fell to his own death in the public view of others while on the stage to address his audience.

Wole states that the Yorùbá endeavour to avoid conflict as much as possible. As a result, sincere and devoted Yorùbá Christians, and Muslims, who have God's judgement as a common ground in their culture and consciousness live and interact well with their neighbours. Wole, nonetheless, notes some exceptions, where some Yorùbá leaders

⁶⁰ J. K. Olupona, "The Study of Yoruba Religious Tradition in Historical Perspective." *Numen* 40, no. 3, 1993.

⁶¹ C. F. Keyes, & Daniel, E. V. (Eds.). (1983). *Karma: An Anthropological Inquiry*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

lost sight of these virtues while in political office. Odu also mentions the role of contemporary politicians in causing moral decadence and abuses of power in the Nigerian state.

In the discussion of how the Yorùbá handle disputes or conflicts, Alhaja (2016) (FI) at the Òsálágbèdè compound interview emphasizes *sùúrù* [patience]. This is like R3 (ES), using the Arabic term *sabr*, [as mentioned above]. In his publication, Abiodun mentions characters like *sùúrù* (patience), and *ìwàpẹ̀lẹ́* (gentle character),⁶² as relevant terminologies often used among the Yorùbá to retain harmony. A lack of *sùúrù* can lead to conflict. *Sùúrù* in the Yorùbá culture is a virtue taught by both the Yorùbá Christians and Muslims. A close interaction among people of different religions but with some shared values help in building harmony.

(b) Social life and Freedom of Religion

Like the discussion on culture, Wole (FGD3), Lódún (FI), a retired Muslim teacher and Lateef (FI) mention the freedom of religion employed by the Yorùbá as a significant contribution to the harmony enjoyed by the people. A portrayal of freedom can be visible in the day-to-day social interaction across religious lines. Ope (FGD3), a Christian who has Muslim friends ate with them at the end of each day's fasting, even though she did not observe the Muslim fasting. Ope had a Muslim elder in her maternal family home and there had been no occasion of violence among them as a family.

Freedom of religion is identified as a strong contribution to peaceful relations, allowing the Yorùbá to interact for their mutual benefit. The Yorùbá are believed to have the freedom to select and practise their own religions. According to Wole, each person can practise their religion and religion should not be enforced on anyone. Freedom to accept or decline invitation is the principal factor for Wole.⁶³

That notwithstanding, there have been strained relationships because of conversion to other religions, where the convert considers it as freedom, but the family calls it worrying. A major conflict among them can have serious consequences for their family unit and community, hence they

⁶² R. Abiodun, "African Aesthetics." Journal of Aesthetic Education 35, no. 4 (2001): p. 22

⁶³ The author observed the scenario of Muslims happily attending social functions among the Christians such as funerals and weddings within the church premises, while Christians reciprocate the gesture in context.

often try to avoid inter-religious conflicts. Similarly, the relationship of the Yorùbá community in their traditional setting and a conversion between two denominations of Christianity are relevant to this discourse. Of paramount importance are the evangelicals' conversion activities, the Muslims' response to apostasy and the Yorùbá people's vigilance not to allow 'imported foreign religions' (Christianity and Islam) to cause disunity among them to lead to violence. Clearly, these have not resulted in honour killings,⁶⁴ or executions among the Yorùbá in contrast to what is seen in some other parts of the world. However, the Sèpètèrí conflict suggest that conflicts can start in a small way and escalate. Conflict could originate from conversion to cause stress within the family. While some Yorùbá may not completely object to conversion to other religions, some find it difficult to cope with and resort to grudges. Nevertheless, most converts see this as religious freedom: being able to choose the religion they prefer. It requires wisdom to handle such situations to please the parties directly involved – the happy converts and the worried relations.

Conversion is a part of the freedom of religion exercised among the Yorùbá, especially when done without coercion and among those who follow their own minds, despite the initial shock to the family, close friends, or the community. Dispute and conflict management skills at family and community levels might be required in such situations. Similarly, family unity is observed in the idea described as *gbomọ́ fún miwò* or *fúni lómọ wò* – the practice of giving youngsters to newly married couples, uncles, or other relations to bring up to adulthood. This has led to youngsters sometimes converting to the religion of the host family, which Christians have mostly benefited from over the years, as seen in Kunle's narration (FGD2). Muslims help their Christian relations as reported in FGD1. Most Yorùbá parents do not prolong their objections to conversion if they sense such children would grow up to be educated and keep a moral tradition (like the *Omọ́lúàbí*) of their culture. This could be why Kunle's father (FGD2) eventually agreed to his conversion to Christianity, although the brother was not pleased with the situation for some time after the conversion.

Considering secondary sources, Singh discusses the ineffectiveness of Christian witness to Muslims while using polemics, being the reason for

⁶⁴ See P. Judge, "Love as Rebellion and Shame: Honour Killings in the Punjabi Literary Imagination." Economic and Political Weekly 47, no. 44, 2012.

their search for new approaches in mission especially in the West.⁶⁵ In contrast, the study among the Yorùbá, according to Nolte, Ogen and Jones confirm the peacefulness observed among the Ede town's three prominent religions (Islam, Christianity and the Indigenous Yorùbá religions).⁶⁶ For the Yorùbá outside of the formal church and mosque worship, their social interaction is expected to be first cordial and second, inevitable. This interaction, when it leads to conversion, will not be volatile on the condition that the new convert will not turn aggressive by being unsympathetic to their family or loved ones. The distinctiveness of the Yorùbá community's peacefulness might be a less use of polemics. These concur with the PS' avoidance of competition, arguments and ostracizing any member that brings their society into disrepute. Common positive values and caring social relations, therefore, contribute immensely to a society's peacefulness.

(c) Mixed Marriages and social contexts

According to Singh, Goli, and Sekher: 'Mixed marriage is the term typically applied to a marital union of two individuals from a different race or religion.'⁶⁷ These scholars extend the definition to cover couples of different social, economic, and castes. Mixed marriage is a complex union,⁶⁸ most especially among couples across ethnicity or nationalities,⁶⁹ possibly raising bilingual children.

Imamura's research on marriages across international traditions of residents of southwest Nigeria with women (21 in all) from the UK, USA, Africa/West Indies, and Western Europe underscores love as the primary basis of the unions.⁷⁰ However, the research found out that the husbands' society in Nigeria reacted more on the differences in their

⁶⁵ D. E. Singh, "Christian Relations with Muslims: Review of Selected Issues and Approaches." *Religion* 185, 2005.

⁶⁶ Insa Nolte and Olukoya Ogen, "Beyond Religious Tolerance Muslims, Christians and Traditionalists in a Yoruba Town." In *Beyond Religious Tolerance*, edited by Insa Nolte, Olukoya Ogen and Rebecca Jones. Muslim, Christian & Traditionalist Encounters in an African Town, 1-30: Boydell and Brewer, 2017.

⁶⁷ D. Singh, S. Goli, and T. V Sekher. "Exploring the Concept of Mixed Marriages in Indian and Selected States: First Time Evidence from Large Scale Survey." *Journal of comparative family studies* 44, no. 2, 2013, pp. 195, 196.

⁶⁸ See D. H. Bouma, "Religiously Mixed Marriages: Denominational Consequences in the Christian Reformed Church." *Marriage and Family Living* 25, no. 4 (1963): 428-32. "Mixed Marriages." *The Furrow* 21, no. 11, 1970.

⁶⁹ G. Neyrand, and M'Sili Marine. "Mixed Couples in Contemporary France. Marriage, Acquisition of French Nationality and Divorce." *Population: An English Selection* 10, no. 2, 1998.

⁷⁰ A. E. Imamura, "Ordinary Couples? Mate Selection in International Marriage in Nigeria." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 17, no. 1, 1986.

ethnicity whilst the couples paid attention to the similarities and their love stories. The family's role in supporting the couples to live in harmony can suffer some setbacks, but their union does not often end in divorce.⁷¹ Chae's work on marriage in sub-Sahara Africa found various forms of marriages whether formal or informal that could be stable, unstable, and/or memorable.⁷² Cottrell, in a literature review of 33 examples found that mixed marriages run the risk of psychological, cultural, and social marginalization. Some are multicultural, and the society's acceptance or tolerance played a major role, even among the Japanese and Koreans who put greater value on the purity of their race.⁷³ So, in line with Feyisetan & Bankole's suggestion, the involvement of the extended family in the life of married couples in Nigeria, from the introduction of the suitors to marriage and raising of the children cannot be over-emphasized.⁷⁴

Samples in this study are mixed marriages across religions (Islam and Christianity) within southwest Nigeria. There are many cases of mixed marriages among the Yorùbá. Some participants in this study testified that they showed respect to their spouses and tolerated each other as some practise different religions while some converted to the religion of the husbands.

There is a growing literature on mixed marriages that can be compared with the situation among the Yorùbá. Mixed-faith marriage is an example of mixed marriage, limited to marriage between two individuals of different religions or denominations. Although mixed-faith marriage [in a religious context] is viewed as between persons of different religions like Islam and Christianity, Bouma suggests it includes between denominations of the same religion as the Christian Reformed Church and any other Christian group.⁷⁵ Bouma argues that some people do not admire the mixing as they consider it could be potentially unhelpful to both the marriage and their denomination or religions. The idea of a religion gaining or losing its members is crucial, but evangelical Protestants in the

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² S. Chae, "Forgotten Marriages? Measuring the Reliability of Marriage Histories." *Demographic Research* 34 (2016).

⁷³ A. B. Cottrell, "Cross - National Marriages: A Review of the Literature." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 21, no. 2 (1990).

⁷⁴ B. J. Feyisetan, and Akinrinola Bankole. "Mate Selection and Fertility in Urban Nigeria." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 22, no. 3 (1991): 273-92.

⁷⁵ Bouma, *ibid.*, p. 428.

United States have gained more through such unions.⁷⁶ Baber added that a greater number of children in Catholic-Protestant mixed marriages were being raised as Protestants.⁷⁷ Other religions like Islam and Hinduism also recorded an increase in their membership as noted in the Religious Landscape Study.⁷⁸ However, another opinion shows that although Christians (Americans) marrying outside of their faith try to retain their beliefs, the idea of Christian authority regarding superior knowledge of the divine could be diminishing with time as mixed-faith marriage continues.⁷⁹ There are studies on the Catholics and Protestants coping in mixed marriages by often allowing the couple to make decision that suits them.⁸⁰

Considering African setting, the increase in the number of women in education and professional jobs has shown a potential to reduce the fertility rate in developing countries like Nigeria as the age at marriage or childbearing is being deferred.⁸¹ Yet, there are more complexities when it comes to mixed marriages as it still affects women, and the children born into such unions. Among the Yorùbá, the wife could be systematically forced to follow the husband's religion and the children go through some latent stress of determining which religion they should follow as they grew older. Children born outside of wedlock also suffer some psychological trauma,⁸² but contrary to Chinwuba's argument, such children would be free of stigmatization as they progressed to adulthood.

However, the Yorùbá place a high value on marriage and responsible elders seek harmony and endeavour to make marriage work, even in a mixed marriage situation. Otite writes on marriage in Nigeria with some attention to the Yorùbá. According to Otite, there are three types of marriages in Nigeria, namely: The indigenous (or traditional), Christian, and the state type of marriage. While Otite categorizes marriages among Muslims under the traditional marriage,⁸³ Efoghe adds that the Muslims'

⁷⁶ Smith et al., "America's Changing Religious Landscape: Christians Decline Sharply as Share of Population; Unaffiliated and Other Faiths Continue to Grow." Demographic Study, 2015.

⁷⁷ R. Baber, "A Study of 325 Mixed Marriages." American Sociological Review 2, no. 5, 1937.

⁷⁸ Smith et al. *ibid.*, p. 28

⁷⁹ R. Wuthnow, "Negotiating Religiously Mixed Marriages." In *America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity*, 259-85: Princeton University Press, 2005.

⁸⁰ n.a. "Mixed Marriages: Can the Problem Be Solved?" *Fortnight*, no. 108, 1975.

⁸¹ O. Wusu, "A Reassessment of the Effects of Female Education and Employment on Fertility in Nigeria." *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 10, 2012.

⁸² N. Chinwuba, "Interaction of Customs and Colonial Heritage: Their Impact on Marriage and Children in Nigeria." *Anthropos* 111, no. 1, 2016.

⁸³ O. Otite, "Marriage and Family Systems in Nigeria." *International Journal of Sociology of the Family* 21, no. 2, 1991, p. 40.

type of marriage is separate from the traditional marriage,⁸⁴ the Church, and Court or statutory marriage. Boparai⁸⁵ provides a comparison between the customary and statutory (Common) laws. Otite adds that Christian marriage does not permit divorce, while the state and traditional forms of marriage do. The three wedding types have similar features like the joining and celebration with differences in the length of the accompanying ceremonies, depending on how much each couple and family have to spend of display.

Nevertheless, the traditional marriage allows polygyny which Christians to not officially accept.⁸⁶ Islam also allows polygyny and divorce, but in a Christian marriage, the parties must seek the assistance of the state for a divorce to be carried out.⁸⁷ However, in the neighbouring Cameroon, theologians, missionaries, and women in the community have engaged in theological discourse by developing their biblical interpretation that accepts polygyny as an acceptable union in [the African] Christianity.⁸⁸ Howbeit, some African Christians have also begun indigenous Christian theology in response to their cultural and theological needs, which has led to the establishment of African independent churches.⁸⁹

Marriage problems often reach the stage of divorce in court, when one party insists on divorce and will not recognize the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) of the leaders or elders. Although people have the freedom to divorce their spouses, this is not encouraged or considered the norm. A divorcee living in her father's house is called *om̄o-osú*, an indication that there were unresolved marriage conflicts that ended in divorce among the Yorùbá.

Lawson and Gibson describe polygyny as the marriage between a man

⁸⁴ G. B. Efoghe, "Nature and Type of Marriage as Predictors of Aggressiveness among Married Men and Women in Ekpoma, Bendel State of Nigeria." *International Journal of Sociology of the Family* 20, no. 1, 1990.

⁸⁵ H. Boparai, "The Customary and Statutory Law of Marriage in Nigeria." *Rebels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht / The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law* 46, no. 3, 1982.

⁸⁶ Otite, p. 41.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 45

⁸⁸ C. Notermans, "True Christianity without Dialogue. Women and the Polygyny Debate in Cameroon." *Anthropos* 97, no. 2, 2002.

⁸⁹ A. S. Joseph, "Impact of Ori-Oke Prayer on Cultural Change in Nigeria an Assessment." In *Ori-Oke Spirituality and Social Change in Africa, Contemporary Perspectives*, 381-92: Langaa RPCIG, 2018. See also Fidelis Nkomazana, "Christianity in Africa in the 20th Century." In *Biblical Studies, Theology, Religion and Philosophy. An Introduction for African Universities*, 313-42: Zapf Chancery Publishers Africa Ltd., 2010

and more than one wife at the same time, which he noted as common among the rich, the cause of which is attributed to women out to compete for marriage partners. Rivalry is not uncommon among the wives in such relationships,⁹⁰ even among the Yorùbá. In his research on aggression among couples in Ekpoma current Edo State in Nigeria, Efoghe found:

[s]ubjects in polygynous marital unions were more aggressive than subjects in monogamous marital unions [also] ...subjects in religiously heterogamous marriages were more aggressive than subjects in religiously homogamous marital unions.⁹¹

This by no means suggests a home without conflict, but more pronounced in polygynous identified in the above research.

Polygyny is not opposed, but rather encouraged among some Yorùbá Muslims if the husband is able to meet the wives' needs and love equally. The Yorùbá Christians, on the contrary, discourage polygyny, although some do find themselves in such unions. The Yorùbá cherish marriage as they do not want to embark on conflict with in-laws and if this happens, it is often a bitter experience, as in the case of the Ifè-Modákéké and Offa and Erin-Ile conflicts raised by Ifá [FGD3] and Oṃoḃo [FI]. Hence, violent conflicts involving in-laws are rare. While FGD2 discusses this extensively, Ade (FI) adds that mixed marriage helps the family as relations seek to treat one another with respect.

The complexity of mixed marriages is evident as Yorùbá Muslims officially accept and promote polygyny, while the Yorùbá Christians officially uphold monogyny. Yet, the Yorùbá do not have unanimous teachings or same understanding about mixed marriages. Lateef⁹² argues for his male Muslim followers to marry Christian women, but teaches that the Muslim women should not marry Christian men:

Muslim ladies have no right to marry Christian men.
Christian ladies who marry Muslims must know

⁹⁰ D. Lawson, and Mhairi A Gibson. "Polygynous Marriage and Child Health in Sub-Saharan African: What Is the Evidence for Harm?". Demographic Research 39, Special Collection on 'Children and Family Dynamics in Sub-Saharan African.' Organized by Guest Editors Olivia Samuel and Veronique Hertrich, no. 6, 2018, pp. 181, 184.

⁹¹ Efoghe, p. 67.

⁹² Lateef in an elite Muslims leader and an Imam.

that their husbands would want the children to practise Islam.

Rodríguez-García has described this as exogamous in Islam, where Senegambian Muslim men marry within and from other religions whereas their women are not allowed to marry from outside of Islam. Women who violate that rule are considered having *kafir* as children (unbelieving children).⁹³ Rodríguez-García's suggestion among the Senegalese in the European context is in congruence with Lateef's argument in this research about [Yorùbá] Muslim men's freedom to marry non-Muslim women and in a polygynous relationship while Muslim women are not allowed to marry non-Muslims.

How children born into mixed marriages among the Yorùbá decide their religion is a point of concern, based on the criteria Lateef lays down, which is not strange to many Yorùbá mixed families. Additionally, the peace expressed in mixed marriages is based on the couple's preparedness and in connection to the extended family supporting the union if they live close by. The stress in mixed-faith marriage is inevitable, according to Ọmọbọ [a convert who married outside of the parents' religion], although not as dangerous as in the cultures where converts are subjected to the threat of death or imprisonment by the society. For mixed faith married couples, their children's choice of religion and interrelations with their in-laws and the larger extended family are all areas that could pose challenges. These problems are particular to the Yorùbá traditional homes and the wider community. Mixed faith marriages pose problems about the social and religious status of the children, and the extended family. Lateef contends that children born into mixed families with Muslim fathers would not be allowed to practise Christianity. He adds: 'Muslims can marry Christians as wives but cannot allow the Christian wife to take their children to church. It happens, but it is not common'. An important question here is how such couples settle their disputes. Lateef replies, 'It is an internal conflict, and they resolve it internally'. I consider this as unsafe, subject to abuse if the woman is not co-operating. So, Lateef's answer is not satisfactory as it gives no space for the freedom of religion that he and other contributors such as Wole and Maku have described earlier.

On the sustainability of harmony in a polygynous mixed marriage and

⁹³ D. Rodríguez-García, "Mixed Marriages and Transnational Families in the Intercultural Context: A Case Study of African-Spanish Couples in Catalonia, Spain." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32, no. 3, 2006, p. 412.

conversion to other religion in different parts of Yorùbáland, Lateef suggests:

Family brackets allow Yorùbá people to live in peace and to value the contributions the individuals bring to the larger family including a convert to another religion. So, there is an economic aspect to peaceful relations and tolerance within the Yorùbá larger extended family. Family brackets mean we value the development we bring to the family.

One of the reasons for the Yorùbá's quest for harmony is the benefit each relation brings to the family, regardless of their religion. It is no surprise that the idea of *omọ ìyá kanná* in both the biological and primordial senses is well-known among the Yorùbá, as families are required to cater for one another. Kings are thought to be responsible for the welfare of their people and accountable to their ancestors as a means of sustaining the peace. In general, marriages (mostly monogamous, and even polygyny) among the Yorùbá often receive the support of the extended family and community to endure and avoid conflict as much as possible. This is like Otite's suggestion regarding the support traditional family offers homes:

Such affection, strong as it may be, is often the product of cooperation in economic activities and child rearing in the traditional family process. Both the Christian and State type of marriage may be used to consolidate the traditional form although the rules of all three may be incompatible.⁹⁴

The interview at the Òsálágbèdẹ compound illustrates this extensively. Otite adds that marriage among the Yorùbá is not a perfect type as some spouses caught up in extramarital affairs, which could lead to divorce, often seek mediation and reconciliation if the innocent party [like the legal wife] does not want a divorce. Connections within the families, therefore, help to heal the concerned couple and reinforce support to keep the peace,⁹⁵ although it sometimes allows indulgences.

Giddens writes: '[a]ll cultures have some recognisable form of the family system, in which there are values and norms associated with the care of

⁹⁴ Otite, 1991, p. 41.

⁹⁵ See Ibid, p. 46.

children'.⁹⁶ The reciprocal care among the Yorùbá is noted as a uniting force for harmony and the continuity of their race. Giddens goes on:

The institution of marriage is a cultural universal, as are religious rituals and property rights. All cultures, also have some form of incest prohibition – the banning of sexual relations between close relatives, such as father and daughter, mother and son, or brother and sister.⁹⁷

When such values begin to diminish, it is expected that harmony will deplete. The current harmony among the Yorùbá is, therefore, due to the ability to sustain the common virtues, especially those promoted by their religions and culture. Maku (FD), a Muslim cleric argues: '[t]here is peace in Yorùbáland because we are *Ọmọ ìyá kanná* from Adam and Eve'.⁹⁸ He adds that cultural values, intra-tribal understanding, and communal and mixed marriages have been useful in keeping violent conflict at bay. These ideas are also emphasized in FGD2 and FGD1.

Mythological, theological, ancestral, and religious discourse about Adam and Eve are suggested as encouraging tolerance between the Christian and Muslim Yorùbá. In traditional Christian and Islamic theology, humans are said to originate from the same parents, cherished by the devoted Yorùbá religious people. This theological connection supports their disposition towards one another. This theological discourse goes beyond the Abrahamic faith already discussed by scholars.⁹⁹ The creation story especially the first human parents, is one of the crucial points for harmony among the Yorùbá Christians and Muslims. The understanding of the connecting stories like Adam and Eve in an inter-faith context is an area for peaceful engagement in the religious milieu. This attempt to answer the question, what features do religions and culture have in common to sustain the peace in this regard?

Maku argues that changing one's religion has an impact on the convert's family and on the community at large; yet he repeated patience (or *sabr*) as required to settle conflict. Maku further comments:

⁹⁶ A. Giddens, *Sociology*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1989, p. 39.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*.

⁹⁸ Translated by the researcher from Yorùbá into English.

⁹⁹ See "Abrahamic Religions: On the Uses and Abuses of History." Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013, 2012.

There is no freedom of religion for a Christian woman who marries a Muslim man. A Christian woman who is not ready to become a Muslim should not marry a Muslim. Muslim girls marrying Christian men should not come back to the mosque. She should stay with the Christian husband. A Christian girl marrying a Muslim has technically adopted Islam. So, think carefully before you marry a person of another faith, as the family of the other man or woman will be unhappy about the relationship at least for some time.

On marriage, Maku warned anyone going into a mixed marriage of the need to convert to the husband's religion, [even though it does not always work that way]. Ọmọbọ has Muslim parents but became a Christian and claimed to be happily married to Mic (FI), a Christian gentleman. This is in congruence with Maku's suggestion to go with the husband's religion but negates Lateef's recommendation that Muslim women should not marry Christian men. Another example is Labake [or Làbákẹ́] and her husband who the author met some years ago (1988). Làbákẹ́, Wasiu's mother was from a Cherubim and Seraphim Christian tradition but married Wasiu's father, a practising Muslim, and both practised Islam, in line with Lateef's suggestion. This shows the complexity of mixed marriages in the Yorùbá worldview, assumed to take place in the context of religious freedom. The immediate family often experience a shock because of such unions but later recover so that the emotional (psychological) conflict does not deteriorate into physical violence (or murder).

Comparing Maku's and Lateef's positions on mixed marriage, there are differences in their understanding and the teachings from the Islamic tradition. For Lateef, Muslim men are free and encouraged to marry Christian women, whose children must practise Islam – or at least half of their children should; while Muslim women are not (officially) allowed to marry outside of the Islamic faith like the Senegambians in Rodríguez-García's study. Lọdún (FI), a Muslim retired teacher, does not condone conversion from any religion, although he is married to a Christian background lady. For Maku, all women are warned to think well before making a choice in marriage. They must be ready to practise the religion of the man they marry and allow their children to do the same. The suggestions appeal for harmony by giving warnings of what the future spouses could expect of such marriages.

Singh and others have noted that mixed marriage is more pronounced among women with a higher education and socio-economic development but low in the poor local communities in India.¹⁰⁰ Bandyopadhyay & Green also suggest marriage for convenience, social-economic reasons, culture [or value], and similarity in education level,¹⁰¹ as bases for mixed marriage in the European context among the immigrants and the host community. Rodríguez-García rates social class and citizenship as the relevant factors often considered in a mixed marriage in the West rather than the culture.¹⁰² In contrast, Murphy suggests the importance placed on marriage within the same religion in the United States but not as strong as it was in the past among their older couples.¹⁰³ However, scholars vary in their opinions about the relationships between couples with the same religions compared with those in mixed-faith marriages. Some specific research in the US shows:

That members of certain religious groups [like Protestants in the US] are more likely than others [the Hindus, Mormon and Muslims] to be with someone of their faith, whether they are married or living together in a romantic relationship.¹⁰⁴

One may ask, does the reason behind mixed marriage have anything to do with the people's economic or financial gains, or the community's cherished values (maybe values within the culture or religions)? Smith and others suggest an increase in intermarriage in the United States, especially religious people with a 'religiously unaffiliated population'.¹⁰⁵ This connecting point between the Christians [Americans] and the unaffiliated spouses could be explored further to unveil if such relationships have any relevance to a commonly held values.

Among the Yorùbá, women advancing in age sometimes experience pressure from family and friends to possibly accept marriage proposals that may end in polygyny (that is being the second wife) or in a mixed marriage. Mixed marriages across cultures and nationalities are common

¹⁰⁰ Singh et al., p. 204.

¹⁰¹ Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay and Elliott Green. "Explaining Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Religious Marriage in Sub-Saharan Africa." CGR Working Paper 90, London, Centre for Globalisation Research School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, 2018, p. 29.

¹⁰² Rodríguez-García, p. 427.

¹⁰³ Caryle Murphy, "Interfaith Marriage Is Common in U.S., Particularly among the Recently Wed.", 2015.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Smith et al., 2015, p. 5

in the southern part of Africa as their connection with Europeans and Asians over the centuries has provided the chances.¹⁰⁶ There are also mixed marriages across ethnic groups and religions in West Africa. Bandyopadhyay suggests:

[There are] ... strong evidence that measures of modernization such as literacy/education, urbanization, wealth, non-polygamous marriages, later age at marriage and non-agricultural employment are correlated with inter-ethnic marriage, which helps to explain why inter-ethnic marriage rates have been steadily increasing in Africa since the 1980s.¹⁰⁷

Considering Singh et al.'s research in India, education, economic potential, and value systems have correlations with mixed marriages, meaning that the wealthy and educated are likely to be open to marrying a person of their choice often with similar values to make the marriage work.

In as much as a social class is considered in mixed marriage in Africa, the family and community values embedded in their culture and religions are emphasized among the Yorùbá. Could education and socio-economic bases be the reasons for the harmony in Lódún's mixed marriage, but he would not recommend mixed marriage for others? Each situation seems peculiar and must be handled carefully. In a very traditional place like India for instance, Singh and others suggest there was a drive to promote mixed marriage to increase the 'socio-economic progress [...mixed marriages...] as a critical indicator of socioeconomic integration in society.'¹⁰⁸ However, there are still reports of honour-killings when victims violate the family or community's regulations against mixed marriage despite India's over fifty years' legalizing inter-caste marriages.¹⁰⁹ Maku in my interview stated:

Christians and Muslims should not treat each other as enemies. Christians and Muslims both take a strong interest in the family relationship and oppose violence. *Ajobi wa ko ni baje o* [may our family relationship not grow sour or stale]. 'Your religion is yours and mine is mine.' Insults should be avoided in

¹⁰⁶ Bandyopadhyay & Green, p. 5

¹⁰⁷ Bandyopadhyay, p. 29

¹⁰⁸ Singh et al. p. 205.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 194

the contents of sermons/*waasi*. In Shaki, a Muslim was banned by other Muslims from preaching because he preached provocative sermons and the Muslim communities threatened to hand him over to the police if he violated the ban.

This reflects the desire of an elderly Muslim leader to keep the peace among his people and could suggest what an average Muslim would interpret as ‘Islam is peace’, a kind of thick concept, giving warnings and not seeking to force Islam on others. Lateef’s suggestion for Muslims to marry Christian women and to keep the children in such mixed marriages within Islam appears more aggressive than Maku’s teaching, both found in the ‘peaceful’ Yorùbáland.

Adé suggests that mixed marriages help family relationships and that the Yorùbá leaders discourage any attempt to use religious differences to cause conflicts. Anike makes a similar comment in FGD1c, with a reference to Sọun the King and his advocacy for harmony among Christian and Muslim residents of Ògbómòṣọ.

Ọmọbọ, a woman from Muslim parents, narrates her own experience. She was brought up in a Muslim family but converted to Christianity and married Mic at a Customary Court in Nigeria. Ọmọbọ was a practising Christian when she married Mic and she has continued to be so over the past 30 years. From a Muslim family of four children, one of her siblings became a Christian, while the other two have remained Muslims. Ọmọbọ’s parents had disputes with her over her choice of a Christian husband and her parents were upset at the time of her wedding, suffering the stress that Maku notes often follows conversion. Ọmọbọ’s parents eventually attended the wedding, having changed their mind. The Yorùbá parents’ view was that it would be unfair to reject their daughter because of her choice of husband and to later attend the weddings of her siblings. This also shows the complexity of the culture of tolerance and love and their freedom of religion. Since the wedding, there appears to have been no conflict between Ọmọbọ and her parents, even when it became clear that Ọmọbọ and Mic (the husband) would not be celebrating the Islamic festival (the sacrificial mandate in Islam) with the family. Mic and Ọmọbọ, however, care for her Muslim parents and siblings in some other ways. According to Ọmọbọ, ‘whatever may happen, we would not go into physical, economic or other forms of violence with one another’. This quote

mirrors the FGD1 Christian participants saying, ‘You cannot continually be fighting [quarrelling] with your cousins’. Similarly, Ọmọbọ suggests that the Yorùbá think deeply and the reason that if they lose anything during any violent conflict, there may not be a way of repairing such damages easily, talk less of a loss of life. This is in line with the use of the term ‘*aláròjinlẹ*’ by Wole to describe this idea, claiming that they would not destroy property because of religion. They, nevertheless, do destroy property because of political conflict, which is beyond the scope of this study.

Raising the children born within mixed marriages requires patience, tolerance and understanding and there is no one way of doing this, even in the view of religious leaders. Muslim children are permitted to live with their Christian cousins and vice versa if certain ethical standards are maintained and there is a promise of looking after their parents as they grow older. This author gathered that education and social status is helpful in maintaining harmony in homes, as with Lódún and his wife, Mic and Ọmọbọ, and as illustrated in the European context. However, Wasiu’s parents did not receive literacy education and belong to a low social class yet claimed to live harmoniously. What other areas of life would have been significant in keeping Wasiu’s parents in harmony in a mixed marriage context? Higher education and social status alone may not necessarily be the only factors behind harmony in mixed marriages as they were lacking in Wasiu’s harmonious mixed marriage.

(d) Co-operation for Conflict Management

Some scholars have identified the quest for power, politics, and money as the root causes of conflicts in Nigeria in the last few decades.¹¹⁰ Odumosu and Omale,¹¹¹ on the other hand, suggest the potential of the local indigenous organizations to settle religious and political disputes in Nigeria. Some Christians and Muslims have met for social purposes

¹¹⁰ S. B. Abdulkarim, "Religion, Peace and National Development: A Look at Interreligious Conflicts in Nigeria." *African Studies/ Dirasat Ifriqiyya* (n.d.); Samuel K. and Afeosemime U. Adogame. *Religion, Conflict, and Democracy in Modern Africa: The Role of Civil Society in Political Engagement*. Eugene, Or.: Pickwick Publications, 2012; J. Harnischfeger, "Sharia and Control over Territory: Conflicts between ‘Settlers’ and ‘Indigenes’ in Nigeria." *African Affairs* 103, no. 412 (2004): 431-52; A. Musa, and Neil Ferguson. "The Role of Political, Socio-Economic Factors and the Media in Nigeria's Inter-Religious Conflict." *Thesis (Ph.D.)*, University of Liverpool, 2011.

¹¹¹ O. Odumosu, "The Role of Indigenous Organizations in Conflict Management in Urban Nigeria." In *Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria*, edited by Ernest E. Uwazie, and Isaac O. Albert and Godfrey N. Uzoigwe. Maryland, USA: Lexington Books, 1999. D. J. Omale, "Restorative Justice as an Alternative Dispute Resolution Model: Opinions of Victims of Crime, and Criminal Justice Professionals in Nigeria." *PhD Unpublished*, De Montfort University, Leicester Bedford, 2009.

under religious banners set up by Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), such as PROCMURA.¹¹² Frederiks also mentions the roles of 'social collective enlightenment' in uniting Christians and Muslims.¹¹³ This, he argues, involves peace action, protests injustice and campaigns for awareness on health-related issues, as championed by NGOs or other sectors. Sholagbade suggests that some NGOs support the health-related campaign.¹¹⁴ Social work has also helped with what Akinade calls the 'dialogue of life',¹¹⁵ which has profited the Yorùbá a great deal. Frederiks writes on the current trends in Christian-Muslim relations and argues that a lack of knowledge of the other religion, the use of 'inflammatory words' and the implementation of *Sha'riah* in northern Nigeria have been responsible for the conflict in some parts of the country. This implies that the ability to manage such problems where it surfaces is beneficial for peaceful coexistence in communities.

This research has shown that the Yorùbá's knowledge of the religions practised among its people, their use of language in their sermons and their avoidance of inflammatory words are useful tools for peace maintenance. Other useful means for the avoidance of conflict and maintenance of peace among the Yorùbá are the messages conveyed in the music and media and positive social functions. These suggest that the lack of one or some of these tools could be responsible for the tension in other multi-religious communities that are prone to religious conflicts.

Through the study of religious texts, scholars have responded to the lack of knowledge of their neighbours' religions, organizing dialogue conferences such as those led by PROCMURA. Similarly, Albert¹¹⁶ blames the poor use of media and communication management by some leaders for many conflicts, while Adé, in this study, suggests that the positive engagement of the Yorùbá people through radio broadcasting is profitable for peace. The use of the media by the Yorùbá has helped to strengthen their harmony, as suggested by Adé and Blessing (FI). Adé

¹¹² PROCMURA-Nigeria, n.d.; PROCMURA-Witness, n.d.

¹¹³ M. Frederiks, "Let Us Understand Our Differences: Current Trends in Christian-Muslim Relations." Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 27 (2010), p. 270.

¹¹⁴ A. Sholagbade, "Eebi Islam and Christianity: A Contribution of "Faith-Based Groups" to Socio-Political and Economic Development of Epe, South-West Nigeria." (n.d.): 1-26. http://c.yacdn.com/sites/www.istr.org/resource/resmgr/africaregional2014wp/abiola_sholagbade.pdf.

¹¹⁵ A. E. Akinade, "The Precarious Agenda: Christian-Muslims Relations in Contemporary Nigeria." Professor Jane Smiths' "Essentials of Christian-Muslim Relations" Summer Class, 2002, p. 1

¹¹⁶ I. O. Albert, "The Role of Communication in the Escalation of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts." In Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria, edited by Ernest E. Uwazie, and Isaac O. Albert and Godfrey N. Uzozigwe. Maryland, USA: Lexington Books, 1999.

uses his skills as a senior staff member of a radio station to promote harmony among the Yorùbá and Blessing reinforces this idea citing appropriate use of music. Osaghae and Suberu elaborate on the approaches for managing conflicts:

Decentralisation of conflicts [...] thereby reducing the capacity of such conflicts to polarise or destabilise the entire *federation*', i.e. creation of multiple states instead of 'regional centres'.¹¹⁷

So, other approaches include the division of each major ethnic group, the empowerment of each community and the establishment of a judiciary at the grassroots level for all aggrieved people to obtain justice when wronged.¹¹⁸ The decentralization of conflict helps to reduce the agitators' capacity, which benefits political leaders who want to subdue and control their people, but it does not provide a lasting solution to the problems that led to the agitation and protests. This is seen in Nigeria three regions divided into twelve and later, 36 states. The division of the major ethnic group for easy development in Nigeria has inflicted more agony and prevented the people from airing their views to obtaining the support they needed. Yet, they did not receive the infrastructural development the division into states was meant for. Each community therefore take the bull by the horn to look after their family and one another through the local joint projects like building of schools, roads, and vigilante groups for their security.

(e) Control vis a vis Management of Aggression

A search into secondary sources can probe, how the peaceful societies (PS) manage their conflicts. Briggs argues that although the Inuit society show aggressiveness, sometimes committing murder, they often seek peace, meaning that they reject violence as a norm but project their cherished peaceful values among their communities through joking, reassurance, and ostracizing culprits.¹¹⁹ Inuit are nomadic and during dispute use songs to diffuse tension.¹²⁰ According to Bonta:

¹¹⁷ E. Osaghae and Rotimi T. Suberu. "A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria." Centre for Research on Inequality, Humanity Security and Ethnicity Crise Working Paper no. 6 (2005), p. 20.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 2005.

¹¹⁹ J. Briggs, "'Why Don't You Kill Your Baby Brother?'" The Dynamics of Peace in Canadian Inuit Camps", Chap. 6 In The Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence, edited by Leslie E. Sponsel and Thomas Gregor, 155-81. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1994.

¹²⁰ J. L. Briggs, "Conflict Management in a Modern Inuit Community." Chap. 5 In Hunters and Gatherers in the Modern World: Conflict, Resistance, and Self-Determination, edited by Megan Bieselee and Robert K. Hitchcock Peter P. Schweitzer, 110 - 24. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000

While the strategies for managing conflicts employed by these peoples are comparable to those used in many other small-scale societies, their world-views of peacefulness and the structures they use to reinforce those world-views do distinguish them from other [violent] societies.¹²¹

Briggs further provides approaches to averting conflict as the communities express their wishes indirectly not to offend others, and the use of jokes to present their requests or needs, (Briggs, 2000). Bieseles and Howell add that the Ju/'hoansi prevent conflicts as they discourage wealth accumulation while strengthening their social bonding of their young.¹²² Bonta compares the western approach to conflict with that obtainable among the PS:

Several *common* notions about conflict and conflict resolution that are asserted by Western scholars can be questioned considering the success of these societies in peacefully resolving conflicts: namely, that violent conflict is inevitable in all societies; that punishment and armed force prevent internal and external violence; that political structures are necessary to prevent conflicts; and that conflict should be viewed as positive and necessary. The contrary evidence is that over half of the peaceful societies have no recorded violence; they rarely punish other adults (except for threat of ostracism); they handle conflicts with outside societies in the same peaceful ways that they approach internal conflict; they do not look to outside governments when they have internal disputes; and they have a highly negative view of conflict.¹²³

The distinctions identified above serve as qualities that strengthen the peacefulness of many of the identified (PS) societies in anthropology. Some Yorùbá also use jokes to present their requests although this appears to be fading away but the idea of not wanting to offend while presenting a request is still in use and is described as shyness (*ojú ntù*) among the Yorùbá. A secondary *ethnie* calls this timidity [as mentioned

¹²¹ Bonta, 1996, p. 403.

¹²² M. Bieseles, and Nancy Howell. "'The Old People Give You Life': Aging Among !Kung Hunters-Gatherers." (2015). <<http://cas.uab.edu/peacefulsocieties/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2015/11/BieHow81.pdf>>.

¹²³ Bonta, 1996, p. 403

in '*Religious Hermeneutics as a Means of De-escalating Conflict and Sustaining the Peace*'], but it works to diffuse tension. So, violence is avoidable where people are willing. Peace also is obtainable where it is promoted, and the parties involved are ready for it. The key features to peacefulness, therefore, are the people's worldview, values, and the available structure to both manage conflict and sustain their serenity.

In response to some psychologist's linear cause and effects relationships of frustration causing anger that leads to aggression, Robarchek argues that frustration among the Semai causes fear rather than anger, and they have learnt to cope with situations that have the potential to lead to frustrations with the use of their charms, exorcism, and their good interpersonal relationships.¹²⁴ Semai's dispute resolution technique (*a bcaraá*) requires the parties involved and some members of the community to be present. Though the case in question is well known to them, their goal is to seek peace but not to determine and punish the guilty. In doing this, they try to avoid emotions, and present their case and viewpoints. The headman will conclude the meeting with a lecture on peacefulness, acceptable behaviour, unity, and the benefit of interdependence on one another.¹²⁵ Bonta, with reference to Robarchek, argues that whereas the modern communities like Pennsylvania (in the USA) seek an attorney to defend them, to win their cases and get a reward, familiarity among the Semai is helpful in conflict resolution as the Semai look up to one another for help and the betterment of their children rather than aggravating a conflict situation for a personal reward.¹²⁶ Many of the Yorùbá communities are known to want to keep friendships hence they often seek ways to end conflicts or prevent them from happening. This is seen in a secondary *ethnie* describing the Yorùbá as timid while another participant calls it the Yorùbá *omolúàbí* attribute of peacefulness in FGD3. Recently, at the peak of some herdsmen's aggravation of violence in southwest Nigeria, Chief Sunday Igboho [Adeyemo],¹²⁷ a Yorùbá activist would rather instruct an identified accomplice-kidnapper to leave the Yorùbáland rather than being violent at

¹²⁴ C. A. Robarchek "Frustration, Aggression, and the Nonviolent Semai" *American Ethnologist* 4 (1977): 762-79.

¹²⁵ C. A. Robarchek, "'A Community of Interests: Semai Conflict Resolution'." Chap. 5 In *Cultural Variation in Conflict Resolution: Alternatives to Violence*, edited by Douglas P. Fry and Kaj Bjorkqvist, 51-58. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997; ———. "Conflict, Emotion, and Abreaction: Resolution of Conflict among the Semai Senoi." *Ethos* 7 (1979): 104-23; ———. "'The Image of Nonviolence: World View of the Semai-Senoi'." *Federation Museums Journal* 25 (1981): 103-17.

¹²⁶ Bonta, 1996.

¹²⁷ BBC, 'Sunday Igboho: the Nigeria Car Salesman going after Cattle Herders', British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 February 2021, accessed 25/02/2021.

him, except for self defence. Similarly, most PS seem to have solidified their worldview on peace whilst violence sometimes emerges mostly out of their slackness in safeguarding it.

Summary

The Yorùbá interact at various levels, in homes, communities, within their towns and villages for cultural, religious, and social purposes. While they found the bases of their interactions inevitable as it surrounds essential events of their day-to-day activities geared towards meeting their needs, it also involves their friends and families in social and cultural contexts. Christian and Muslim Yorùbá come together under inevitable interactions for social/cultural and cooperative ventures, which often result in a better understanding for conflict management and developmental joint ventures. With all the available methods and theories of managing conflict and bringing about peace, conflict is still a regular experience in some quarters. A study of the sustainability of peace, when proactively using certain features of culture and religions that foster unity can support human's understanding of peace.

Figures

Figure 1. ES mind map - positive religious values




Figure 2. FGD1 mind map on the knowledge of religions and value system.




Figure 3. NVivo FGD3 mind map religious values.




Figure 4. FI Interview mind map for religion and values




Figure 5. ES mind map – Yorùbá cultural (and social life)




Figure 6. *FGD1 mind map on social and cultural interaction*




Figure 7. *FI Interview mind map for culture and social interactions*





Figure 8. NVivo FGD3 mind map culture



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Boundaries and Conflicts in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Ife-Modakeke and Kaduna Crises

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Abstract

Nigerian independent history is replete with incidences of boundary-based crises and violence, a growing trend which negates the aspirations of the nationalist fathers on the eve of and at independence. Up till the present time, Nigeria has experienced and has had to deal with one boundary or communal conflict or the other at different times and on different levels, with attendant insecurity, killings, displacement of populations, wanton destruction and the attendant economic stagnancy. It has indeed become a nagging issue confronting the Nigerian project. Relying on extant secondary sources, the study establishes, on the constructivist framework, the link between sub national tussles and Nigerian slow developmental strides by comparatively discussing communal violence in the north and south of Nigeria, using case studies of the Ife-Modakeke and the Kaduna crises. It concludes that prevalent religious, sub-national and ethnic consciousness, further exacerbated by politicking elites, has been the bane of a national spirit and has hampered the development of a united Nigeria since independence.

Keywords: identity, ethnic, communal, boundaries, conflict, Nigeria

Introduction

Nigeria is one of the African countries that have witnessed violent communal conflicts with attendant insecurity, destruction of thousands of lives yearly, and impediment to development.¹²⁸ Communal conflict refers to dispute or tussle between two communities or groups that share different communal identities, based on a common history, culture, religion or

¹²⁸ Sundberg, Ralph, Eck, Kristine and Kreutz, Joakim. "Fighting Without the State: Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.49, 2012, pp503-516.

values, whereby each party seeks to gain control over some resource.¹²⁹ Multi-ethnic or multi-racial societies have historically witnessed critical problems, crises and violence as a result of ethnic cleavages.¹³⁰ While this is true, it is peculiar to poor or developing countries where conflicting groups usually identify with an ethnic or religious culture, thereby creating boundaries often considered not *permeable* and along which violence is fomented.

It is however truer that cultural conflicts are tractable with some amount of dedication. For one, while culture is mostly inherited, it is also constantly evolving, (re)constructed and willfully chosen.¹³¹ If culture could evolve or be willingly chosen as such, then the immutability of culture and its boundaries is substantially played down. Still, identity is a deep-seated, sometimes subconscious perception and understanding of oneself.

Successive administrations in Nigeria have battled with one identity-related crisis or the other. The current democratic era has particularly witnessed insurgencies, herders-farmers clashes, and clashes between contiguous communities among others. By all indications, the so-touted unity in diversity exists only on paper and there seems to be no lofty heights in view. As the country celebrates its 60 years of independence, a critical reflection on the state of the union is timely and very apt.

This paper thus selects the North-South Kaduna and Modakeke-Ife crises to represent and discuss two major forms of boundaries- land and religion in the north and south respectively. This north-south division has been one of the most historically used sectionalizing term in understanding Nigeria and this study borrows from that.

Obviously, the word ‘boundary’ does not always connote the physical or any material essence but constitutes such things as demarcates ‘us’ from ‘others’. Hence, the use of the term to connote any form of division or distinction. The two cases are selected not only for their disruptive and destructive impact but to underscore the ubiquity of ethnic tensions and violence in Nigeria.

¹²⁹ Brosche, Johan. Causes of Communal Conflicts- Government Bias, Elites, and Conditions for Cooperation. *Development Dissertation Brief* 2015:06 Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys (EBA) Stockholm

¹³⁰ Osadola, Oluwaseun S. “Socio-economic implications of the Ife-Modakeke Conflicts on Inter Group Relations in Nigeria- A Re-assessment.” *GSJ*, vol. 7, issue 4, 2019 ISSN 2320-9186]

¹³¹ Stewart, Frances. “Root causes of violent conflict in developing countries.” NCBI, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/> accessed on June 28, 2020.

Ife-Modakeke Conflict

The Ife-Modakeke crisis is allegedly the oldest intra-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. The conflict, which persisted for over a century, was between the Ife who regard themselves as landlords and the Modakeke regarded as their tenants. This is in spite of their identical socio-political institutions and practices.¹³² Traced back to the internecine era, the first recorded crisis occurred between 1835 and 1849. Between then and 2000, there were seven major wars which resulted in deaths of several thousands.¹³³ The relationship between proprietor and tenant was initially quite cordial, the latter having proved themselves in times of war such as the Owu War of 1825 as dependable allies. Apparently, the misgivings between the two communities were initially not on resources or land but highlighted how identity at the subgroup level could be stronger than at the level of the nation and state. The escalation of the dispute between these neighbours became glaring during the internecine war when each allied, with one of the warring parties during the Ekitiparapo war. Later conflicts in the 20th century extended to land and the payment of royalties (*isakole*) on cocoa harvest and was *resolved* by the federal military government Land Use Decree of 1978 which revoked the *isakole* system. Full-blown local government politics was introduced in the early 1980s and 1996 when on both occasions, the Modakeke's expectation of a separate local government was thwarted leading to prolonged violent protests.¹³⁴

The narrative of their contiguous existence is nothing spectacular. The Ife Kingdom is recognized as the cradle of the Yoruba race. Oyo refugees fleeing the Fulani religious onslaught of the 19th century settled the neighbouring Modakeke. It is important to note that this narrative is not contentious, as it is an accepted one on both sides. However, the Modakekes sought an end to any antecedent of subordination, refused to be regarded as part of Ife but a separate entity, and wanted an end to the payment of royal tributes to Ife. The crisis between these two communities remains the longest in Yoruba history. While the crisis has simmered since 2000, the scars are still very visible in the relics of war in the communities. The conflict was typically over identity, land, tributes and of course politics. In a research carried out to find the cause of the conflict, the participants interviewed from both communities typically blamed the other

¹³² Lamidi, Kazeem O. "Communal conflict, communal peacemaking and governmental intervention in Nigeria: Lessons from the Ife-Modakeke crisis" *AJCR*, 2019/2]

¹³³ Asiyabola, R. A. "Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: A Case of Ife-Modakeke in Historical Perspective." *Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Creative Arts*, 5(1), 2010, pp.61-78

¹³⁴ Lamidi Kazeem O. 2019 op cit.

side as the aggressors or oppressors and so justified their fight. An Ife participant claimed the Modakeke had continued to give the Ife people nothing but trouble since Ife welcomed them, waging war on them since the time of his grandparents because they did not want to *rightfully* pay tributes over the land they so freely sojourn, till and enjoy. Conversely, a Modakeke participant admitted the Ife as host but bemoaned the continual tendency of Ife to see the Modakekes as aliens, exploiting them since the time of his grandparents, and so justifying the long war as one to end tyranny and subjugation in any form.¹³⁵

Undoubtedly, the identity tussle was about control, power and access to resources (initially just land). The situation however worsened considerably with the introduction of politics from the 1970s, further widening the gulf between the two communities. The NPN (National Party of Nigeria) activities during this period fed the cravings of the Modakeke as they were promised a local government of their own with the implication of political independence, separate identity and full ownership of and access to land. The Modakeke sought a separate local government in 1957, and in 1979, but were denied by the defunct Western Region politics. Escalation after the 1970s was the handiwork of insincere mediators who politicized an already volatile situation and ignited a tinderbox with resultant socio-economic consequences¹³⁶ just as the case in Kaduna.

North-South Kaduna Crises

Kaduna is a geographically and historically centralized melting pot. Seat of the defunct Northern region and also defunct North Central State, Kaduna City remains vibrant as the capital of the current Kaduna State. Of the twenty-three local government areas, Kaduna North, Kaduna South, Zaria, and Sabon Gari have been the most densely populated.¹³⁷

Straddling three local governments, one major cause of tension in Kaduna is the distinction between indigenes and non-indigenes of the state. The non-indigenes claim discrimination in provision and gaining access to basic facilities and services.¹³⁸ The northern part of Kaduna is

¹³⁵ Folami, O. M., & Olaiya, T. A. "Gender, storytelling and peace construction in a divided society: A case study of the Ife/Modakeke conflict." *Cogent Social Sciences*, 2(1), 1159015, 2016

¹³⁶ Osadola Oluwaseun S. 2019 op cit.

¹³⁷ A 2006 Report of a study to prioritise intervention areas in Kaduna <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/192871513807353133/ARK-report.pdf> accessed 25 June 2020]

¹³⁸ Thomas, Matthew, "MCI Social Sector Working Paper Series" No3 Education Needs Assessment for Kaduna City, Nigeria. 2009

predominantly of Hausa and Fulani origin and probably all Muslim. The south however has about thirty significantly Christian ethnic groups, the largest being the Gbari.¹³⁹ These Christian ethnic groups constitute perhaps close to a half of the population of Kaduna.¹⁴⁰

In 1987, Kaduna witnessed violent conflicts, emanating from a dispute among students of different ethnicities and religions in Kafanchan, and in 1992, between the Muslim Hausa and Christian Kataf over relocation of a market. Communal conflicts have assumed even more religious than ethnic fervour especially since 2000 over the extension of Sharia law to the Kaduna State criminal code. While the sharia jurisprudence did not apply to non-Muslims, the latter claim they were affected in many other areas and protested the politics behind it which allegedly sought to perpetuate the dominance of the Muslim north.¹⁴¹

Kaduna's large Christian population makes it more prone to religious conflicts more than other states in the north because it is an intersection of no less than thirty two ethnic groups in Nigeria. The fateful and fatal clash in 2000 began when the Kaduna arm of the Christian Association of Nigeria staged a protest against the introduction of sharia. This was met with a counter protest by Muslim youths and the ensuing confrontation degenerated to violence with massive but uncertain death toll. The ripples of that landmark violent conflict resonated far beyond Kaduna as there were proxy wars in other northern states of the country where there are Christian populations.

In 2002 when another violence erupted, people were still embittered by the lackluster response of the government to prosecute the perpetrators of such wanton destruction of lives and properties. The belief was that government tried to avoid the possibility of escalation if they charged those people responsible. An unfortunate development was the acute segregation in town with areas described 100 percent Christian or 100 percent Muslim as people moved to sections dominated by people of their own faith for safety.¹⁴² This stark segregation along ethno-religious lines is clearly expressed by unofficial names given to the northern and

¹³⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica. Kaduna. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kaduna-state-Nigeria> accessed 225 June 2020]

¹⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch, "The Miss World Riots Continued Impunity for Killings in Kaduna" vol. 15, No. 13(A), 2003 <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria0703/2.htm>

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

southern halves: Mecca and Jerusalem respectively.¹⁴³ With the implementation of Sharia in Kaduna, though a watered down version of it to appease the non-Muslim populations, there has been call for a Southern Kaduna state. The 2002 crisis also known as the Miss World Riots witnessed no less wanton killings and destruction on both sides. It began with a publication by ThisDay newspaper that allegedly extolled the beauty of the contestants and mentioned that even the Prophet would have gladly taken one of the pageants for a wife. On Thursday 21 November 2002, Muslim youths began a calculated violence, targeting Christians for kill and their homes for destruction and loot. The reprisal from Christian youths was not less violent and took place the following day on Friday 22 November.¹⁴⁴ Kaduna, the metropolitan capital of the north thus became too hot for sojourners and lost its reputation and prospect as a beloved jewel.

Kaduna State case seems to have defied all solutions as it has been the centre of conflicts for decades.¹⁴⁵ According to a report, Southern Kaduna was attacked about 41 times between 2009 and mid 2016 with severe loss of lives and properties.¹⁴⁶ Recent attacks in May 2020 by unknown AK47 wielding men on southern Kaduna villages, have been explained, based on precedence, by residents or survivors as more of attempts to intimidate peoples off their lands than random bandits seeking loot.¹⁴⁷ Often, the police undermines these news as fake news thus contradicting the claims and eye witness accounts of the concerned constituents.¹⁴⁸

Consistencies and peculiarities of the two conflicts

Having examined the two cases, one can establish certain similarities between the Ife-Modakeke crisis and the Kaduna crisis. A prominent

¹⁴³ Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann. "Violence in Southern Kaduna Threatens to Undermine Nigeria's Democratic Stability." Speech at Chatham House 15 February 2017. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/violence-southern-kaduna-threatens-undermine-nigeria-s-democratic-stability#>

¹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch. The "Miss World Riots", op cit.

¹⁴⁵ The Conversation. *Explainer: factors that foster conflict in Nigeria's Kaduna state* Feb 18, 2019. <https://theconversation.com/explainer-factors-that-foster-conflict-in-nigerias-kaduna-state-109899>

¹⁴⁶ Uroko, Favour C. "Re-addressing the Ethno-Religious conflicts in Southern Kaduna, Nigeria in the Light of Abraham –Lot Narrative (Gen 13:1-18)" <http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ujah.v19i2.2>

¹⁴⁷ BBC News Pidgin, 28 May, 2020 <https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-52837502>

¹⁴⁸ See the following dailies: <https://guardian.ng/news/kaduna-police-denies-fresh-attack-killings-in-southern-kaduna/>, <https://guardian.ng/news/rep-says-killings-in-southern-kaduna-turning-to-genocide/> and <http://saharareporters.com/2020/06/04/southern-kaduna-residents-plead-humanitarian-aid-killings-mass-displacement-continue> all published between May and June 2020]

feature of both crises is the division along the original inhabitants (sons of the soil) or land-lords and more recent settlers in the case of Modakeke-Ife and the minorities versus the majority in Kaduna. In Kaduna, the war also rages over livelihood, between the pastoralists and the agriculturalists. So, land and space remain the major cause of conflict in both cases at one point or the other.

Furthermore, peculiar to the Kaduna case is the significant lap or parallel between ethnic and religious boundaries. This makes it easy for conflicts to be defined along any such lines, further confusing and aggravating the situation.¹⁴⁹ The Modakeke-Ife crises never reported any friction along religious lines.

Another underlining feature is that the crises in both cases have been long drawn with wanton loss of lives and property, stifling peace and development over decades in the case of Kaduna and well over a century in the case of Ife- Modakeke. Aside the loss of lives, the diversion of communal and government attention and resources towards quelling the conflict could have been prevented and the energy channeled towards development.

Politics, politicking and politicians have exploited both crises in the past years. In both cases, one can quickly glean the evolution of a combination of control, power and access, from ethnic-religion in Kaduna and land in Osun to modern politics in both cases. As in the Modakeke-Ife case, there has obviously been a departure from the feud over *isakole* to local government politics. For the southern Kaduna case, it has ranged from religion to sheer ethnic majority dominance to presidential elections to battle over land and space between the nomadic herders and the farmers. Just as identities are formed and evolve over time because of exigencies, one can see how the conflicts transmuted over time as a result of external factors or adaptation. Both cases were long drawn but the last of clashes in both cases definitely had a totally different outlook from the beginning. The fact that the rationale for war changes over time goes a long way to explain that identities and values are always changing and especially that the struggle for power and influence is a major constant motivating factor among humans.

¹⁴⁹ Gebremichael, Mesfin et al (eds), *Nigeria Conflict Insight*. Institute for Peace and Security Studies Addis Ababa University 2018]

Literature on ethnic or communal conflicts in Nigeria have discovered a pattern that points to greed as well as distribution of power and wealth.¹⁵⁰ This of course is the power of political influence at different levels as unscrupulous politicians and elites have exploited the rift already on ground to their own benefit. They could not be bothered about the impact of such actions on the sanity, sanctity and humanity of the communities. A careful study of the cases reveal that there were some level of coordination, direction and in cases, premeditation in the attacks. This without fault eliminates spontaneity or mob action in those certain cases.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the argument of intractability of these conflicts because of the deep divides of the warring parties does not hold so much water. First, because some of these violent clashes could have been avoided if the embers of division were not thoughtfully stoked and second, because identities and boundaries and imagined, fluid and flexible.

Imagined identities and fluid boundaries

In line with constructivist thought, the primordialist view that ethnic violence is inevitable because of the rigid and inflexible characteristics of members of these ethnicities does not have a good standing. This implies that the fact that there are current hostilities does not translate to a primordial or eternal condition and that, contents and boundaries do change over time as earlier mentioned. While ethnic violence may actually have links with colonialism, the fact that colonialism is ubiquitous in Africa and Asia and violence is not plays down the vitality of that connection.¹⁵¹ Although this is a blanket explanation, relegating the consideration of the peculiarity of individual cases, the cases considered as well as others reveal how aspirations or *casus belli* changed over time. Following the 'elite theories of ethnic violence', a good number of continued and escalated violent intergroup relations in Africa and Nigeria specifically have been more of the result of politics and politicking rather than a conception of one group's identity and the *otherness* of the others.

While colonization is usually at the other end of the barrel for explaining violence in postcolonial situations, one may pause and

¹⁵⁰ Lamidi, Kazeem O. 2019. Op cit.

¹⁵¹ Fearon, J. D. and Latin D. D. "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity", *International Organisation* 54, 4, autumn 2000, pp.845-877

consider the fact that Yoruba nations had been at war among themselves before colonialism and this evidences the fact that intergroup clashes is not attributable solely to colonialism. The Yoruba case puts imperialism, power and economics at the wheels of such conflict. The Igbo and Indian caste systems where certain people within the communities are considered 'not part of us' are also pre-colonial.

Conversely, the link between colonialism and ethnicities could also be exploited to explain the transience of ethnic identities. It is true that many strong ethnic identities in Nigeria are a handiwork and artificial creation of colonialism just for administrative convenience. Many of these identities had no or very weak origins in precolonial Nigeria and where they existed, they did with very fluid boundaries. Even now, group identities get to the level of bearing arms only when it has economic and political considerations, a validation of the *greed hypothesis* and a default in the social contract.¹⁵²

In essence, boundaries are fluid because nations, of all sizes and ages, are imagined. The image of their communion only exists in the minds of the collective individuals. According to Gellner, '*Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.*' He also argues that all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are imagined.¹⁵³ In other words, nationalism masquerades under false pretences. Identity therefore is flexible, manipulative and forged by individuals, based on the consciousness or perception of what they are as against what others are, to gain recognition over others in a particular space.¹⁵⁴

To further drive home the point, the Yoruba has been categorized, in not so distant past, into one linguistic family since the 19th century even though there are many subgroups in this category with unintelligible dialects. The notion of a Yoruba nation is actually quite recent, less than two centuries old.¹⁵⁵ For example, while the Ife and the Modakeke belong to the Yoruba group, a different layer of subgroup identity further divided them so strongly. Chief Awolowo and Robert

¹⁵² Stewart, Frances. NCBI op cit.

¹⁵³ Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, 2006 p.6

¹⁵⁴ Asiyabola, R. A. 2010 op cit.

¹⁵⁵ Falola, Toyin and Genova, Ann. (eds) *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*, University of Rochester Press, New York, 2006 p3-4]

Smith effectively enunciated this flexibility or mirage of identity when they mused that the Yoruba claim spiritual union only by lip service but have waged war within themselves with much mutual and lingering hatred. Historically they never constituted a single polity and the name they bear, which originally addressed the Oyo, was only given wider applications by the Christian missionaries in the 19th century.¹⁵⁶

The above goes to explain that the notion of who we are, as against what others are has evolved many times over time. The *sanctitude* of an ethnic, religious and even racial entity is a farce and an understanding of this will better engender peace among contiguous societies or communes. Good governance that ensures equitable distribution of resources will also further peaceful cohabitation among communities.

Boundary violence and weak governance

The Land Use Act of 1978 that placed ownership of land in the hands of the government was enacted as an intended but failed solution to the long-drawn contests over land. Since then for instance, land disputes in the north-central zone have been very violent and bloody. Second to Boko Haram, land disputes constitute the greatest threat to security.

These conflicts and many more have escalated through politicization and the sheer ineptitude of government. The lap between ethnic and religious boundaries earlier mentioned poses a problem. For instance, Nigeria is constitutionally secular, yet the government dabbles into religious matters allowing a good number of states in northern Nigeria adopt the Sharia law. Muslims also fear the undue western influence from the Christian south, which threatens the sanctity of their Islamic communities.¹⁵⁷ Nigerian government has also involved itself in practices that have had counterproductive results. One major example of this is the involvement of the secular government in sponsoring pilgrimages.

Having established these, it is instructive to know that boundaries are fundamental to identities and therefore dear to communities. There is probably no country in the world that has no boundary issues, either ongoing or historical. Boundaries are so crucial to ethnic or religious identity as it distinguishes perceived entities. Beyond this, boundaries are important for issues such as taxation, census, and even access to certain

¹⁵⁶ Asiyanbola, R. A. 2010 op cit.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*

services in the public domain. If boundaries were not important or valuable, they would not have caused so much disputes and violence in history. As it is in the international arena, territory is important for the formation of national, cultural or religious identity. This is also the reason boundary disputes between two homogenous entities are difficult to settle because of the need for *recognition of their distinctiveness*. For this reason, government cannot afford to treat signs of tension with kid gloves. Allowing boundary tension to simmer is only a recipe for statewide unrest and general instability.¹⁵⁸

In 2016, the estimated record of death in herder-farmer conflicts was 2500. Between January and April 2018, about 400 people died. By 2018, over 175,000 people had been displaced within the country as a result.¹⁵⁹ Even before then, there had been several clashes between farmers and nomadic groups, which often got violent and bloody. This has become a common phenomenon simply because perpetrators have gone unpunished most of the time thus perpetuating a culture of violent impunity. The chain effect is that when no punishment is meted out to offenders, people would take laws into their hands in defence. While Benue, the food basket of the nation and a very central state, has been most affected, farmer-herder clash has spread to 17 or more states of the country. The centrality of Benue has geographic and religious implications- that is, a savannah favouring both agriculture and pastoralism and an intersection for the predominantly Muslim north and predominantly Christian south. These divides or junctions are oftentimes exploited as escalation usually has factors beyond the issues or resources contested. The state government initiative to ban grazing of cattle in Benue did not abate the clashes.¹⁶⁰

Benue state recorded over 480,000 displaced persons and between 2016 and 2018, Amnesty International reported 3,600 deaths from farmer-herder clashes in Nigeria. As the battle for land and water rages on, the proposed solution of cattle colonies also known as the Ruga Settlements have instead heated up the country with the government seen as making

¹⁵⁸ Tyabazayo, Phumlani. "The Nature of Internal Boundary Disputes: A Case Study of Matatiele Provincial Boundary Demarcation Dispute, Province of the Eastern Cape, South Africa!". *Beyond Intractability*. Ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, USA. n.d. <https://www.beyondintractability.org/library/internal-boundary-disputes>

¹⁵⁹ Muller-Jung, Friedrike and Oneko, Sella. "Nigeria's communal violence: It's about more than land". Deutsche Welle 26 April 2018. <http://www.dw.com/en/nigerias-communal-violence-its-about-more-than-land/a-43550443>

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

compensations for one party with further losses for the other (by the provision of land for the settlements). This perceived one-sided approach to the brouhaha by the government has not helped the situation as people stay aggrieved on both sides of the divides. With a population of about 200million and an annual increase of almost 5million a year, there is bound to be intersections of spaces.¹⁶¹ Changes to subnational boundaries have been an important aspect of violent communal conflicts in Nigeria. (Fjelde, 2009) There can therefore be no such thing as a pristine demarcation between one community and the other. Moreover, livestock economy is indispensable and integral to the well-being of all, north and south, as many people subsist on its long chain of production.¹⁶²

In Plateau, also a central state, June 2018 was probably the bloodiest episodes of the farmer-herder clashes. Probably 38,000 people have been chased from their homes in Plateau alone, not mentioning Nasarawa and Taraba states. While the conflict is truly age-long, it is evidently being exploited by opportunistic politicians seeking to sow *seeds of discord and disunity*. The President in reference urged Nigerians to *reject any simplistic portrayal ..of this conflict as either religious or ethnic-based*. Even the former defence minister, Chief Gen. Theophilus Danjuma stated that *the armed forces are not neutral...collude with the bandits* and asked everyone to *defend their territory*. Solutions to the problem are made difficult by a political atmosphere of distrust. In that atmosphere, no initiative is judged or perceived correctly. The onerous task Nigeria government faces is getting the conflicting parties to trust the umpire.¹⁶³

While Ife-Modakeke crisis may have simmered, grievances, unfulfilled promises and perceived suppression have continually shaped the identities of the Southern Kaduna peoples under successive administrations while governments at both state and federal levels have been accused of conspiracy, preferential treatment, or at best, tactical silence.¹⁶⁴

It is actually difficult to engage leaders across the divide in inclusive and representative dialogue because each side usually feels strongly about

¹⁶¹ Gansler, Katrin. "Nigeria: The Politicized herders and farmers conflict" 16 July 2019. <https://www.nigeria-the-politicized-herders-and-farmers-conflict/a-49598457>

¹⁶² *ibid*

¹⁶³ The Africa Report. "Nigeria. Clashes and Conflict." 9th Nov., 2018. <https://www.theafricareport.com/464/nigeria-clashes-and-conflict/>

¹⁶⁴ <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/violence-southern-kaduna-threatens-undermine-nigeria-s-democratic-stability#>

their grievances. Leaders from southern Kaduna's local government areas adopted the Kafanchan Peace Declaration of March 2016 facilitated by the Centre for Human Dialogue. Similar dialogue was adopted in resolving the perennial Ife-Modakeke crisis,¹⁶⁵ one that escalated the same way as others did.¹⁶⁶

Johan Brosche has argued that government's dilemma and bias (which may be caused by threats of insurgency, political opposition, or strategic economic interests) such as selective sanctions, plays a huge role in violent communal conflicts more often than not. He also challenged the simplistic understanding of the causes of communal conflicts as the results of scarcity of resources and ethnic hatred. Instead, the lethal combination of scarce resources and government bias makes for an incendiary situation.¹⁶⁷

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has attempted to discuss boundary issues in Nigeria and the conflicts they engender. It examined individually and comparatively cases of boundary violence in Kaduna and Osun states. A major observation is that warring parties exhibit a high consciousness of self, based on the concept or notion of the *other*, and this forms a strong indisputable force in navigating communal relationships. While many news reports, research documents, and texts claim that the escalation of conflicts are attributable to political manipulations, these inordinate elites only exploit a deep-seated notion of identity and exclusivity among the people. While the paper establishes that identity and boundaries are very crucial to communities with even benefits for governments and planning, it should be settled that there are several multi-ethnic societies in the world cohabiting with mutual ethnic boundaries and evolving with time. It is therefore recommended that warring parties are exposed to these realities to understudy how those communities have handled issues surrounding boundaries and identity. A good understanding of the flexibility of identity formation based on historical reconstruction would go a long way in orientating people about how they view themselves and others. This is to the effect that social integration becomes the focus of communal relations rather than

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

¹⁶⁶ Lamidi, Kazeem O. 2019 op cit.

¹⁶⁷ Brosche, Johan. "Causes of Communal Conflicts-Government Bias, Elites, and Conditions for Cooperation." Development Dissertation Brief 2015:06 Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys (EBA) Stockholm]

division. Moreover, this will bring the awareness of warring peoples to the de facto cause of violence by making them see the underlying economics and power play behind the conflicts.

Tackling poverty and environmental degradation, securing inclusive and transparent government, and enacting policies to reduce horizontal inequalities are also crucial steps in curbing conflicts in Nigeria. Where the government or elites gleefully reap from the imbalances, it becomes a more difficult task. From the above, it is evident that the complicity of government, more than anything else has been responsible for the escalation, proliferation and sustenance of boundary conflicts and violence in Nigeria with dastard consequences for the development of the country.

The National Youth Service Corps and the Challenges of Nation-building in Nigeria

Adeyemi BALOGUN

Abstract

Nigeria has implemented a wide range of integration policies and programmes to address the challenges of national unity and citizenship created by the diversity of the country from the period of colonial rule. While these policies and programmes achieved a few successes, the problem of national unity and citizenship have persisted in Nigeria. This paper explores how one of these integration programmes referred to as the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) work and why it is unable to resolve the problem of national unity in Nigeria. Based on existing literature and primary sources, the paper argues that even though the NYSC is useful for managing the country's diversity, it lacked the support from the government and the ruling elite to make it achieved the desired result.

Introduction

Like many countries in Africa, Nigeria was established from a multitude of ethnicities by the British colonialists. Before its foundation, the colonial administrators recognized the diverse ethnicities of its people; however, due to their concerns for social order and administrative convenience they introduced policies such as amalgamation and indirect rule that further widen the differences among the people. Thus, in the post-independence era Nigeria faced the problem of national unity. This reflected in a stiff competition for power and resources among the diverse ethnic groups, resulting in political instability that led to the collapse of the First Republic and a thirty-month civil. The primordial tendencies of Nigerians also promoted a tendency in which the ruling ethnic group often seconded the national interest to group interest, thereby increasing the prejudice and competition from other ethnic groups. As these challenges affected socio-economic growth and development of the country, the Nigerian government introduced a wide range of national integration policies and programmes to address them.

Experimenting with national integration is not peculiar to Nigeria. It has also been adopted in similar multi-ethnic societies such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Ghana, among others. Whatever promises it hold for addressing

the challenges caused by plurality, its objectives and significance have been very controversial. One of the early views on the concept of integration is found in the works of John Stuart Mill (1976, 294-5) who consider it as a process of assimilation of minority group by the majority group. This is based on the thinking that the minority group has a lot to benefit from the majority. But contrary to this assimilationist view, Connor (1972: 372-8) argued that increased contact among disparate groups will not dissolve their cultural differences but increase their antagonism. Given these controversies, the contemporary attempts at addressing the problems of plural societies is to manage them with certain mechanisms that come in form of policies and programmes such as divide and rule, balancing system, consociational democracy and displacement (Otite: 2009, 179-201 and Ojo: 2009, 23-27). Since the colonial era, Nigeria has experimented with a few of these mechanisms such as divide and rule system, federalism, state creation, power sharing, Federal Character Principle, Unity Schools and the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). But despite their relevance, the effects of these mechanisms in addressing fissiparous tendencies in the nation's socio-political system have been mixed. Generally speaking, the success of these mechanisms has been at the level of implementation while their overall effects on the sustenance of national unity and stability of the country remained indeterminable.

It is difficult to generalise on how these mechanisms work and their problems because they have different rationales and context in which they are designed to operate. Thus, this study only focuses on one of these mechanisms, the NYSC programme established for graduates of tertiary institutions in 1973. As this paper posits, the NYSC is useful in the management of Nigeria's plurality but it lacked adequate support from the government, the ruling elite and the members of the public to make it effective. In the next section, the paper discusses how Nigeria's plurality has been managed since the colonial era in order to understand why the NYSC was established. This will be followed by a history of the NYSC showing how it has been implemented and the challenges it faced.

The Management of Nigeria's Diversity since the colonial era

With more than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups, Nigeria is one of the most pluralized states in the world. A few of the ethnic groups in the country are the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Igbo, Yoruba, Ibibio, Efik, Tiv, Nupe, Ijaw, Urhobo, and the Jukun (Falola *et al*: 2007, 104 – 119; Otite 2000, 221-31; Okpoko: 1993, 133). Nigeria diversity has been deepened by the spread of Islam and Christianity which are not evenly spread in the different

geopolitical regions of the country. In the northern region, for instance, Muslims are the major religious group; the South-east is dominated by Christians while the South-west is populated by Muslims and Christians of almost the same number. Generally speaking, Nigeria's diversity has not resulted in a common consciousness as each ethnic group tends to promote their group (and religious) interest over others. In the colonial era, the British administrators tried to address this challenge with a policy meant to attenuate ethnic differences. It appears that the first attempt to reduce ethnic difference in Nigeria was the amalgamation in 1906 and 1914 (Ojo: 72-3). But the British administrators were aware of the problem of merging the people together. Lord Lugard, the architect of Nigeria's amalgamation was one of the officials interested in keeping the differences among the people. He advocated separate administrative systems and development programmes for the Northern and Southern Provinces. His successor, Hugh Clifford also dismissed the possibility that Nigeria could be welded together when he confirmed his awareness of the fact that many groups in Nigeria were in a very real sense nations and that it was the task of the colonial government to build and fortify these nations (Coleman: 1958, 194). However, for administrative and economic reasons, Lugard merged the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914, a process that led to the emergence of Nigeria as a unit (Olaniyan & Alao: 2003, 1-7 and Tamuno: 2004, 393-4).

Federalism has also been introduced to reduce ethnic differences in Nigeria (Ojo 2009, 35; Ogunjenite 1987). Formally embedded in the country's constitution in 1954, federalism is considered to be a system that facilitates the creation of unity in diversity. In simple terms, it is based on the principle that many states or nationalities or sub-units come together to form a government with a central body holding the major power in some affairs of the state such as defense and immigration. However, it is assumed that the federating states wield the real power but repose some of it to the central government to manage certain affairs on their behalf. This is why the federating states are assumed to have huge control in such areas as resource control, education and revenue generation, thus allowing them to be in a stronger position in their relationship with the central government. This form of government is assumed to help in the de-centralization of power in one political group such that the tendency by one group to oppress others is reduced (Watts 1998, 119-126; Ojo 2009, 44-7; Elaigwu 2007). Although a few principles of federalism exist to date, Nigeria operated a military system of government between 1966 and 1998 (excluding a civilian rule in 1979-1983) that affected the operation of federalism. In this period, power was centralised in one political unit while the federating units became weaker as

they lost many of their powers to the central government. This structure was left intact when the country returned to a democracy in 1999. Today, many Nigerians are campaigning for a return to the federal system in order to resolve the problems of national unity, insecurity and slow socio-economic development in the country.

Besides the political measures, Nigerian scholars and artists also tried to construct a unique Nigerian culture through their writings, arts and speeches, all in an effort to promote a strong unified state. Wole Soyinka, for instance, wrote *The Swamp Dwellers* to promote unity in Nigeria while his other work, *A Dance of the Forest* was written to commemorate the nation's independence in 1960 (Falola 2008, 163). Historians and sociologists were also emboldened to research into many Nigerian groups in order to reconstruct the earlier Euro-centric histories of the people of Nigeria. Historians were particularly sought by politicians in this period to help in promoting the unique African culture necessary in order to promote unity, assert the humanity of Africa and its civilizations (Adesina 2006, 25).

Despite these measures, Nigerians could not overcome their primordial sentiments and ethno-religious loyalties. One of the most obvious examples of this was the growth of cultural nationalism during the post/colonial period. In most of the urban centres, there were various cultural unions belonging to the Igbo, Ibibio, Yoruba, Hausa, among other ethnic groups which continued to foster ethnic consciousness of each group (*ibid.*, 340-52). The inability of the colonial government to forge a common consciousness among the people of Nigeria also affected the political elite who were supposed to galvanize the interests of their people towards a common national development. The main political figures including Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Sir Adeyemo Alakija and Sir Tafawa Balewa fanned the embers of ethnicity and religion to promote their personal and ethnic ambitions that saw them promoting ethnically conscious political parties that fought for independence in 1960.

The attitude of Nigerians and the political elite to other ethnic and religious groups ensured that the unity of the country was threatened on many grounds at independence. This reflected in the stiff competition and struggle for power among the political elites in the three major regions: the East, West and North. To address this competition, a parliamentary system of government was established to facilitate a power sharing arrangement among the major parties in the three regions. This led to the formation of a

coalition government between Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe National Congress of Nigerian Citizen (NCNC). Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Action Group (AG) became the opposition. The competition among the political ruling elite also shaped their actions towards national issues. For instance, at independence, many minority groups feared their domination by the major ethnic groups and thus clamoured for states of their own. The clamour was politicised for some time before the Mid-Western region was created by the government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, an action seen in many studies to weaken the opposition in the Western region.

In the mid-1960s, the competition among the ruling elite led to a series of clashes in many parts of Nigeria. In 1966, worried by the inability of the political elite to address the problem of national integration and the crises created by this problem, the military led by Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi took over the reins of government and implemented a unification decree that made Nigeria a unitary state. The decree revoked most of the powers of the federating units and centralised them in one body, the central government represented by the military head of state. The unification decree became another policy meant to address the problem of Nigeria's unity. However, Ironsi was only able to sustain this policy for about six months after he was killed in a counter-coup led largely by military men from Northern Nigeria. The counter-coupists, in a revengeful move, are believed to have ended Ironsi's government because they assumed that he supported the overthrow of Balewa's government, led by Igbo officers, that brought him to power.

Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (later Major General), the military head of state that succeeded Ironsi, implemented the creation of states as another policy to address the challenge of national unity. He created twelve states that put an end to the regional government structure and increased the chances of many minority groups in government. But this was not enough to assuage the problem of integration as the Eastern Region led by its military Governor Lt. Col Chukwuemeka Ojukwu decided to secede from Nigeria. This led to a thirty months civil war as the Gowon government tried to bring back the Eastern Region (called Biafra) to the union. After the war, Gowon and other military heads after him launched a wide range of integration policies and programmes to prevent another civil war. Besides the goal of national unity, these policies and programmes were aimed at promoting national development and inculcating values such as patriotism, honesty and diligence into Nigerians. A few of these policies and programmes include

power-sharing system, state creation, Federal Character principle, party system, the NYSC, and the Unity Schools (or federal government colleges) (see Suberu 2002 & 2007). In the next section, the paper focuses on one of these programmes, the NYSC.

National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)

Before the establishment of the NYSC, many Nigerians had called for a national service to engage youths in the task of nation-building, even in the first decade of independence. Among the prominent voices were those of Mr Tai Solarin, the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS) and Professor Timothy Uzodinma Nwala, who initiated the East Central State Volunteer Services Corps (ECSVSC). The ECSVSC was introduced shortly after the civil war to address the damages caused by the war in the Eastern region. A survey of calls for youth service in this period pointed to at least six ideas that youth service was expected to achieve. First, it was considered to be as part of duties of citizenship through which the youths would sacrifice their time and energy and provide cheap labour for the country's urgent social and economic needs (*Nigerian Tribune*: 1973, 9). Second, it was understood to facilitate attitudinal change in which discipline would be instilled in the youths, make them patriotic to the nation and create a sense of national consciousness in them (NYSC: 1983, 12; *Nigerian Tribune*, 9). Third, service was expected to help in addressing the problem of unemployment among the youths because it embeds skills acquisition (*Nigerian Tribune*, 9). Fourth, service was expected to help in raising military personnel who would (i) reduce or eliminate the monopoly of the use of arms by the armed forces, and (ii) serve as reserve to defend the country in case of aggression (Uwuche: 1971, 107-9; Agunbiade: 1993, 1-2). Fifth, service was believed to be a make up for a presumed inability of modern educational institutions to train the youth for good citizenship, leadership and self-reliance (Kalu: 1987, 18). Sixth, service was seen as an opportunity for a nation just recovering from crisis to maintain social cohesion, peace and stability through (i) the re-engineering of new citizens whose allegiance would be to the state, and (ii) the promotion of inter-ethnic relations (Ochi: 2011 and Obadare 2005, 15).

Many of these ideas were also shared by Gowon when he established the NYSC in 1973. Gowon was particularly convinced that the NYSC would not only train the youths of Nigeria to be discipline and patriotic but also be the set of 'new Nigerians' whose orientation differs from their predecessors birthed during colonial rule. This is why he affirmed government's commitment to provide the physical, mental and spiritual

environment in which the youths can grow up to be worthy citizens of the nation (*The Nigeria Police Magazine* 1973, 21). The youth service was also part of his vision that the Nigeria can be rebuilt anew to correct the error made by the colonial government. The thoughts of Gowon and other Nigerians are highlighted here to understand the aspirations of the proponents of youth service and compare them with the experiences of the NYSC programme in following years.

In terms of goal, the NYSC was mainly established “with a view to the proper encouragement and development of common ties among the youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity...” (NYSC Decree 1973: 1973, A505) To achieve this goal, the scheme was to instil tradition of industry into the youth, raise their moral tone, develop common ties among them, encourage them to seek employment at the end of service in their respective states of deployment, and enable them to acquire the spirit of self-reliance. Implicitly, the scheme also aimed to raise a leadership class who are patriotic, morally and physically disciplined and truly nationalistic. The programme was designed for graduates of tertiary institution based on the thinking is that when the members of this class go through the “triple liberating experience of higher education, national service and exposure to other cultures” (Enegwa and Umodem: 1993, 17-8) they would be able to act as change agent or social catalysts that would guarantee the much-needed unity among the diverse groups of Nigerians. In 1993, when the decree establishing the programme was reviewed, another goal was added to that of 1973 to cope with socio-economic challenges (notably poverty, unemployment, drug abuse and cultism) that affected the nation and the youths in that period. This additional goal sought to encourage the “development of the youths of Nigeria and Nigeria into a great and dynamic economy” (NYSC Decree, 1993).

To achieve the goals of national integration, common consciousness and economic development, the NYSC was structured in such a way as to deploy corps members to states different from their ethnic group. Works are also assigned to the corps members in a way that ensures the representation of diverse ethnic groups. In addition, there is an orientation course which is used to prepare the youths for their assignments, acquaint them with their environments, inculcate the national values in their mind and foster closer relations among them. The scheme also has a primary assignment phase where corps members are deployed to render service to the nation in various establishments of their state of deployment. Another phase in the scheme is the secondary assignment. Also referred to as the

Community Development Service (CDS), the secondary assignment is used to harness the skill and creativity of Corps members into projects that would contribute to the development of their host communities and the nation in general.

Both governmental and non-governmental agencies collaborate with the NYSC to address various socio-economic issues affecting the Nigerian state and the world at large. Some of these organizations include The British Council, World Health Organization (WHO), John Hopkins Hospital in the United States, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CNB), the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), among others. These agencies make use of corps members to address various issues that concerns them. For instance, the WHO engages corps members to create awareness on HIV/AIDs while the CBN seeks collaboration with the corps members to deal with unemployment and entrepreneurial development.

Over the years, the NYSC has made significant contribution to socio-economic development in Nigeria. Generally, this contribution is mostly felt in the education institutions. Most corps members served in these educational institutions, especially in primary and post primary schools across the nation where some of them were made heads of department and headmasters. Some corps member medical personnel who served in health institutions have also helped to promote government's health policies in such areas as the Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT), Expanded Programmes for Immunization (EPI) and malaria. In the agriculture, corps members have been used to promote programmes such as the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and Green Revolution. The impact of corps members have also been felt in rural development programmes such as the construction of school blocks, libraries, health centres as well as in the sensitization programmes on malaria, gender equality and climate change.

Through the annual supply of thousands of corps members, the NYSC also helped to solve the problem of shortage of labour in various establishments across the nation (*This Day*: 2009, 25). This has ensured the survival of many establishments that find it difficult to pay higher wages. In the same vein, the NYSC has helped to promote friendships and closer ties among youths of diverse ethnic backgrounds in Nigeria. Indeed, one of the most important observations by many corp Members is that the NYSC has made it possible for them to know about other people and places in the country which they might not have visited (Olabisi 2001). The scheme has further provided a platform for creativity and personal achievements for corps

members. There are cases of corps members who noted that the NYSC has been a blessing to them for the opportunity in securing their first employment in life (Adeyemo 2012). In addition to this, the service programme has continued to stimulate leadership training skills in corps members, as many of them learnt various lessons in management and administration through their service roles as CDS presidents, platoon leaders, committee members, to mention just a few. Generally, by deploying CMs for various CD programmes and initiatives in the urban and rural areas, the NYSC scheme has impacted on socio-economic and political development in Nigeria (Iyama 2009 and *The Nation*: 2011, 31). With these contributions, the NYSC could be said to have remained a vital medium through which social change and economic growth have been promoted in post-independence Nigeria. Yet, the NYSC is not without some fundamental challenges that question its contribution to nation-building.

Challenges and Realities of National Service in Nigeria

Today, the NYSC scheme is faced with the problem of corruption which could be between the corps members and the NYSC officials or among the NYSC staff themselves. There are corps members who bribed NYSC officers for posting to places of their choice, thereby defeating the main ideology of the programme. Also, many corps members collaborate with these officers to allow them travel for days and months with the agreement that the officer will take certain percentage of the monthly stipend of the truant corps member (Ubochi 2011). There are also reported cases of supposed corps members who skip the service programme, sit at home or abroad and make arrangements with certain NYSC officers to collect their certificates.¹ Among the NYSC staff, the most pronounced case is the 1993/84 episode which involved the former Director of the scheme, Colonel Peter Obasa; his assistant, Mr Folorunsho Kila; an ex-accountant, Mr Olalere Omiyale; Mr Kayode Fernandez; and Mr George Onigbogi (Nnadi 1986, 8 and *Guardian*: 1987, 16). All of them were charged for the theft and misappropriation of over N200 million. Expectedly, cases of corruption have been significantly detrimental to the operation of the NYSC the realization of its objectives. More than this, it could be said that corruption itself is a backlash on an organization meant to instil traditions

1 NYSC: A Brainstorming Session, Ideas on How to Make the NYSC Scheme Better, *Musings of a Crazy Nigerian*, Accessed Jan. 14, 2012 from <http://moacn.wordpress.com/>

of honesty, discipline, patriotism, among other moral values in the youths (Obadare, 22).

Inadequate funding from the government is another problem of the scheme. According to the 1993 Decree, State governments are required to pay an annual subvention of N500, 000 to the NYSC secretariat in their state. Even though this amount may no longer be realistic due to the increasing population of corps members, it is observed that many states do not pay their subvention on time (*Nigerian Observer* 1978, 13; *Weekly Trust*: 2011). At the swearing-in of Batch B 2011 corps members in Bauchi State, for instance, the State Coordinator announced that the state had paid its last subvention in 2002 (*Nigerian Observer*, 1978; Ehiabhi 2011). The lack of adequate funding from these governments has thus been responsible for the unavailability of necessary amenities for corps members throughout their service year. Many facilities in the permanent orientation camps are also dysfunctional and there is no provision (especially accommodation and transit camps) for the annual population increase of corps members in many states (*Weekly Trust* & Ehiabhi 2011).

Another recurring challenge of the NYSC is the issue of age falsification by corps members. Mostly, during the completion of their mobilization forms, many prospective over-age students doctor their ages to fit into the limit accepted by the service scheme (Agboro 2011, 47). Many youths have their reasons for doing this. For instance, some youth got admitted into the university late and might have exceeded the age limit for participation in the scheme by the time they graduated from their institutions. Many also want to eke out a living and escape from the harsh economic realities of the country. A few students in this category take advantage of the NYSC to see if they could find other means of survival in their states of deployment. And, there are those who just want to experience the programme, enjoy the privilege of being posted to another region and collect the discharge certificate attached with it (*ibid.*). This practice actually portrays the dilemma of many youths who see the NYSC as either a means of survival or pleasure, an objective which differ from objectives of the sponsors of the programme. The implication of this is that the NYSC has continued to encourage the admission of unqualified men and women for service which suggest wastage of national resources. In general, this practice is an indictment of a system that is an embodiment of discipline, honesty and dignified national virtues.

The NYSC is also faced with the challenge of security for its servers. This is perhaps the most important reason for the persistent clamour to scrap the scheme in recent times because many corps members have been killed during ethnic conflicts, religious violence and election crises. Some have been victims of rape, kidnapping and road accidents (Oyebanji 2009, 13 and Odiegwu 2009, 5). Ironically, most of these issues are meant to be addressed by corps members in the society through the CDS. As the security of lives and property of corps members continue to threaten the survival of the NYSC, it exposes the faith of the Nigerian society, including governmental institutions, in the service programme. In the deployment of Batch B 2012 corps members, for instance, not only did prospective corps members reject their posting to the northern states which are threatened by the Boko Haram insurgency, both the state governments and the National Assembly intervened to stop their deployment to these volatile states.

Besides, the NYSC also faced the problem of fraudsters and illegal operators often in collaboration with some NYSC staff (Osang 2012; Wakaso 2012; Egbemode, 2012). There are people who collect money from prospective corps members for deployment to states of their choice and those who obtain NYSC discharge certificates for students who do not undergo the service exercise (Amasingha 2011; Osang, 2012; Wakaso 2012). Some fraudsters also operate separate orientation camps for desperate youths who want to obtain the NYSC certificate (Osang 2012). The victims of this illegal operation are usually given the NYSC call up letters, complete NYSC kits, juicy posting and the NYSC discharge certificates. According to a victim, the reason for undergoing this illegal scheme is because of the request for NYSC discharge certificate by employers of labour (*ibid.*). Another lady noted that her involvement in the fraud was due to the inability of the NYSC to issue a call up notice to her two years after graduation from the university (*ibid.*). There are also youths who have undergone the NYSC service scheme but decided to take part in the exercise again because they could not find job after their first service year (*ibid.*). Many of these victims are however graduates of part-time and distance learning programmes whom the NYSC law has kept out from participating in the service scheme (*ibid.*). Their decision to undergo the service might therefore not be unconnected with the need to have the discharge certificate that would earn them paid employment. This situation also reveals the dilemma of many youths regarding the service scheme.

In addition, there are those who used the image of the NYSC to commit crimes. There are have cases of armed robbers who used the NYSC uniforms to rob unsuspecting members of the public and businesses (*Nigerian Observer*, 13). There was also the case of a man who was nabbed in July 2011 wearing the NYSC uniform and attempting to burn the Jos NYSC Orientation Camp (Adeago 2011). Some corps members have also been arrested for armed robbery. For instance, a 29 year old Sarmade Omiya was arrested in February 2012 for drugging a car driver and stealing his car afterwards in Abuja (Ohalee 2012, 32). Apart from these cases, some members of the public are used to wearing the NYSC uniforms which is against the law.

All of these have called to question the ability of the NYSC scheme to effectively tackle the problem of nation-building. More pertinent is the observation that the scheme has been responsible for many national problems. In particular, the scheme has been blamed for underutilization of corps members and unemployment among the youths because many of them are posted to places of primary assignments where their services are not needed. Similarly, by making cheap labour available in the economy, the need to employ permanent staff do not arise in many establishments. It is also important to mention that the NYSC presently has most of its ex-corps member in the ruling class of Nigeria (Obadare 2005, 9). Among these ex-corps members is Dr Goodluck Jonathan. There are scores of ex-corps members who have (or now) held various political appointments as Governors, Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Legislators, Judges, etc. There are also ex-servers who have become captains of industry, senior civil servants, religious leaders, community leaders, teachers, among others. To a large extent, cases of corruption, embezzlement of public funds, nepotism, among other socio-economic and political vices are not unknown in the character of the nation's ruling class in spite of the patriotic values and moral disciplines that are taught in the service programme (Akinbi 2003). Therefore, with the thousands of ex-corps members who probably constitute the highest working class in strategic sectors of the nation's socio-economic and political system, one of the questions to ask is the impact of the service scheme on the youths and the Nigerian state that has continued to witness political, religious and ethnic violence, which by far are the most significant problems which the scheme was established to address (*The Nigerian Voice*: 2011). While the NYSC might not be blamed for its inability to arrest these challenges, they are, nonetheless, indicative of the weakness of the scheme in combating them as envisaged by its initiators.

The scheme has also proved ineffective in addressing the problem of citizenship in Nigeria, the most essential factor in national integration. Obadare has given some insights on why the scheme has not been able to effectively address the question of citizenship in Nigeria. According to him, the civic service scheme is underpinned by the republican tradition which however has certain limitations that are built into it (Obadare 2005, 12). First, the republican tradition assumes that both the state and its citizens are mutually engaged in a common project of nation or state building. Second, it is assumed that the “effects of this common or joint venture are evident at every stage of the process, thereby renewing and revalidating the ideal or/and the target – state consolidation and nation building through national solidarity and development” (*ibid.*). Third, it is assumed that the “only legitimate means of public participation is as a citizen-soldier involved in the defence of the state - or in contemporary times, citizen-civilian involved in *sacrificial* communal or national service – and one who directly participates in governance” (*ibid.*). Certainly, the first and second assumptions did not explain the fact that differences exist in the interest of the state and its citizens because it construes the state as being formed by the governors and the governed. Therefore, in multi-ethnic states like Nigeria, these assumptions and emphasis on duties above rights may be problematic because the service rendered to the state may serve to reconstitute rather than consolidate it (*ibid.*).

Nonetheless, service is assumed to instil a sense of citizenship into the server. As Azaro (1993) points out, “an ideal, either implicit or explicit, of active citizenship can be found as a constitutive element in every theory or proposal for national service.” But the thinking that service is *antecedent to* and shapes citizenship positively has been reconsidered by Obadare who contended that the conception of citizenship and a sense of community is *prior to* the performance of service in the Nigerian case (Obadare 2005, 2). Indeed, in the one year national service, most youths are not guaranteed a citizenship status in their host communities nor feel some sense of commitment to the nation. This leaves many of them wondering why they should give their service to a community where they are not regarded as citizens.

Yet, the NYSC scheme cannot be held accountable for its inability to address the citizenship crisis in Nigeria. Rather, the ambivalence in Nigeria’s constitution can also be held suspect. In fact, the constitution recognises and upholds the citizenship status of every Nigerian, irrespective of birth, sex, ethnicity, religious beliefs, etc (1999, Section III).

But there are also provisions in the same constitution which recognise the boundary between indigenes and settlers of a particular territory, and thus put a divide between these citizens. Although it is also important to stress that the constitution categorically states that no citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any form of discrimination, disability or restriction that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other ethnic groups, sex, religion or places of origin (Ibid: Chapter IV, Sec. 47). Despite this provision, a myth used by many groups in Nigeria to justify the dichotomy between indigenes and settlers is that “one can only belong to a particular ethnic group and by virtue of that, one might not be in a position to enjoy those benefits associated with settling in a place or among groups with different history, culture and language.” (Adesoji and Alao 2009) There are also many Nigerians who do not consider the places they live outside their indigenous towns or villages as their native homes (Akanji 2011). It is thus realized that citizenship in Nigeria refers to a wider, societal affinity that is at once political in nature, while “indigeneship regresses towards ancestral identification with patriarchy, almost always tinged with a myth of origin, evolution or advent” (Takaya 2010). In essence, as observed by Femi Taiwo (1996), there are no citizens in Nigeria, but citizens of Nigeria. This is because the Nigerian citizenship exists in geographical terms with no freedom to locate anywhere within the boundaries of the relevant boundary, whereas citizens in modern socio-political system are not encumbered by natural factors and geography in their country.

In spite of the obvious challenges facing the NYSC, many governments since the era of Yakubu Gowon have expressed their support and confidence in the ability of corps members, which, in a way, underscores its relevance and its utilitarian value for the growth and development of Nigeria. But this support has not helped the NYSC to achieve its intended purpose because of their assumption over the programme. Ubochi (2011) opined that the need to love the country and promote national unity can neither be forced on the psyche of the youth nor the people of Nigeria. This is because the love of one’s country is “engendered by statesmen and leaders, who have exhibited patriotism, altruism and selfless service to the nation, more by concrete actions than by puerile precepts” (*ibid.*). To this extent, it could be said that the leadership of the country has not done enough to promote legacies that are worth emulating by the youth. For many years, the leadership of the country has been involved in corrupt practices, repression of opposition, among other attitudes that are not in tandem with the ideals of discipline, honesty, loyalty, among others, which the NYSC preach. More than this, the Nigerian government has not been

able to either provide sustainable socio-economic infrastructures or guarantee a minimum standard of living for the enjoyment of the citizens. Invariably, whatever the NYSC teaches the Nigerian youths is not practiced by the government who must lead the way by example.

Conclusion

This study shows that diversity is not a problem in Nigeria. The problem is the inadequate support for the policies and programmes that are used to manage this diversity. In the case of the NYSC, the institutional support to make it achieve its goals is weak. As a result, the programme is unable to benefit from the ruling elite who are sincere in their actions, a society that frowns at corruption and identifies with government policies, and a constitutional provision that is clear on the development of citizenship. To be sure, there is a synergy between the NYSC and this institutional support because an affective operation of one of them is mostly dependent on the working condition of others. Thus, the inability of the Nigerian state to guarantee this institutional support, either by error or omission, is the reason why the NYSC has made little contribution in addressing the problem of national integration and other socio-economic problems.

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British Intervention on Health in Nigeria and its Effects on Okun-Yorubaland, 1900-1960

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Abstract

This study evaluated the effects of British intervention on medical healthcare in with a focus on Okun-Yorubaland. It argued that the British Government officially took over the administration of Nigeria in 1900. However, its administrative impact on social infrastructural development in Nigeria was nearly a tale of neglect. This major deficiency is attributable to virulent epidemics and outbreak of World War I, which characterized the British social engagements in the opening decades of the twentieth century. This study uses historical approach to evaluate the exogenous and endogenous factors that caused inevitable change in the passivity of the British government to intervene on Nigeria's social infrastructural challenges. It synchronized the overlapping effects on the Okun-Yoruba people in Central Nigeria during the period of study.

Keywords: Nigeria, Okun-Yoruba, Health, Hospital, Disease.

Introduction

The sequential outbreak of Malaria, yellow fever and influenza in the opening decades of twentieth century devastated the world generally (Gale, 1968). The virologists claimed, these diseases affected the demographic structure of the world at large during the period (Ohadike, 1991). The last of these diseases (influenza) coincided with the later period of World War I (1918-1919). We can sufficiently argue that the interplay of epidemics and the outbreak of war left the world with two fold tragedies. Consequent upon the war, the global economy entered a serious phase of recession 1929-1932 (Brown, 1989). Thompson (2006) and Connelly (2006) have argued that the British government's involvement in the war was very central. This made the economy of Britain dwindled and eventually entered into a state of comatose. Thus, the financial stress during this period affected the global economy to the extent that most of the European countries found it extremely difficult to finance their colonies in Africa and Asia. In view of the general scenario, the activities of the British Government in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa were at its lowest ebbs immediately after the war and through to 1930s as aftermath

of the war and epidemics. The British health policy on its West Africa colonies as observed by Paul, (2015) was almost an absolute neglect. While it is plausible to generalize and attribute this fundamental negligence to the aftermath of the global outbreak of epidemic and war in one hand, on the other hand, it reflected the weakness of British political administration in West Africa. This becomes topical in the sense that the Francophone colonies in Africa were not neglected like the Anglophone countries and yet, France experienced the epidemic as well as involved in the war. It is on the strength of the above argument that we can strongly attribute the differential experiences and levels of social development in the Francophone and Anglophone countries to their policies. It would be recalled that the French policy of assimilation was aimed at frenchifying their Africa's subjects. This, on like the Anglophone, which policy segregated against their colonial subjects (Thomas, 1980; Olukoju, 2003). Thus, whatever privileges accruable to a Frenchman in France, was thought worthy to be applicable to a French man in Dakar and other colonial territories elsewhere. This was however not the case in the Anglophone territories. A Briton saw himself absolutely special to a Nigerian and other people under its colonial territories. This has wider and lasting implications in terms of their socio-economic, political and health policies in their various territories. This study explores the scenario and the factors that motivated the British interventions on health and the implications on the Okun-Yoruba communities in the Central Nigeria during the period of study.

Okun-Yoruba in View

Okun-Yoruba people constitute one of the groups that clustered around the confluence of rivers Niger and Benue in Nigeria. They are part of the people, Obayemi (1980) referred to as people in the Confluence Region in his study of Central Nigeria. This group was originally known as Kabba-Yoruba people. However, during the ethnographic study of Eva-Kraft Askari, a British ethnographer, he found and justified reasons he used Okun instead of the general Kabba for the people (Eva-Kraft, 1986). Thus, he became the earliest scholar that first used Okun, to denote the group under study here. He used the concept to identify as well as to classify them. The usage of the term was to strike a balance and to foster uniformity among the people. This people are sub-divided into five groups, namely: Iyagba, Ijumu, Owe, Bunu and Oworo. The use of Kabba as a general term over the generalissimo was beginning to cause disillusionment among other groups (Paul, 2016a). They perceived the term as means of a section of the group Owe (also known as Kabba) to

lord it over other sub-groups. Askari must have encountered this challenge during his ethnographic field survey. In order to avoid unnecessary controversy, he decided to use a common expression, Okun-Yoruba to classify the groups and as a means of identification. Even though, each of the groups has its peculiar dialect, they are intelligible. Later, Obayemi, one of the leading scholars of Okun-Yoruba histories popularized the concept as an acceptable term for the purpose of group identification. Overtime, the concept became generally acceptable as a means of identification in a special sense to the groups under this study. Some scholars did not find the concept a good replaceable expression to Kabba-Yoruba. In his argument, Onaiyekan (1975) wrote *inter alia*:

We find it hard to see how this eliminates confusion when it only introduces a new and unheard-of expression to replace a term that had already become widely accepted, even though it may seem loosely used to foreign ethnographer who was out for precision at all cost.

Despite his arguments, subsequent Okun-Yoruba historians, such as Z.O. Apata, Y. Akinwumi and I. A. Paul among others have continued to use the expression to denote the groups under study during their historical survey of the people. However, it must be stated clearly, that even though we find this concept, Okun as a suitable term to identify this group of people, we need to exercise caution. This is because; the concept does not exist as a peculiar term to them. It is noteworthy that their neighboring groups such as Akoko-Yoruba, Ekiti-Yoruba and even Oyo-Yoruba, also used the term as a means of greeting (Akinwumi, 1992).

Colonial Agitation for Better Amenities in British West Africa

Scholars such as, J.E. Flint, I. Obaro and R.A. Adeleye have argued that by 1900, the British colonial government had conquered Nigeria and had fully established its hegemony over the whole of its regions (Flint, 1960; Adeleye, 1971; Obaro, 1977). In addition, the plan for its administrative structure was also gathering momentum. We have reasons to argue that between 1900 and 1906, the British government was busy consolidating its administrative structures with nothing tangible in place. However, 1907 till 1914 saw the beginning of administrative restructuring in Nigeria through the efforts of Frederick Lord Lugard (Lugard, 1922). This came to a climax in January 1914 when Frederic Lord Lugard (the first Nigerian Governor General) succeeded in amalgamating the North and Southern Protectorates. This major effort was considered a watershed and

revolutionary in the political history of Nigeria. It would indeed, have been a great achievement for Nigeria but the outbreak of the World War I (1914-18) did not allow it to translate to social development. A critical assessment of Nigeria during this period shows that, there was no major impact of Colonial legacy that reflects significantly on Nigeria's social development and at large on other British colonial territories in West Africa as a whole (Conklin, 1997).

It was this major observable loophole that triggered the idea of comparison between the British and French territories in West Africa. For example, while dispensaries, hospital and other social amenities were built in all the communes in French colonies, the facilities were meant for all its citizens without specific marks of differentiation (August, 1985). This was however not the same in the British territories. Social amenities were provided for the British officials who lived differently in the Government Reserved Areas (GRA) while others lived in segregated areas where there was no serious attention for the provision of social amenities. However, the contiguous geographical locations of French and British territories in West Africa sub-region began to cause basis for comparison among the educated elite (Garba, 2019). It was widely circulated through propaganda in the available newspapers in the British West Africa during the period that people in the French colonies enjoyed better amenities than their British counterparts (Agboola, 2019). It was also added specifically that the British lacked better health policies for its territories (Ogunremi, 2019). These arguments were strongly peddled by the educated elements who were alienated from the British Administration. Most of these accusations also warranted the early decolonization process in British West Africa. The Educated elites maintained hard-line and consistent arguments of neglect especially on healthcare matters (Paul, 2016b). The medium of popularization of idea and consistency on this matter by the educated elites made it extremely difficult to be ignored by the British government. Thus, the British Secretary of State, proposed the possibility of constituting advisory bodies to investigate the veracity of the reality of this popular opinion; that French West African territories were much developed than the British territories of West Africa. These bodies were also to make recommendations on how social amenities especially on health matters could be improved across its territories in West Africa.

Advisory Bodies to the British Government and Reports

Toward the end of 1920s, the British Government took dramatic steps to improve the general condition of its West African colonies. This was as a

result of the agitation of the educated elite who after their returns from abroad to Nigeria were dissatisfied with the general level of development and segregation between the British officials and the Nigerians. They were eager to see the impact of British administration in their various communities. In reaction to the various agitations through newspapers, the British Government appointed Dr. A.T. Stanton to advise the Secretary of State on the Medical and Sanitary matters in the colonies and also introduced new innovation that would improve the general condition of the Colonial medical services (NAI, 1926). Secondly, it sent Under Secretary of State for the colonies, W.G.A. Ormby Gore, on tour of West African colonies in order to survey the state of socio-economic development programmes including medical and healthcare services (NAI, 1928). At the end of these exercises, Ormby observed that, medical and healthcare services in Nigeria was far behind and could not be compared with French territories in neighboring West African colonies he had visited. He strongly advised the government to provide adequate medical services for the entire native population, unlike in the past when it concerned itself with services to European and native officials.

In addition, he recommended the training of indigenous dispensers, dressers, midwives and welfare workers to undertake medical and healthcare services within their ethnic groups. The above recommendations became plausible in the face of insufficient European personnel and the need to co-opt the natives in the healthcare services within their domain (Schram, 1970). Barely two years later after this recommendation, Dr Stanton toured West African colonies to survey primarily the medical and healthcare facilities. His report complemented the previous report of Ormby Gore. He also recommended the expansion of healthcare services across West African colonial territories. These two official reports were very significant in the historical revolution on healthcare services in British West African territories. In the first instance, it emboldened the Government of Ramsay MacDonald, which came to power in 1929 to pass the colonial Development Act of 1929 providing a grant of One Million (1, 000.000) pounds to support Nigerian's Annual Budget of 1930 (Phillipson, 1947). This development coincided with Governor Thomas's Local Government Reforms in Nigeria, which aimed at the institutionalization of Native Authority (N.A) in the country to undertake the establishment of social services and resulted in the institution of medical and health facilities including dispensary, sanitary and child welfare services among others.

The Native Authority (N.A) Dispensaries

Following the recommendation of Ormby Gore and Stanton, the Colonial Government started discussions on the possibilities of expanding health facilities to rural communities. At the Resident Conference of 1929, they endorsed the recommendation of the expansion for the network of dispensaries and the training of Dispensers and other health workers (Paul, 2018). They however, scheduled the official training of the scheme of N.A dispensaries for 1930. Consequently, the Provincial Authorities in Kabba Province proposed to build dispensaries in the Districts such as, Kabba, Ikare, Okene, Koton Karfi etc, while she also proposed out-station posts to these adjoining settlements of the District headquarters in preparation for the launching of the scheme. As planned, the Colonial Administration launched the scheme of N.A Dispensary in 1930 but almost all the construction of the proposed building were still in the process of construction at the time the scheme was launched. By April 1931, N.A. Dispensary building in Kabba was completed and launched. Another key programme in the scheme was Out-station post mechanism. This method was proposed for consideration because of the wide geographical sphere and scattered settlements around the confluence region. Out-station plan was thought plausible to cater for minor cases of health issues in different locations outside the Provincial Headquarters. Whereas, serious cases encountered from the out-station posts were to be referred to the Province for intense medical attention. Unfortunately, the proposed out-station programme could not be realized due to certain factors. In the first instance, shortage of medical personnel was critical. During this period, the European medical personnel available were very few in number (Paul, *ibid*). It was partly for this reason; it was considered that the best way to overcome the challenge of insufficient medical personnel was to train the natives as dispensers, midwives and welfare workers.

It is imperative to stress here that the challenge of medical personnel was the underlining factor that prompted the consideration of the training of native population by British Colonial Masters (African Mail, 1913). Hitherto, the natives under normal circumstances were considered as weak and lacking the sophisticated intelligence for such rigorous assignments (Paul, 2016b). Secondly, financial constraint jeopardized the plan. Maintaining out-station programme required heavy financial commitment. It required building more structures, hiring more medical personnel and paying the salaries of the health workers in the out-stations. However, the outbreak of the global economic depression of 1929 to 1931 hindered all the measures put in place towards the realization of the plan. Alternatively,

the Native administration considered Mobile Clinic in place of Out-station posts (Arogundade, 2018) The Provincial Government in collaboration with the District Officer (DO) embarked on Mobile Clinic strategy. The Mobile Clinic Officials moved around the communities with NA Medical Van periodically to treat as well as to inoculate people against epidemics diseases (Ajibade, 2018). Each of the communities has it days in the month in which the Mobile Officials with the N.A van visited. Usually, the people in the community would gather at a designated venue to be treated by the medical officials. Serious cases were referred to the Provincial Dispensary in Kabba for medical attention. In some cases, where there were complications that could not be handled in Kabba, such were referred to Government Hospital in Lokoja. Other major constraint of this pattern was; the periodic visit of the mobile clinic officials could not guarantee health stability for the local population in the rural areas. Between the periods when the clinic officials were not available, the lives of the rural dwellers were literally exposed to danger.

This strategy, even though achieved appreciable results to some extent, the Provincial Government had to review the previous methods. One of the giant steps taken to combat the problem of personnel was to recruit indigenous people through the Province and District and sent them for training in Kaduna, Makurdi, Lokoja, and Enugu for some months after which they were posted to different centers as, dispensers, dressers, midwives and leprosy and sanitary officers (Paul, 2018). The section to which individual belonged was determined during the period of their training. Some were sent to London, Canada, United State of America for their training. After the completion of their trainings, the trainees were placed under the direct supervision of District Officers (D.O), who gave instruction and direction of their activities (ARDMSS, 1932). As part of their roles and functions, the Sanitary Inspectors ensured people conformed to specific standards that enhanced good health of the people. They watched over surrounding of homes to ensure the communities were kept clean in order to prevent disease vectors such as mosquitoes. It should be noted that during the period of study, modern latrines were not common among the people. Everybody went to the forest/bush to defecate (Otitonaiye, 2018). However, there were possibilities for under age children to defecate indiscriminately. Thus, as part of the responsibilities of sanitary officers, they were to ensure the surroundings of the people were kept clean. Later, pit latrines were introduced. At the inception of this idea, pits were dogged to the depth of between 10 and 12 feet down and strong slabs of woods were used to cover it. A round or square hole was created

through which people passed their feces. As part of their responsibilities, the sanitary officers were to ensure rivers or streams where the communities fetched water for domestic purposes were kept clean especially during the dry season (NAK, 1933). They equally served as advisers to the village heads who were in charge of public utilities such as market square. Food and meat sold were scrutinized to ensure high quality food materials and meats free from contamination were sold to the general public. Animals such as goat, cow, ram etc that were slaughtered for commercial purposes in the abattoirs were inspected to ensure that they were free from any form of infectious diseases that could endanger the lives of the masses (NAK, 1936). Animals that were not inspected by the Sanitary Inspectors were not allowed to be sold for public consumption (Paul, 2018). Government empowered the Sanitary Officers to prosecute the violators of the above offences. Violators were fined heavily, which ultimately made them feared by the general public. With this development, Okun-Yoruba communities were kept clean.

The Dispensers on the other hands were like the modern day medical doctors. They were stationed in the established dispensaries to take care of the people with diverse health challenges. They treated people with snake bites, malaria, skin and water borne diseases (Paul, *ibid*). They administered drugs to the people and taught them how they were used. From 1900 up till 1930s, there was no full-fledged government hospital in Kabba Division. Ilorin and Lokoja, which were the nearest were one hundred and twenty (120) and fifty-three (53) kilometers respectively from Kabba town, which was the headquarters of Kabba Division. There were instances, during which people with serious health cases died in the process of transporting them from Okun-Yorubaland to either Lokoja or Ilorin (Olorungbeni, 2019). In addition, there were also transport difficulties. During the period under studies, only few cars were available for transportation of people from one location to the other. Thus, the combination of distance and transportation difficulties constituted a major difficulty to healthcare delivery to the people. This explains why the Dispensary in Kabba served a useful purpose. It received a large turnout of patients who were seeking for healthcare attention but who could not travel to Ilorin and Lokoja (Olorungbeni, *ibid*). Apart from attending to medical cases, the dispensary also served as center for vaccination.

The construction of dispensary center in Kabba initially satisfied the aspiration of the Okun-Yoruba educated elite. This was because; it served the interests of large number of educated elite who had moved to rural

areas as teachers, N.A officials and missions' workers (Paul, 2016c). It is worthy of note that these educated elite were instrumental to the idea of establishing modern medical health facilities from the opening decade of the twentieth century across Nigeria. Thus, the establishment of the Provincial Dispensary in Kabba was to the educated elite, a fulfillment of purpose. The commissioning of the Dispensary in 1931 was greeted with fanfare and pageantry. Within a year of its commissioning, it attended to an average population of 11, 686 patients (Paul, 2015). It was further reported that the new facilities could hardly meet the needs of the high number of patients that were coming for treatments. However, it is important to mention here that the high number of people recorded was largely as a result of free treatments of patients, which was the initial policy of the maternity when it was established. Secondly, we can also advance further that it was an indication of appreciation of western medicine over traditional medicine, which the people had used to before the introduction of western medicine.

However, the subsequent development on the maternity took dramatic turns in 1937, when the Provincial government introduced another policy of payment for treatments administered on the patients (Paul, *ibid*). The introduction of this policy was due largely to inadequate financial resources to meet the needs of the large number of patients who were patronizing the dispensary. The financial needs of the maternity became astronomically increased because of the necessity for more drug supply, payment of medical personnel and other overhead costs of running and maintaining the dispensary. The Provincial Government thought it would be financially helpful if the patients were made to pay part of the treatments administered on them by the medical personnel. Provincial Authority introduced a fee of one penny for every dose of medicine and three pence for every wound or disease treated to a conclusion. Only government and Native Authority workers and school children were exempted. This was considered beneficial for the survival of the maternity as the purported amount accruable from the payment was planned to supplement part of the huge financial needs of the maternity. However, the introduction of the policy discouraged majority of the people to the extent that appreciable number of people abandoned the maternity. This became manifested vividly in the number of patronage. There was a shortfall of over 50% of previous year's attendance. People were disillusioned about the introduction of fee charges. Other people started to patronize the traditional medical practitioners for their health wellbeing.

Conclusion

This study has evaluated the British intervention on healthcare delivery with attention on the Okun-Yoruba people in the confluence region of Nigeria. The study shows that 1900 marked the official takeover of Nigeria by the British government. Even though officially, Nigeria was proclaimed the British colony, the British could not do much to justify positive social infrastructural development because of the challenges of the virulent epidemic and the outbreak of World War I between 1900 and 1919. In this study, it was argued that between 1900 and 1906, British government was still battling with struggles of consolidation. Thus, great achievement occurred between 1906 and 1914, with the amalgamation of southern and Northern protectorates of Nigeria. However, with the outbreak of World War I, in 1914, the British government was bogged down with the war in Europe and she was finally distressed.

The seemingly abandonment coupled with the alienation of the Nigerian educated elite triggered agitation and petition through comparative policies of Francophone and Anglophone in West Africa. The British government did not respond to the agitation of the educated elite until the late 1920s. This necessitated the constitution of Dr. A.T. Stanton in 1926 and the other W.G.A. Ormby Gore in 1929 both were to survey the levels of social amenities in Nigeria and British West Africa respectively and make recommendations for improvements. The two reports berated the level of healthcare services in Nigeria and British West Africa. It was these reports that fired the government of Ramsay MacDonald of 1929 to approve a grant to the tunes of One Million Pounds for the upgrading of social amenities especially medical health facilities in British West Africa. This development facilitated the establishment of Health and Sanitation Department. This development facilitated the preventive and curative approaches.

In Okun-Yorubaland, it enhanced the recruitment of potentials out of the native population who were trained as Dispensers, Sanitary officers, Maternity Officers. These officers were empowered by the Districts Officers (DO) to bring violators to book. The activities of these locals helped Okun-Yorubaland. In the first instance, they served as educators or trainers to the general populace of Okun-Yoruba people. Secondly, they ensured the local population kept to basic rules of environmental hygiene. Between 1920 and 1960, these officers were fully in charge of medical healthcare in Okun-Yorubaland. They enforced healthcare related laws and the deviances were punished accordingly within the armpit of the law. The

Mobile clinic, which was put in place to lessen medical complications among the rural population in Okun-Yorubaland helped in no small measure within the period of study.

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An Assessment of Team Teaching as a Method of Historical Pedagogy in Nigeria

Abubakar Sadiq HARUNA & Rabiatu MUSA

Abstract

This study assessed Team Teaching Approach (TTA) as a method of Historical Pedagogy in Nigeria. To achieve this, three research objectives with corresponding research questions and hypotheses were formulated for the study. One-sample pre-posttest quasi-experiment was employed in which 200 students were purposively selected from History departments in Federal College of Education (FCE), Kano and Sa'adatu Rimi College of Education (SRCOE), Kumbotso (male=100; female 100). Ten lecturers (5 from each institution) were employed to serve as Research Assistants. The instrument used for data collection was Research Methods Achievement Test (RMAT). The scale was developed by the researchers and pilot tested; Cronbach's alpha analysis of the pilot study reveals reliability coefficient of .83. The RMAT is made up of 30 objective test items. The experiment was conducted in two settings; FCE, Kano and SRCOE, Kumbotso. In each, 50 male and 50 female participants were selected to arrive at 100 samples for each of the settings. Thereafter, pre-testing was conducted on the participants using Research Methods Achievement Test. Participants were taught a few topics on research methods for a period of eight weeks by the Research Assistants (team members) via a Team Teaching Approach (TTA). Posttest was then administered and the two tests (pretest-posttest) were analyzed using one-sampled t-test and chi-square at 0.05 significance. Results reveal a significant mean difference in pretest-posttest of achievement of history students exposed to TTA ($P. 0.031 < 0.05$); no significant gender difference was found between pretest-posttest of achievement of male and female students ($P. 0.701 > 0.05$). The study concludes that Team Teaching Approach has significant effect on students' academic achievement in history courses. Hence, it can be adopted as a method of Historical Pedagogy in Nigeria.

Keywords: Team Teaching, Historical Pedagogy, Academic Achievement

Introduction

Historical pedagogy in institutions of higher learning vary greatly in the types of approaches employed by lecturers. In some cases, there may be

a choice between Single Teacher Teaching Approach (STTA) and Team Teaching Approach (TTA). Within both groups there may be further differences based on teaching experience, professional qualifications, personality traits, and other individual variances ^[1]. Though, some studies have found support for the efficacy of STTA, researchers have continue to question its ability to address learning needs of students in a heterogeneous class setting ^[2].

Successful interaction between lecturer and student very often provides the impetus behind effective teaching and reinforces student motivation to learning. As important a role as lecturers play in the successful teaching of history courses, this role may at times fall short when history instructions are offered by a single teacher ^[1]. History lecturers usually measure their successes and failures against norms created by others within their own profession. Still most lecturers have unique teaching styles which are identified by how they deliver instructions, evaluate students, select content suitable for student's level of competence, and support the needs of their learners. An inevitable factor in all lecturers that, to a varying degree, influences any aspect of classroom behavior, from the teaching task itself to basic daily communication between lecturer and student, is lecturer's competence in pedagogy ^[3].

The effect of pedagogy on academic achievement of students is increasingly becoming a crucial issue among scholars. The results of many studies suggest that there is a significant effect between a teaching approach and students' achievement ^{[3][4][5]}. Apart from the dichotomy that characterizes history teaching (single/team) as a concept, the pedagogy is linked to a host of other teaching styles that are usually determined and judged by the students who are at the receiving end of the teaching process. In fact, students cannot learn a subject without projecting some kind of an attitude or bias toward it ^[6]. Such kind of attitude has significant impact on students' perception of the worth of the teacher as well as achievement in the subject.

According to a study, Team Teaching (TT) is different from single Teacher Teaching (STT) because it involves two or more teachers each with distinctive roles, sharing responsibilities for planning, presentation and evaluation of lessons for the same group of students ^[2]. It involves collaboration between two or more teachers whereby talents, expertise, interests, and resources are put together in order to accomplish a

learning instruction ^[7]. Furthermore, team teaching approach when used effectively can avail students the opportunity to learn from different experiences of the team members (teachers) as well as exploring their personal learning styles ^[8]. However, while team teaching may prove advantageous for many students, some may feel frustrated and discontented about having more than one teacher ^[2]. But with proper collaboration and cohesiveness within a team, there are vital benefits for those willing to adopt team teaching approach especially in History instructions. In addition, the distinguishing quality of team teaching is in its collaborative, cooperative and interactive abilities which give the approach a degree over single teacher teaching ^[9]. Beyond the advantages of creating, additional time for other academic activities and supportive environment it equally augments the opportunity for intellectual growth, increases student's teacher interaction ^[10], overcome isolation that is the norm in the conventional single teaching approach ^[11]. For the students, team teaching can help them benefit through the opportunity to receive teaching from lecturers for whom the aspect/content is their area of expertise and interest which exposes them to diverse perspectives on historical issues.

A researcher ^[12] identified three models of team teaching which are interactive, rotational and dispersed models while another scholar ^[13] classified team teaching into two categories. The first category involves a combination of models according to the personalities, strength and philosophies of the team teachers as well as that of the students. In this first category, team members teach the same students at the same time within the same classroom ^[2]. The second category involves a variety of team teaching models in which the instructors work together to prepare the teaching materials but do not necessarily teach the same group of students at the same time. Some researchers ^[14] explained that team teaching models can be described as weak or strong. This depends on the degree of collaboration integration, interaction and cooperation of the team members in their level of engagement in the teaching of the students. A scholar ^[13] further stated that no single model of team teaching automatically results in success for a given teaching situation. Rather any such programme must be planned to suit the curriculum, teachers and students.

History studies in institutions of higher learning involve a range of courses whose contents and objectives are directed toward developing higher level skills and scholarship, as well as research orientation ^[1].

Among the courses offered is Research Methods; which is a core course taught to students during the second or third year of either Nigeria Certificate in Education (NCE) or undergraduate studies (BA or BA. Ed). Unlike other taught courses in history studies, research methods exposes students to the rudiments of historical investigations and the necessary skills for academic inquiries ^[4]. Hence, history students are required to, at the first instance, offer and pass the course, and then apply the skills learnt to historical research or project writing. Naturally, while some students are able to meet this requirement without much difficulties, others may have problem of comprehending the concepts and procedures of research methods ^[15]. This double-edge status of research methods has been a case of concern to students, research teachers and supervisors, thus a viable pedagogical approach that can provide for the learning needs of students and improve their academic achievement in research and other history subjects is required.

Several studies on effect of team teaching on academic achievement of students abound. For instance, in one study ^[2] on the effect of team teaching on students' academic achievement on English Language Comprehension of senior secondary school students in Onitsha Education Zone, they employed non randomized pretest-posttest control group quasi experimental design. With a population of 5,171 senior secondary two students, data was obtained from 189 students (97 males and 92 females) samples and analyzed ANCOVA. Results of the study showed that the students taught English language comprehension with team teaching approach achieved significantly higher than those of the control group who were taught with single teacher teaching approach. The female students in TTA group achieved significantly higher than their male counterparts. In another study on the effect of team teaching on academic achievement of 9th graders in science, the researchers collected data from 24 students of class IX in Rewari District of Haryana ^[16]. They employed pre-test post-test quasi experimental design and results of the study revealed that there was a significant positive effect of team-teaching on academic achievement of students in Science. Another study ^[17] examined the effect of team teaching on the academic achievement of students in introductory technology. They selected two secondary schools for the study and employed Introductory Technology Achievement Test (ITAT) as instrument for data collection. Upon analysis of data collected, result of this study showed that there is a significant difference between the

mean posttest achievement of students taught using team teaching and those taught in a conventional single-teacher classroom.

After reviewing previous studies, the effect of team teaching on achievements of students in a emerges as an issue that not only affects historical pedagogy and the learning process, but also affects history students' attitudes and learning assumptions. Although, majority of the studies reviewed reveal potential effect of team teaching on students' academic achievement, none has actually addressed the peculiarity of historical pedagogy and students' academic achievement in tertiary institutions in Nigeria. The present study is therefore an attempt at bridging the gap. Hence, the main purpose of the study is to assess team teaching as a method of historical pedagogy in Nigeria.

Objectives of the study

1. To find out the effect of team teaching on students' achievement in a history course (Research Methods).
2. To determine gender difference in the effect of team teaching on achievement in a history course (Research Methods).

Research Questions

1. What is the effect of team teaching on students' achievement in a history course (Research Methods)?
2. What is the mean score difference in the effect of team teaching on achievement in a history course between pretest – posttest of male and female students?

Research Hypotheses

1. There is no significant effect of team teaching on students' achievement in a history course (Research Methods).
2. There is no significant mean score difference in the effect of team teaching on achievement in a history course between pretest – posttest of male and female students.

Research Methodology

One-sampled pretest – posttest quasi-experiment was employed in which 200 students were purposively selected from History departments in Federal College of Education (FCE), Kano and Sa'adatu Rimi College of Education (SRCOE), Kumbotso (male=100; female 100). Ten history lecturers (5 from each college) were employed to serve as Research Assistants. The instrument used for

data collection is Research Methods Achievement Test (RMAT); it was developed by the researchers and pilot tested. Cronbach alpha analysis of the pilot study reveals reliability coefficient of .83. The scale is made up of 30 objective test items. The experiment was conducted in two settings; FCE, Kano and SRCOE, Kumbotso. In each, 50 male and 50 female history students were purposively selected to arrive at 100 samples for each of the settings. Thereafter, pre-testing was conducted on the participants using Research Methods Achievement Test. Participants were taught a few topics on research methods for a period of eight weeks by the Research Assistants (male and female history lecturers) via a team teaching procedure. Research Methods course was used as treatment because of its peculiar double-edge status among history courses. Posttest was then administered and the two tests (pretest-posttest) were analyzed using t-test and chi-square at 0.05 significance.

Results

Data obtained from RMAT scores were computed via descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and the figures were used to answer the two research questions. Thereafter, one-sample t-test procedure and chi-square statistics were employed to test the corresponding hypotheses at 0.05 significance; summaries of the analysis are presented in the tables below:

Research Question 1: What is the effect of team teaching on students’ achievement in a history course (research methods)?

Table 1: Pretest – posttest mean scores and standard deviations of students’ achievement in a history course (Research Methods) (n= 200)

Academic Achievement	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Mean	Error
Pre-test	40.7257	13.9156	1.26918	
Posttest	60.6250	12.4492	1.40125	

The result in Table 1 shows that the mean score of 60.63 and standard deviation of 12.44 of posttest are higher than the mean score of pre-test (40.73 and standard deviation of 13.92) of students’ achievement. This

shows that team teaching has a relative effect on students’ achievement in a history course (Research Methods).

Research Question 2: What is the mean score difference in the effect of team teaching on achievement in a history course between pretest – posttest of male and female students?

Table 2: Mean score difference between pretest – posttest of male and female students’ achievement in a history course (Research Methods) (n= 200)

Students’ preferences	Male		Female	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Pretest	44.71	13.92	45.73	12.45
Posttest	59.63	13.49	60.63	13.41
Average Mean & SD	52.17	13.70	53.18	12.93

The result in Table 2 shows that the average mean score of 52.17 and standard deviation of 13.70 of pretest – posttest for male students’ achievement is closely related to that of female students’ achievement in a history course (mean= 53.18; SD= 12,93). This shows a closely similar mean scores between pre-test and posttest of achievement of male and female students.

Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: There is no significant effect of team teaching on students’ achievement in a history course.

Table 3: t-test analysis on effect of team teaching on students’ achievement in a history course (Research Methods) (n=200)

Academic Achievement	Mean	SD	t-test	Df	Sig. (2- tailed)	Decision
Pretest	40.73	13.92	4.27	198	.0031	Reject null hypothesis 1
Posttest	60.63	12.45				

The t-test analysis for null hypothesis one presented in Table 3 reveals a significant result. The p-value of .0031 is less than the threshold of

0.05 hence, the null hypothesis which says; there is no significant effect of team teaching on students’ achievement in a history (Research Methods) is hereby rejected.

Hypothesis 2: There is no significant mean score difference in the effect of team teaching on achievement in a history course between pretest – posttest of male and female students.

Table 4: Chi-square analysis on difference in the effect of team teaching on achievement between pretest-posttest of male and female students (n=200)

Academic Achievement	Mean	SD	Chi-square	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Decision
Male	44.71	13.92	4.27	198	.701	Retain null hypothesis 2
Female	59.63	12.45				

The statistics in Table 4 show result of chi-square for difference in pretest-posttest of male and female history students’ achievement in a history course. The p-value ($p=.701$) exceeds the decision threshold of 0.05, hence the proposed null hypothesis is hereby retained.

Discussion of Findings

Findings of the present study have revealed positive effect of team teaching on students’ achievement. Analysis of hypothesis one shows that team teaching approach has significant effect on students’ achievement in a history course. The descriptive data (pretest-posttest mean scores) presented in Table 1 and inferential statistics ($p.0031 < 0.05$) in Table 2 indicate significant results. Hence, the postulated null hypothesis which states that ‘there is no significant effect of team teaching on students’ achievement’ in a history course is rejected. This finding corroborate the previous related studies ^{[2][16][17]}. In all the above-mentioned studies, results reveal potential effect of team teaching on academic achievement in English Language, Sciences and Introductory Technology respectively. The main distinction between the present study and the previous ones cited is on the methodology employed in the experiment. Whereas, previous researches used quasi experiment involving two groups (control vs. experiment), in the present study, one-sampled quasi experiment design was adopted. However, the result generated by the study is vindicated by the earlier findings.

The second analysis on hypothesis two found no difference in the effect of team teaching on achievement in a history course between male and female students. In other words, the average pretest – posttest mean scores and standard deviations obtained via descriptive statistical analysis of data collected relatively marginal. Furthermore, the p-value of 0.071 obtained through chi-square analysis exceeds the decision threshold of 0.05 significance. Hence, the postulated null hypothesis which states that ‘there is no significant difference in the effect of team teaching on students’ achievement’ is retained. This finding deviates from a previous study^[2] in which they found that female students in TTA group achieved significantly higher than their male counterparts. This deviation further establishes the efficacy of team teaching as an approach that provides for learning needs of students irrespective of their gender.

Conclusion

The study concludes that Team Teaching Approach (TTA) is an effective pedagogical technique that can be used to enhance students’ academic achievement in history studies. In addition, apart from providing basis for improving and enhancing instructional processes, it establishes empirical basis for pedagogical practice in tertiary institutions. This is evident from the fact that the posttest achievement indicates a significantly higher mean scores than the pretest achievement. Furthermore, the fact that achievements in pretest – posttest of male and female students exposed to TTA treatment did not vary suggests that, the approach is a viable pedagogical technique that can provide for the learning needs of students in a diverse classroom setting.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are offered:

1. History departments in higher institutions of learning should adopt Team Teaching Approach in teaching history courses. This can be achieved by allocating two or more lecturers and urging them to collaborate in teaching the course.
2. In planning and executing TTA, lecturers or team members should be sensitive to students’ peculiarities such as gender difference, learning styles, and learning needs of the students. This would ensure that every student learns at his/her pace by exploring varieties of learning materials and techniques used by the various teachers that participate in the instruction.

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Breaking with the Past: The Changing Dynamics of Fashion in Post-Colonial Nigeria, 1960-1970

Oluwadarasimi Abiodun FAKUNLE

Abstract

This paper with the adoption of historical and multidisciplinary approaches, attempts a look at the changing dynamics of fashion in Nigeria in the first decade of independence. Within the general context of historical method, the work is specifically adopting socio-cultural approach which is no less historical. This historical narrative and sociological approach make this work a multidisciplinary one, especially in archaeology, anthropology, and Nigerian and African studies. The work focuses on the type and style of cloth worn in Nigeria at this period of time. This period is important for this study because it examines the immediate changes on the traditional African style of cloth or more appropriately, some major impacts on the traditional style of cloth in Nigeria. Focusing on Lagos, this paper notes that fashion trends was more pronounced in this city first, because it was by independence about the only cosmopolitan state in the country and second, the city was noted for setting the pace, as against the colonial effect, in terms of its conscious adoption of local forms of dress which were either newly interpreted or invented. An attempt will be made to provide a comprehensive description of fashion in Nigeria which cut across majorly cloth styles and some other aspects of fashion/dress such as hairdo, foot wears and other body adornments. It concludes that by the turn of the decade, fashion trends became inherently traditional, supplanting western fashion that had earlier controlled and dominated much of the scene.

Introduction

Fashion theory, a new interdisciplinary journal, compliments the scholarship of costume, in which formerly, cloth has been made an accessory in symbolic, structural, or semiotic explanations, and as a result, any serious engagement with clothing itself has almost vanished. Actually some works view dress as a set of competing discourses, linked to the operation of power, that construct the body and its presentation, this study pursue historical questions about changes in dress practice brought about by a variety of encounters including

colonialism at first, and westernization which stood as a continuous colonial legacy in post-independence Nigeria.

This study uses fashion to frame this study because it is at the heart of widespread contemporary preoccupations with clothing and is central to the most exciting new scholarship on dress. Looking at fashion and dress, the distinction between fashion in the west and the 'traditional' clothing of Africa precisely drawn by scholars who explain fashion's origin in terms of the development of the capitalist production system in the west. 'Traditional' dress was never a cultural 'heritage issue', but was always a changing practice, remaking itself in interaction with other dress styles.¹

Scholarship on dress in Africa revolves around the enduring appeal and transformation of cloth/clothing; the effects on dress and identity of colonization, 'modernity', and globalisation, and dress issue in the diaspora. Diverse local dress practices have changed in complex ways in interaction with islam, christianity and colonialism. Fashion, the realm of clothing that is characterised by self-conscious change has long played an important role in the characterisation of culture and sub-cultures, providing a key means of marking affiliation or classifying people and cultures including Nigerians.

The study covers mostly Lagos as it stood as the centre of government in Nigeria during colonial rule and at independence, and beyond just been central, it also stood as the meeting point where cultural values are been spread into other parts of Nigeria.

The dynamic changes that actually occur at the break of 1960, though it can be said that this period was a hit in fashion of Europe, despite this fact, the colonial legacy as per dress culture took a turning point in which there was an upgrade in traditional attires, people began to sow dresses into different styles, with the enlightenment gotten from the west, which was mostly brought by some Nigerians who travelled out of the country and thereby gained knowledge of what is going on outside, they came back not to introduce the western cloth/attires but to make into styles the traditional materials of the Nigerians, but even despite this there was still the dominant of the western fashion.

¹ Karen T. H. 2004. The World in Dress: Anthropological perspectives on clothing, fashion and culture. Annual Review of Anthropology. Vol. 33. Pp 369-392

The Recent Past

The recent past here refer to the colonial period which brought in colonial legacy and culture and which by one way or the other has influenced fashion in Nigeria.

Appearance was a strongly contested area in the relations between colonizers and colonized. Indigenous people in many colonized societies adorned their bodies with cosmetics, tattooing, or scarification, wore feathers and other forms of ornament, and habitually went naked or dressed in animal skins or other non-woven materials. When they did wear woven cloth, it was often in the form of clothing that was draped, wrapped, or folded rather than cut, stitched, and shaped to the contours of the body. Dress and textiles conveyed information about gender and rank in terms different from those familiar to the colonizers. Such vastly different dress practices, especially nakedness, struck colonizers as evidence of the inferiority of subject populations, because colonizers considered their own norms and lifestyles to be proof of their superior status.²

The turn of the 20th century became a period when various old associations had largely lapsed out with new ones being formed during the colonial rule such as those based on mosques and churches. Voluntary social clubs known as *egbo* formed started commissioning fabrics for marking anniversaries and other occasions of their association. The colonial period which started from 1906 up till 1960 for Nigeria, could be said to have been as far back as the 19th century for Lagos. This is because the British occupation of the area of Lagos has taken place since c. 1860s, and this influenced the society to a significant degree, bringing along with it a large number of repatriates from Sierraleonian, Brasil and Cuba who were to have a great influence on the structure and nature of the society.³

The colonial era in Nigeria witnessed a flirtation of many cultures with its culture mostly through Lagos, Lagos which became the centre of administration and the seat of the British government becomes the centre for the transfer and melting point of different cultures and social

² Alloula M. 1986. *The Colonial Harem: In Theory and History of Literature*. Manchester University Press.

³ Cole, P. D. 1975. Lagos society in the nineteenth century. *Lagos: the development of an African city*. A. B. Aderibigbe. Ed. Nigeria: Longman. Chapter 2: 27-54.

lives. To start with, there have been more migrants into Lagos from the interior and with each bringing their own culture.

At the beginning of the colonial rule, the British government in Nigeria generally capped their official uniforms with white helmets, like the District Officers wearing helmets, as part of their uniform, sanitary inspectors putting on 'khaki' trousers and coat over the sleeve and tie along with a brown helmet. There was the creation of public and private jobs in which indigenous people were absorbed into, with some people becoming clerks, railway guards, nurses, teachers, some enlisted in the queen's own Nigerian regiment, police, pilot and steward, and thereby creating/producing uniforms for each of these offices. Thus, each of these offices possesses distinctive uniforms used to recognise them. For instance, the police at that time had a black woollen knickers with a kind of Indian tunic shirt worn over which a police belt held the knickers and tunic together. This stood as the basis for what is in vogue today, as most section of government offices has their uniform. At this point in time, the acceptance of African wear in colonised countries (particularly Nigeria) has limits, for instance, junior staff in their offices sometimes are barred from entering the parliamentary chamber without a tie.⁴

Apart from the government workers who wear uniforms, there were also some other associations like the Boy Scouts, Boy's Brigade, school children, soldiers in the arm, members of St. John's Ambulances and the similar bodies that were established, and which uses dresses made from textile in the local factories in Nigeria.⁵ Aside this, the period between 1900 and 1939, European attire predominated at festive occasions such as weddings, naming ceremonies, baptisms, house-warming, funerals or memorial services. With the dominant foreign rule, there came a drastic shift in the way the people think and therefore came changes in fashion. Even the traditional rulers were not left out; for instance there was the case of king Dosumu of Lagos recorded, that he was noted to have been seen in an attire of a clean loose white robe: red silk velvet slippers and looking sophisticated in the European attire he was wearing. Aside Nigeria, other African countries colonised, like

⁴ Mwesigire. B.B. 2015. Decolonising dress and fashion: *African wear in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda*

⁵ Interview conducted with Mr. Ajayi Ladi of Lagos State Council for Arts and Culture on 20/8/2014

in Kenya, an instance of what happened on arrival at Jomo Kenyatta and Entebbe International airports, the immigration officials were dressed in plain white or yellow or blue uniform and some dark trouser, be it black, navy blue or green and fully tucked in like colonial subjects of the 1940s.⁶

At this point in time, the new elites were also interested in taking part in family occasions for which commemorative uniforms (aso-ebi) were used. This is a practice where members of the same family will dress alike using some cloth pattern at occasions. This practice of 'aso-ebi' was a Lagos concept that emerged in the 1920s with few bereaved family members who were using uniform hand-woven fabrics for easy recognition in church congregation. 'Aso-ebi' was interpreted by Nigerians to be an uniform mourning outfits which many people strove to have and wear as a mark of respect for the dead and not the it was being used it the latter years.⁷

In the 1920s, bringing back to view the Lagos doctor, Sapara, ordered his tailor to make for him an 'agbada' in light cotton cloth, shorter and narrower than the usual voluminous gown, and with only a little embroidery round the neck, finishing with a triangle in the front. This at this point in time became a new gown style, which became adopted by the youth of Lagos and became very popular and named after him 'Sapara style'.⁸

The period as late as 1933, it was observed that Nigerians do not care much for clothing as a covering, but they were very fond of it for the purpose of display, and on great occasions, they exhibited it in great quantities, and in all colours and shades of colour. That on the ordinary occasions many of the people content themselves with less clothing than decency requires. The young of both sexes were very often allowed to go out without clothing and this even when it might be

⁶ Mwesigire, B.B. 2015. Decolonising dress and fashion: *African wear in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda*

⁷ Akinwumi, T. M. 1990. The commemorative phenomenon of textile use among the Yoruba: a survey of significance and form. Ph.D. Thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.

⁸ Oyelola, P. 2010. *Nigerian artistry*. Ibadan: Mosuro Publishers.

expected that their own sense of propriety would lead them to seek the use of it.⁹

In the late 1930s there was the formation of political parties, the use of the local style of clothes by the educated classes became common and native and European clothes began to be worn equally on special occasions.¹⁰ So this means that there was the reawakening in the weaving of traditional clothes, which have been abandoned starting from the 19th century for the European attire and style of dress. Though with certain historical events that took place in the first half of the 20th century, such as the first and second World War (1916-18, 1939-45.), and the economic depression of the 1930s, there was no room for most indigenes to reflect or take any giant strides in improving the indigenous textiles or fashion up till the period towards independence.

In the 1950s, what culminate a rich woman's wardrobe was a strapless blue and silver ball dress, worn with a crinoline underskirt to emphasise the fullness of the dress with gloves and shoes to match. Clothes worn during the day was a day frock of simple but elegant design within the house, and for outdoor worn with a matching jacket. An instance was what was discovered in the wardrobe of the wife of Nigeria Federal Commissioner, who gave evidence of her dress sense as stated in the West African Magazine. Where she had Nigeria 'welcome to the queen's velvet ensemble which was made in London and other clothing such as a king-fisher blue cocktail dress and a little dark suit she wore when presented to the queen mother. This was a typical complete dress worn by the rich women in Lagos society at this point in time.

Also for the young men, they became appearance conscious, they had in their wardrobe as for western wears, one or two button jacket, with black slit. Narrow lapels and the slim look trousers, trouser legs taped at times to under eighteen inches. There was also the choosing of colour for every wear. Window pane cheele lattice wears, stripes were pattern seen in worsteds, waistcoats became very fashionable, might have lapels or long points. For evening, one dress suit bead pleated edges to the black satin faces, and to the cuffs. Also there were the

⁹ Euba, T. 1987. Dress and Status in 19th Century Lagos: *History of the peoples of Lagos State*. A. Adefuye, B. Agiri and J. Osuntokun. Eds. Lagos: Literamed Publications (Nig.) Limited. Chapter 10: 139-157.

¹⁰ Plankensteiner, B. and Adediran, N. M. 2010. *African lace; a history of trade, creativity and fashion in Nigeria* Gheru/Kortrijk: Snoeck Publishers.

ready-to-wear clothes imported from Italy. These as captured by the West African Review were the dress in vogue for young men as at the period of 1957.¹¹

Other clothes in vogue include such like, vest, panties, nylon petticoat, nylon tricot waist ships and full lengths, rayon crepe (offering protection when worn under cotton dress), three quarter shot, and dressing gown/house coat of a woolen material. Among the top clothes were warm over-coat and tweed suit which is warming, tough, etc.¹² (West African review 1955). As for the traditional wears, with an impact over a far wider region, there were the spread fashions in cloth and modification of older pattern of trade. The Yoruba gowns and smocks, *dandogo* and *gbariye*, still retained the pair of openings through which the wearers could hold their horses' reins. This now serves only as the opening of pockets can be seen in garments intended for very young boys.

1960, The Trending Fashion

With independence in 1960, a conscious adoption of local forms of dress, in part newly interpreted or invented, took hold. Employees both public and private sectors were now entitled to wear local clothing styles at work, a choice not accorded under British rule.¹³ A growing interest in the traditional garment of Nigeria had been stimulated during the time leading up to independence in 1960.¹⁴ Later around the time of independence in 1960, young men belonging to the educated elite proclaimed their nationalism through the use of *indigo adire* for their loose, short-sleeved, collarless 'mbari' shirts. Later, the *adire eleko* wrappers became collector's items as it was supplanted as a clothing fabric by factory prints (ankara) produced all over Nigeria. This means that until 1960, adire was synonymous with indigo.¹⁵

At this point in time, there was what was known as the national dress, the forerunner of the Nigerian national dress probably owes its origin to a well-known Lagos doctor, whose name (Sapara) was given to a Yoruba adaptation of the over-large heavy Hausa garment adopted by

¹¹ Anon. 1957. West Africa's lady-of-fashion. *The West African Review*. May-August: 356-358

¹² Anon. 1955. *West African Review*

¹³ Plankensteiner, B. and Adediran, N. M. 2010. *African lace; a history of trade, creativity and fashion in Nigeria* Gheru/Kortrijk: Snoeck Publishers.

¹⁴ Ashiwaju, G. and Enem, E. U. 1976. Nigerian body adornment. *Nigerian Magazine*. 68-87.

¹⁵ Oyelola, P. 2010. *Nigerian artistry*. Ibadan: Mosuro Publishers.

the Yoruba men converted to Islam as discussed earlier. This lighter-weight version of *oliya sapara* was thus known as *agbada sapara* by the Yoruba people of Lagos. This style of dress and so many other style sown from the original traditional clothing material of the Nigerian people became constant and common all around, though foreign influence on fashion continue to grow, the people of Nigeria still maintain their traditional costumes. Though it all started with this, there was a kind of re-consciousness in the making of traditional materials into different styles to suit the taste of fashion of the Nigerians at this point in time.

With the continuation of foreign influence, such clothes aside traditional were introduced, which included the long-jacketed, scrawl printed, *surah* silk suits with all around pleated skirt for female. Coats which started their swing from a narrow rib-level band and gathered momentum as they flared out to the hem, the *pagoda* seven-eight coat which widened out at the base, but still took a reed of a shirt below to produce the remaining eight.

For the male at this point in time, the dress was composed of the usual long pair of trousers (*sokoto*), and a waist-length shirt with a round collar (*buba*). The collar was usually bordered by delicate machine-made embroidery and had a short button panel. The Muslims in the state preferred a longer version of the shirt that reaches the lower leg. The style was known as *senegal* and also worn by some non-Muslims according to personal preference or occasion. This variety of everyday attire for men was made of the *ankara* or *adire* as well as of other fabric types considered as characteristic “male material”. There was the variety of light structured cotton clothes in the same restrained tones, sometimes were finely striped or delicately patterned, similar to those commonly used for western shirts, were employed. The male style materials were favoured by urban business men and politicians, and were well adapted to the local climate and offers an elegant alternative to the European-style suit, most especially when the national costume was encouraged at this point in time. The men’s suit were of the same cut as those of everyday use, but were made mostly of embroidered textiles. On official or special occasions, men of higher social status or age will wear an additional robe over the ensemble of shirt and pants. The voluminous gown in the Hausa style (*agbada*) was made of the aforementioned materials or damask, called guinea brocade. It was usually decorated in the front and around the neckline with elaborate

embroidery. To complete the outfit was the use of a cap (fila), made of *aso-oke* or stiff damask like the women's head dress.

There were also other fabrics favoured by the men and these include fine white cottons, pale coloured cottons, heavy hand-woven ones on stripes, velvets, rich brocade, damask and silks, as well as colourful "mammy clothes", (The rich fabrics were also used by women for formal dress). What is most interesting about the men's garments at this point in time was that, the garments were all cut from the square or rectangle of varying size. Some robes were intricate and cleverly pleated to give shapes. At the typical Yoruba party or ceremonial gathering, there was always the display of full richness and elegance of the national costume, like we have today. The men will put on silks and velvets of glowing colours, dark purples and blues, or immensely elegant in stiffly starched white damask, *broderie anglaise* or pleated cotton, embroidered with golden threads.

There was also the *conductor's suit* which appeared a suit of *khaki* and beige wool or cotton fabrics with short sleeves and sewn-on pockets that was worn without a shirt. The Hausa style gown, which has already been described earlier, assumed a particular importance in Nigerian men's fashion. At this time, the style of cloth worn was designed into the ones that would be able to promote national liberty. Even top officials wore traditional clothes, like gown of white cotton damask ornamented with rich hand-embroidery and the likes.¹⁶

Everyday women's attire in the traditional style consisted in general of three pieces at this point in time; there was a tailored blouse with a skirt that extends to the ankle, dubbed "up and down", and a head tie of the same material. The mostly close-fitting blouses and skirts were fashioned in a variety of styles following the existing fashion or according to personal taste. Industrially, there were printed cotton materials (ankara) and resist-dyed cloth (adire) which were predominantly used for each ensemble (close-fitting blouses and skirts).

The women equally with the aim of impressing and looking beautiful in their rich costumes tucked into their clothes the typical Yoruba blouse with great wing-like sleeves, dark smooth skins gleaming through the

¹⁶ Plankensteiner, B. and Adediran, N. M. 2010. *African lace; a history of trade, creativity and fashion in Nigeria* Gheru/Kortrijk: Snoeck Publishers.

transparent nylon. On their head was the high-flying turbans intricately and expertly wound, concealing every strand of their hair. For special occasions, a fabric is chosen by the host or hostess and the principal guests and relatives all agree to dress alike in the chosen fabric; this was a continuation in the practice of *aso-ebi*

Also on special occasions, what the people categorized as traditional clothing took another form, and differs from the everyday dress in cut. For festive events at this period, the women wore a wide, straight-cut blouse with round collar and long-sleeves, a long wrapper and matching head dress. This ensemble was considered as a classic style comparable to English wears (for instance the women's suit). This could also be made of *ankara* or *adire*, it was often tailored in *aso-oke* (hand-woven narrow strip cloth) or more often in imported embroidery textiles. The matching head tie were in a stiff material, either new styles of *aso-oke* or colourful *brocade* called damask, and tied so as to achieve voluminous proportions. More mature ladies supplemented their dressing with a shawl (*iborun*), which was folded over the shoulders, draped over the lower arm, or wrapped around the waist.

On Sunday mornings in 1960 Nigeria (Lagos specifically), most worshippers particularly youth would be seen in immaculate washed and ironed cotton robes or the very popular narrower trousers (a change in the previous version trouser) and short tunic of matching fabric. Weaving of any sort of cloth and the sowing into any style was bound up with the requirements of the people closely related to the life they led. What matter most was that, they should be suited to the climate and economic conditions, occupations and environment. Some of the people intended to underline their identity with the garments they chose to wear, others merely want to cover their nakedness or keep out the elements. Others also wanted to give their outward evidence of prosperity.

Also in the year of independence was the industrial embroideries known as *lace* in Nigeria, which defines the appearance of the people worldwide, becoming an intrinsic element of festive clothing and fashion for the Lagos people and other people in Nigeria. Like the already known wax prints that have been produced since the 19th century, in everyday parlance among the Lagosians, there was a broad distinction between "African" and "European" style of dress. And also the "Euro-American" clothing was in vogue and wide-spread in the

daily life of the people. In certain office professions, such as banking, it became an obligatory dress; the so-called traditional clothing continues to dominate many spheres of urban life. There was a strict attribution of certain types of materials to specify style of dress in existence, but in which with the creative reinterpretations of well-known fashion designers, the conventions were broken down.

Historical Analysis of fashion from Independence Up Till 1970

The kind of clothes which emerged immediately after independence to become what was called the Nigeria national costume, have evolved and developed over several generations of Nigerian history. Some people noted that one of the forerunners of the Nigerian national dress, as earlier mentioned probably owes its origin to a well-known Lagos doctor; whose name was given to an adaptation of the over-large heavy "Hausa" garments, into a more suitable and more manageable form to be adopted by the men in Lagos who were converted to Islam. This light weight *agbada* of Oliya Sapara was thus known as *agbada sapara* by the Yoruba people.¹⁷

The popular West African dress, *taille basse*, for example, combines a tight skirt, developed from African wrapped dress, with a loose blouse that was introduced by Christian missionaries who wanted to make African women cover themselves in a chaste, Christian manner. At this time, the *taille basse* follows the latest fashion and presents itself as sensuously appealing. It is cut tightly around the breast and waist, offers a seductive décolleté, and emphasizes the hips with flounces. Married women tend to drape an additional piece of cloth (*pagne*) around the hips, which alludes to female fertility. They may drape another one as an elaborate turban, lending an air of pride and dignity. The textiles' patterns also mix indigenous and colonial traditions with modernity. Highly respected are quality traditional wax-prints. These export prints made for Africa in the Netherlands and England were originally developed by the Dutch to undercut Indonesian batik production but sold more success fully on the African market. Other fabrics are made of cheaper local fancy-prints with bold patterns, including images connected with traditional proverbs or objects of modernity and prestige, such as cell phone or radio. The wide flowing *boubous*, loose-fitting gowns worn by men and women in West Africa, testify to the Islamic influence in this region. They are very often made

¹⁷ Ashiwaju, G. and Enem, E. U. 1976. Nigerian body adornment. Nigerian Magazine. 68-87.

from fine cotton damasks imported from Austria, where the same fabrics are used as table cloths and bed linens.

Nigeria witnessed two major setbacks in her history in few years after independence. First was the political upheaval that erupted in the 1966 coup, which brought in the military and second was the civil war up till 1970. After the demobilization of most military personnel who took part in the civil war, dress making improved for male and female. Lagos apart from being the federal capital and seat of government became a haven of refugees. And thus, it can be said that fashion revolution and the craze for the 'made in Nigeria' dresses started in Nigeria, at the time the military president (Obasanjo) took over with the banning of imported clothes and accessories.¹⁸

From 1960 onward, those who were not Muslim, and those who had worn the kilt-like wrapper, or skirt-cloth, now ordered suits in the form of *oyala sapara* (sapara, narrow trousers, buba). For this kind of style, all kinds of fabrics were chosen as well as a hat of one of the traditional styles to please the wearer. In the years following independence, what was called national costume was to be seen everywhere.

In the immediate post-independence era, men's cloth went through little or no such change, but the European fashion still remain dominant. In which some of it included the short *French suit jacket* splited at the back, with a turn-back sleeve to reveal a sparkling white cuff either short-sleeves or arm's length. Lagos at a point in time rose to witness some *jockey* style trousers worn by the boys, the trousers which were so tight-fitting.¹⁹

Gradually, changes were occurring in style of clothes as more changes were made by the 'modern generation' of young people. Costume, except that of ceremonial occasions and traditional festivals became more fashionable than regional. The garment *buba* for instance, was once worn as underwear; at this point in time, it became a favourite outer tunic, worn by young Lagosians. Conservative men still considered it 'bad form' to be seen in public without the outer covering gown, which was the well-known *sapara*. Another short tunic-type of

¹⁸ Ajayi, L. 1993. *African fashion and textile*. Lagos: Lagos State Council for Art and Culture Press.

¹⁹ Ajayi, L. 1993. *African fashion and textile*. Lagos: Lagos State Council for Art and Culture Press.

garments, adopted by the Nigerian youth all before the coming of the civil war was the *dansiki*, which with buba, was adapted to styles of their own, worn with narrow trousers of foreign design.

There was also an outfit known as *frenchies* which came from the French-speaking territories beyond. The style was a compromise between African-style and European-style casual wear. Young men wore it as a business suit. Made of synthetic cloth, suited to tailoring, the outfit was made in dark and dull colours.

In the past was the presence of elaborate styles development, when the young girls originally wore the small garment called *tobi*. This was their role garment, given at puberty and worn with beads. In the sixties, the costume of the Yoruba women became extremely elaborate; first was the underwear composed of *tobi* or *yeri*, once the sole garment, made up from a straight strip of cloth, sometimes pleated, reaching to the knee or thereabouts, sewn to a band which was tied around the waist, the petticoat of coloured cotton with tucks and other embroidery. There was the outer garment (*irobirin*), a large wrapper of about six yards wrapped on the body to cover the breasts and reached to the calf or below. For the brides and richer women, two of the large wrappers were used in order to cover the ankles, and in some cases, might be touching the ground. There was still the use of the smaller cloth of about three yards (*iborun*) by married women, folded and laid carefully over the left shoulder. The short blouse of tunic style with long or short sleeves (*buba*), which was cut from straight pieces of fabric, folded into either square or rectangular shapes, without a shoulder seam and having a simple boat-shaped neck, or rounded neck-line cut fairly high. The *buba* might be from any fabric unlike previously women's clothes which were made from home spun cloth woven in standard breadths of 10 of 5 wide.²⁰

In the early sixties, Nigeria developed a kind of 'cultural nationalism', and this became fashionable for the young women the *been-tos*, like wearing 'buba' and 'iro', "up and down", and long skirts made mostly from *akwete*, *okene*, wool and *brocade*. *akwete* became in vogue at this point in time as top designers of the time like Mrs Thomas and also the then Nigerian first lady, Flora Azikwe were wearing it. Though the 'national costume' was also reigning, there were still some European

²⁰ Negri, E. 1962. Yoruba Women's Costume. Nigeria Magazine 72. March 1962: 4-12.

fashion existing. Like there was the one-shoulder strap dress which was used for cocktail parties, formal dress made of silk organza with layers of frills that took as much as twenty yards of materials, all fashioned after patterns from abroad. Also in 1961, it was in vogue to put on nylon blouses which prompted the display of flimsy undergarment.²¹

The female costume was an indication of the attitude of men at the time a garment is in fashion. Not until this point in time, the female dress has always been much simpler than that of the male. Until the sixties, colour and fabric have been more restrained, but with the growing emancipation of women in the country at this period, the import into Lagos consisted of a greater variety of European and Japanese textiles at cheap prices, and more elaborations and exaggerations of the basic style crept in.

With the emancipation of women taking their place in industry and different professions, the young women often found it more convenient to wear simple European dress for office hours and keep their more elaborate national costume for parties and formal occasions. Some compromised by leaving off the head tie and substituted it for the 'buba', which was a low-necked sleeveless cotton blouse. For formal occasions, the fabrics were extremely rich; brocades, velvets and lace were worn, as well as the traditional hand-woven cloth. These hand-loomed clothes like the *aso-oke*, was costly but retained its charm. Variations of indigo blue became no longer the only colours seen on the female. Although the indigo blue was dominant, every possible hue was worn and fashion changes were made with the use of colour. When a style of fabric is introduced either in weave or in colour, then it became something fashionable to be worn or possess. Then when it became popularized within the reach of the masses, it was 'demode' it loses its importance and replaced by new styles.²²

The attitude of women toward dressing was that of retiring modesty toward men folk at this point in time. For the married female (when married to a rich guy), she wore modest 'high-necked' blouse, 'long-sleeved', 'binding skirts' impeding the movement and concealing the legs to the ankle. For those not married, the style of dress worn was aimed at increasing the apparent size and stature of the wearer;

²¹ Plankensteiner, B. and Adediran, N. M. 2010. *African lace; a history of trade, creativity and fashion in Nigeria* Gheru/Kortrijk: Snoeck Publishers.

²² Negri, E. 1962. Yoruba Women's Costume. *Nigeria Magazine* 72. March 1962: 4-12.

enormous sleeves and fullness of bodice, often in a semi-transparent fabric that conceals, reveals and suggests, voluminous folds in the skirt-cloth, and constantly needing adjustment to avoid complete loss.²³

Sometimes country-girls were seen to be wearing only skirt-cloth, which was usually pulled up high over the breasts and tied with the usual scarf-like narrow cloth. They also wear their cloth pulled-up short for work or informal times. Often their knees were exposed, as well as a glimpse of a brightly coloured cotton petticoat with plenty of machine embroidery on it.

There were changes also in the traditional mode of dress of a bride, the most sought after to be worn for the complete outfit of the bride was the hand-woven cloth, *sanyan*, *beige*, with fine white threads woven into it, made from the cocoons of insects. If the bride were to be from a rich family, she would choose *etu* (a natural fiber cloth of black speckled with white) to change into or in other case, she might prefer the crimson with stripes of green, black and white cloth (*alari*). The most expensive of all was the precious all-crimson cloth with an edge of trimming perforations.

As from the mid-sixties up till the seventies, so many innovations were brought to the old style dress in Nigeria, most especially in the western part, and this has been developing all the time into fashions which are originally truly Nigerian in representation.²⁴ For instance, the *aso-oke* cloth worn by Yoruba women was not embroidered until the experiments of fashion designer like Mrs Sade Thomas in the mid-sixties. And also did she pioneer the use of *aso-oke* for the *buba*, which had previously been made of high-weight machine-made fabric. Wavy or zigzag lines with curved motifs at intervals were embroidered in orderly fashion all over the surface of the fabric. The embroidery was done on machines by men, but did not all resemble the traditional motifs used on men's robes.²⁵

With the use of threads, needle and sewing machines and materials, local and imported, there was the revolution with talent and artistry offering to the cult of fashion and beauty all around the Lagos territory.

²³ Interview conducted with Mr. Ajayi Ladi of Lagos State Council for Arts and Culture on 20/8/2014

²⁴ Ashiwaju, G. and Enem, E. U. 1976. Nigerian body adornment. Nigerian Magazine. 68-87.

²⁵ Oyelola, P. 2010. *Nigerian artistry*. Ibadan: Mosuro Publishers.

Mrs Sade Thomas made evening dresses with the traditional Igbo cloth (akwete) and then people started imbibing it. What she did for designing, was said to have been use for modelling by the late Joyce Obong (a model in Lagos at this time). In fact the traditional wear was used by the representative of Nigeria in the 'miss world' contest, as Miss Morenikeji Fabrido was seen putting on the three piece form of clothing for the women.

Also there was the mini and micro-mini skirt which later gave way in the seventies to the midi with the variation in the length of midi occurring. There was the high-necked or what could also be called 'barely revealing neck' cloth for everyday wear, but as time went on, it started to come low as people dared.

In the mid to the late 1960s was the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), which contributed to the decline of certain social practices like the practice of *aso-oke* by the Lagos women. At this point in time, social life suffered greatly; people as a rebuff could not spend much on cloth, but solely relied on their old cloth which they neatly washed, iron and kept clean for outing.

Dressing differently than cultural norms prescribe may provoke politically charged reaction, as Bastian (1996) describes for south-eastern Nigeria women's adoption of the Hausa style tunic on top of wrappers or trousers. Experimenting with elite dress from the muslim north that politicians and the business men took up in the 1970s oil boom, women created their own dress practice, as did young male tailors who used colours, fabrics, and accessories to subvert the dress aesthetic associated with chiefly rank in their hierarchically, male dominated society.²⁶

By 1970 and beyond, constant style changes have turned the tailoring business into an entrepreneurial niche for women as haute couture designers and small scale tailors. Incorporating influences from magazines, music, video, and street scenes, their custom made clothes bend cultures from within Africa and beyond, with both new and second hand clothing serving as resources.²⁷

²⁶ Bastian M. L. 1996. Female "*Alhajis*" and Entrepreneurial Fashion: flexible identities in south-eastern Nigeria. Duke University Press.

²⁷ Hendrickson H, ed. 1996. Clothing and Difference: *Embodied Identities in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa*. Durham: Duke University Press

Conclusion

In all, the breaking with the past suggest the drastic change that occur in Nigeria as regard fashion between the colonial and postcolonial Nigeria, though one might be thinking that the period is just a decade after independence and that there could not have been much changes, the fact here is that there occur a drastic change in dress between the period of colonialism and independence. This dynamics as analysed previously to be simply put showcase the improvement or the upgrade in the traditional dress. Nigerians became motivated and encouraged to go back to the traditional wears which were forcefully neglected during the colonial era, it should also be noted that these traditional wears were not only worn for special occasions, as people began to feel free to wear it in their day to day activities

Since the 1980s West African fashion has turned away from readymade clothes in a Western style. Clients and tailors cooperate closely to design unique fashionable creations. They may study international fashion magazines as a source of inspiration but each dress is created individually. Tailors maintain that artistry, originality, and creativity are the very essence of their enterprise. Since fashion is the primary mode of demonstrating social standing, economic success, and credit worthiness, each woman strives to be as beautiful and fashionable as possible, even if she can barely afford it. Thus, fashion tends to change very quickly.

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Migrants, Community Associations and their Development Initiatives in Katsina, 1976–2019

Samuel WYCLIFF

Abstract

There is no society in the world without a migrant community that became united under some common aims and objectives in order to achieve their interests. Katsina State Capital in the North-West of Nigeria was not an exception. Therefore, through historical methodology and cross examining of primary and secondary sources, this paper examines the history of community associations and community development initiatives in Katsina state capital but narrowing it to migrant communities of Nigeria residing there. The paper argued that, these communities, united in order to promote their languages, cultures, identity and nationhood through the establishment of community associations, speaking of their languages, cultural displays during festivities, such as the end of the year parties/celebrations, almanac launching, and exhibition of traditional dishes. Further to this, they ensure the welfare of their members through provision of soft loans to establish small scale and medium enterprises, payment of children school fees, assistance in terms of needs; births, weddings, sicknesses, disasters, and the conveying the corpse of deceased members. Apart from the above, their votes always count with regards to presidential, gubernatorial, national and State House of assembly/senatorial or constituency elections. This is because many Katsina indigenous politicians always sought for their support considering their important roles in winning Katsina state capital elections. Beyond that, the economic activities of their members have contributed immensely in the informal sector of the economy especially through the spread of other business opportunities, Internal Generated Revenue (IGR) and execution of some projects. The paper concluded that, the presence of these community associations have indeed promoted cross cultural relationships among Nigerians to the extent that they were appointed as Special Advisers to the State Governor.

Keywords: Community Associations, Katsina State Capital, History, Migrant, Roles.

Introduction

The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) is a country with over 250 ethnic groups and approximately 500 languages. Besides, there is no community that lives in total isolation or refused to interact with other communities within their vicinity. Moreover, human beings wherever they are whether they are “migrants” or “sons of the soil” do make concerted efforts to establish community associations, forums, and or movements for different purposes that hinged on faith, unity, peace, progress, and above all to sustain their purpose of existence, nationhood, culture and identity as unique human beings residing in a particular part of the world. Katsina State Capital being a historic headquarters of the ancient Katsina Kingdom, Emirate in Northern Nigeria which has overtime undergone transformation in various spheres, had in existence different community associations, especially by the migrant communities residing there as a result of social dependency along with push and pull factors of migration and inter-group relations. This development called for an extensive research on their history, roles, and challenges. It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts to examine the history of community associations and community initiatives in Katsina state capital of Nigeria, from 1976 when Katsina became a Local Government Area (LGA) under the defunct Kaduna state, and then to 2019 which marks the end of the first tenure of All Progressive Congress (APC) government in Katsina State and Nigeria. Sequel to this, the paper was divided into sections. Section one gave the introduction which is ongoing on. Section two is the territorial location of the study area while section three gave the conceptual clarification on community associations. Section four focused on the growth and development of these community associations, meanwhile section five looked at the challenges while section six gave the conclusion and recommendations.

Territorial Location of Katsina State Capital

Katsina State Capital refers to Katsina metropolis or city which is also the administrative headquarters of Katsina LGA, Katsina Emirate Council and Katsina State in the North-West Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria, West of the continent of Africa. It is located some 172 Kilometres north-west of Kano town and 260 Kilometres east of the city of Sokoto. It roughly lies between an upland area located on Latitude 12⁰ 5' and 13⁰ 22' North and Longitude 7⁰ 33' and 9⁰ 22' East in the extreme north of Nigeria and spur of land between two water courses of *Koramar*

Tilla and *Gisu* flowing in north- easterly direction.²⁸ It is also located at the extreme part of Nigeria-Niger border.²⁹ Thus, its immediate environs form the present study area, which is bordered by the local area of Kaita to the North (North-East), Jibia and Batsari to the North-West, Batagarawa and Rimi to the South and then Mani to the East.³⁰ Hence, the metropolis occupies the present Katsina District having *Magajin Gari* as the District Head. It also consists of ten ward units: *Wakilin Gabas*, *Galadiman Gabasawa*, *Wakilin Arewa*, *Galadiman Arewa*, *Wakilin Yamma*, *Magaji Madu*, *Wakilin Kudu*, *Galadiman Kudu*, *Magaji Modoji*, and *Magaji Shinkafi*.³¹ Thus, the colonial census survey put the population figure of the Katsina State Capital in 1952 at 52,672 comprising people of diverse origins or languages of the Nigeria area residing there.³² Hence the population statistic of the capital was growing steady because in 1926 it was 15,215, in 1931 it stood at 27,831, in 1940 it rose to 31,699 and by 1944 the figure had risen to 36,423 and then in 1946 and 1953 the population of the city stood at 37,262 and 52,672 respectively. It further rose to 115,220 by 1977,³³ 144,895 in 1980,³⁴ and 223,644 in 1991, and to 318,132 in 2006. More so, total population figure stood at a projected figure of 429,400 in 2016, 432,149 in 2017 and 460,375 in 2019.³⁵

²⁸ *Max Lock Survey Group, Surveys and Planning Reports for Kaduna State Government* .London: Westminster Press Ltd, 1978. Pp. 23 & 46-47 and Shehu, J. "The Creation and Urban Transformation of Katsina Town, 1987–2007." In Ashafa, A. A. (ed.). *Urbanization and Infrastructure in Nigeria since the 20th Century, Festschrift in Honour of Professor Ezzeldin Mukhtar Abdulrahman*. Kaduna: Kaduna State University, 2011. Pp. 220-222

²⁹ Shehu, Pp. 220-221.

³⁰ Iliyasu, W. "An Analysis of Urban Violence and Threat to National Security in Nigerian Cities: The Example of Katsina Metropolis, 1980s–2007." Working Paper, Department of History, Umaru Musa Yar'adua University (UMYU), Katsina, Nigeria, 201. Pp. 1-5; Yandaki, A. I. and Shehu, J. "The Environment, Nature and the Action of Man in Birnin Katsina, 1000–2000: Some Critical Reflections." Paper presented at the 3rd National Conference on Climate Change and Its Implications for Sustainable Development in Nigeria held at Federal College of Education, Katsina, August 2–5, 2010 and Mamman, M. *The Emergence of Wards in Katsina Metropolis*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press Limited, 2011. Pp. 1-210.

³¹ Shehu, J. "A Social and Political History of Katsina Metropolis, 1960–2007." PhD (History) Thesis, Usmanu Danfodiyo University (UDU), Sokoto, 2012. Pp. 7-9, and 220; Grove, A. T. *Land and Population in Katsina Province*. N.P. n.d; Buchaman, K. M. and Pugh, J. C. "Land and Peoples of Nigeria." PhD (History) Thesis Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria, n.d and Usman, Y. B. *The Transformation of Katsina 1400–1883. The Emergence and Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment of the Emirate*. Zaria: ABU Press Ltd., 1981. Pp. 186-187.

³² *Max Lock Survey Group*. Pp. 46-47 and Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazette, Abuja Number 2, Volume 96, B33, February 2, 2009, p. B33.

³³ NAK/KATPROF/NA W44-Population Statistics. Pp. 57-93.

³⁴ *Max Lock Survey Group*. Pp. 33-34.

³⁵ National Population Commission Office, Katsina, 2011; "World Bank, United Nations – Census GeoNames." Access December 27, 2019 from <http://populationstat.com/Nigeria/katsina> and "City

Nonetheless, as a State Capital, Katsina metropolis attracted migrant communities from within and outside Nigeria who came in search of opportunities. As a result therefore, new forms of inter-group relations developed during this period. Besides, as it was observed by Liman and Adamu, state capitals and states creation in Nigeria have been an important epoch in the development of capital cities because it attracted capital and human resources.³⁶ Owing to that, Katsina metropolis had since 1987 witnessed a gradual increase in population which necessitated structural changes within the walled city or from all angles or areas of the city. Quite a number of open spaces were developed into residential houses³⁷ and for other purposes.³⁸

Conceptual Clarification

The people or citizens of a particular state consists of communities, societies and associations. Communities consist of people who live in a particular area and share certain characteristics or amenities. Societies consist of groups of people who share certain values. Associations are groups of individuals who share similar interests.³⁹ Therefore, in order to under study the phenomenon under review, it will be good to have an understanding of this key concept “community association.”

Community Association

Community association therefore is a non-governmental association of which comprises members of a community participating in the said community association, such as a neighborhood, village, condominium, cooperative, or group of homeowners or property owners in a delineated geographic area.⁴⁰ They usually have common interests, cooperative spirit, operating under a written constitution and bye-laws as well. They equally registered with government agencies most especially the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Social Development. However, the kind of community

Population-Statistics, Maps and Chart.” Access December 27, 2019 from <https://www.citypopulation.de/php/nigeria-admin.php?adm2id=NGA021021>.

³⁶ Liman, M. A. and Adamu, Y. M. “Urbanization and the Spatial Development of Urban Centres.” In Yakubu, A. M., et’al (eds.). *Northern Nigeria A Century of Transformation, 1903–2003*. Kaduna: Arewa House Kaduna, 2005. Pp. 359-360.

³⁷ Establishment of New Layouts, Construction of Low-cost houses and expansion of infrastructure amongst others.

³⁸ Katsina State Urban Planning and Development Authority Office Record of October 12, 2010.

³⁹ Amtaika, A. “Is the Private Sector A Partner of the State in the Socio-Economic Development or a Subordinate: The Marxian and the Neo-Liberal.” In Amtaika, A. (ed.). *Socio-Economic Development in Africa. Challenges and Dimensions*. Texas: Pan-African University Press, 2017. Pp. 55-87.

⁴⁰ “Community Association.” Retrieved on May 14, 2020 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_association.

associations we are dealing with in this study simply refers to associations established by Nigerian languages, ethnic groups, people from different Local Government Area (LGA), States and the six (6) Geo-Political Zones of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) who may be residing in any part of the country other than their place of origin. Such community associations are usually formed in order to protect and promote the welfare, culture and identity of their members under a constitution and bye-laws. In fact, they ensure that the said associations are registered with the host community government under the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Development. In addition to that, most of them have a direct link or get registered with the LGAs, states and geo-political zones of their origin and or national bodies (association) in order to have a larger awareness, sent and or receive support from or for any on-going community projects whether in their home, communities or in their host community.

The Growth and Development of Community Associations in the Katsina State Capital

Having seen the conceptual clarification of community associations, therefore, the focus will now be on their growth and development in Katsina State capital.

It is a well-known fact that Katsina State capital had been a home of heritage and hospitality. This made it to attract quite a number of communities among which quite a number of them were integrated as a result of commerce and Islamic religious factor, especially since the 15th to early 20th centuries. To this end, they lost their identity thereafter or subsequently were identified as the Hausa and Fulani. However, the history of migrant community associations in the capital could be traced to the colonial period (1903–1960) which paved way for the migration of the Igbo, Christian missionaries such as the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS),⁴¹ Roman Catholic Mission (RMC) and Sudan Interior Mission (SIM).⁴² In the same vein also, were colonial imperialist firms, agents and staff such as teachers, typists, drivers, engineers, medical personnel, photographers, as well as independent businessmen and women especially from the former Western and Eastern Regions of Nigeria.⁴³ Subsequently, this led to the establishment of community associations in Lagos in 1923 such as the Igbo State Union (ISU). They had branches all

⁴¹ This missionary body is now Anglican Church.

⁴² Now Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA).

⁴³ "History of John's Church" *Hope Magazine. A Publication of the Diocese of Katsina Anglican Commission*. October, 2011:16-17.

over the country,⁴⁴ including the Katsina metropolis, which having been partially established there in the 1940s, began to change grounds in the 50s.⁴⁵

Furthermore, the Igbo community associations seemed to be the first in the Katsina metropolis with community associations such as Awkuzu Progressive Union established in 1944 and then Okigwe Senatorial Union 1972. As such, in their quest to promote the welfare of their members as well as the development of the Igbo society, they continued to re-organize their unions and associations. For example the Igbo had quite a number of local government associations and unions in Katsina metropolis which were based on their original LGAs the in South-East Geo-political Zone Nigeria, which led to the reactivation and reorganization of the Igbo Union (IU) in 1973 under the leadership of late Chief John Areh (being a Central body whose activities were curtailed in 1966 as a result of the Nigerian Civil War). In 1989 the IU name was changed to Igbo Welfare Association (IWA) with Chief Sylvanus Ezebulie as the first Chairman. It is equally important to note that it was in 1989 that the IWA elected Chief Hillary Chukwuma Okonkwo as the Eze 1 of Katsina,⁴⁶ and at the same time established the Igbo Traditional Institution headed by the Eze and the Igbo Political Institution headed by the IWA President. By 2006, during the tenure of Chief Daniel Abe experienced another change as it IWA was renamed Igbo Community Association (ICA) as a symbol Igbo oneness and unity. It was also line with other Igbo associations in Northern Nigeria.⁴⁷

It is important to put on record here that, Chief Hillary Chukwuma Okonkwo was unanimously elected as Eze Ndi-Igbo 1 of Katsina State in 1989. On June 17, 1995, he was formally installed as the Eze Ndi-Igbo of

⁴⁴ Coleman, J. S. *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958. Pp. 35-33.

⁴⁵ Wycliff, S. "A History of Igbo-Migrant Community in Katsina Metropolis, 1903–2011." M.A (History) Dissertation, ABU, Zaria-Nigeria, 2012. Pp. 182-183.

⁴⁶ "Forging Ahead as People." *Igbo Community Association Maiden Edition. Igbo Day Magazine*, 2008:16-17 and *Imo State United Association Katsina State Magazine for Imo Day Celebration*. July 26, 2009:49.

⁴⁷ Onyia, Chief O. (OK 2000). Age 41. President Igbo Community Association (ICA) Katsina State. Interviewed at Ahmadu Bello Way, Sabon Layi Katsina on November 14, 2014 by 12:00–2:20pm; Ezeike, Chief N. D. E. A. Age 68. Civil Servant. Interviewed at Custom Wire House Katsina on April 17, 2015 by 10:00–11:00am; Solomon, Mr. E. Age 43. Dealer Bookshop & Stationeries. Interviewed at Mexico Bookshop, along Usman Nagogo Road, Gwangwan Katsina on November 11, 2014 by 10:05–11:00am and Mai Hoto, Alhaji A. Y. Age 69. Interview at his Studio –Gwongwon, Usman Nagogo Road on November 11, 2014 by 9:30–10:05am.

Katsina by the then Military Governor of Katsina State – Navy Captain Emmanuel Acholonu (1993–1997) and was given a staff of office. Also, as a sign of closer cooperation with the Igbo Community, Okonkwo's coronation got the blessings of the late Emir of Katsina Alhaji Muhammadu Kabir Usman (1981–2006). The Eze symbolizes the leader of all Igbo in Katsina State, and therefore by the virtue of this office, he channels led all the challenges of his people to the government or to the traditional authority for amicable settlement especially if the problem had to do with *Katsinawa* (Katsina indigenes) or other migrant groups.⁴⁸ Besides, the ICA is the central body that brought together persons of Igbo origin by birth, marriage, naturalization or adoption within a metropolis or geographical area. Its main purpose was to cater for the welfare, promotion and maintenance of Igbo heritage while enhancing infusion in recognition of other cultures. Its membership was open to all Igbo organizations in the geographical area as defined in its constitution. No wonder its motto remained as *Ihunaya, Udo Idin'otu* (Love, Peace and Unity).⁴⁹

It is also of equal importance to note here that, apart from the ICA, there were other prominent community associations that emerged in Katsina State capital. The factors that led to the establishment of such associations were tied to the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in 1973 which posted young Nigerians from other parts of the country to Katsina.⁵⁰ Further to this, other important factors were the creation of Katsina as an LGA in 1976, followed by its upgrading as the administrative headquarters of Katsina state

⁴⁸ Nwoso, Chief J. C. The Onowu Igbo Katsina (Igbo Prime Minster and Acting Eze of Katsina State), Age 84. Dealer of Generator and Blubber. Interviewed at IBB Way Tsohuwar Tasha Round About, Katsina on November 5, 2014 by 10:00–11:00am; Ahononu, Chief C. O. (Omereochie I of Katsina), Age 53. Dealers of Electrical/ Electronic materials. Interviewed at IBB Way, Kofar Kaura Round About, Katsina on September 9, 2014 by 12:00Noon–1:30pm; Chief J. Umetiti, (alias as Bugashi), Age 75. Dealer Generator and Plumbing Materials. Interviewed at Ahmadu Bello Way, Sabon Lay, Katsina on September 9, 2014 by 10:00–10:40pm; Ochukwu, Chief S. Age 75. Proprietor New Palace Hotel. Interviewed at Off Sarki Muhktar Way, Sabuwar Unguwa Katsina on November 8, 2014 by 10:30–11:00am; Obi, Chief A. Age 84. Dealer of Iron and Steel Materials. He was Classmate of Late Emir of Katsina Alhaji Kabir Usman. Interviewed at IBB Way Adjacent formal Nakowa Bakery, Katsina on August 31, 2014 by 10:00–11:30am and September 6, 2014 by 12:00Noon–1:30pm; Louis, Mrs. N. Age 48. Administrative Officer, Federal University Dutsin–Ma. Interviewed at Shagari Low–cost, Along Batsari Road April 5, 2015 by 4:00–5:00pm and Umeagudosi, Chief J. (the Eze Udogachi), Age 58. Dealer of Generator and Plumbing Materials. Interviewed at IBB Way, Tsohun Tasha Round About, Katsina on July 30, 2014 by 10:30–11:00am and September 9, 2014 by 9:00pm–9:30pm.

⁴⁹ Constitution for Igbo Community Association (ICA) Katsina, Katsina State, Reviewed, 2008. p. 2 and Osaghae, E. E. *Trends of Migrant Political Organization in Nigeria: The Igbo in Kano*. Ibadan: IFRA Institut français de recherche en Afrique, 1994. Pp.35–53.

⁵⁰ O. Chikezie F., “NYSC Permanent Orientation Camp, Katampe Extension, Abuja (A Study of Adaptable Spaces).” M.Sc. (Architecture) Dissertation, University of Nigeria, NSukka– Enugu-Nigeria, 2011. Pp. 6–9

on September 23, 1987 from the defunct Kaduna state. All these led to the influx of public/civil servants such as force men and paramilitary as a result of transfers by both federal government and private firms. The building of LGA and State Government secretariats, and the proliferation of banking institutions, then business men and women who came from different tribes/languages and ethnic groups from across the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) or the six (6) Geo-Political Zones (North-West, North-East, North-Central, South-West, South-East and South-South) all of which led to demographic changes and the cosmopolitan nature of Katsina State Capital were additional factors that led to the influx. More so, when a particular individual came in contact with their fellow tribes/language men and women, or people from the same LGAs, State and or geo-political zones, they exchange contacts and subsequently, they start their community associations through meetings. Some of which started from 2 to 10 members etc. Subsequently, the numerical strength of the community associations increased over time. Examples of such were the Kilba Development Associations (KDA) (1989) and lots more.⁵¹ Table 1 presents list of the various community associations.

List of Community Associations in Katsina State Capital), 1943–2019

S/No.	Association Name	State	Geo-Political Zone
1.	Igbo Community Association (ICA)	South-East	South-East
2.	Abia State Association	Abia State	South-East
3.	Bende Progressive Union	Abia State	South-East
4.	Oha Ngwa Welfare Association	Abia State	South-East
5.	Ikwuano/Umuahia Progressive Union	Abia State	South-East
6.	Ohafia Development Association	Abia State	South-East
7.	Isuikwuato Development Association	Abia State	South-East
8.	Omunochi Uturu	Abia State	South-East
9.	Arochukwu	Abia State	South-East
10.	Anambra State Association	Anambra State	South-East
11.	Awkuzu Progressive Union	Anambra State	South-East
12.	Orumba Welfare Association	Anambra State	South-East
13.	Aguata Progressive Union	Anambra State	South-East
14.	Ekwusigo Local Government Union	Anambra State	South-East
15.	Nnewi Local Government Progressive Union	Anambra State	South-East
16.	Old Njikoka Development Union	Anambra State	South-East

⁵¹ Wycliff, S., Ayuba, Elder A., and Nedamanaya, Elder P. M. "Brief History of Kilba Development Association (KDA) Katsina State Chapter, Nigeria, 1989–2017." KDA Historical Committee, December 2, 2018. Pp. 1-5.

17.	Ekwulumili Development Union	Anambra State	South-East
18.	Orumba North Association	Anambra State	South-East
19.	Nnewi South	Anambra State	South-East
20.	Ihiala Divisional	Anambra State	South-East
21.	Ebonyi State Association	Ebonyi State	South-East
22.	Ebonyi South	Ebonyi State	South-East
23.	Enugu Development Association	Enugu State	South-East
24.	Enugu Youth Association	Enugu State	South-East
25.	Nsukka Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
26.	Abakaliki Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
27.	Igbo-Eze Local Government Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
28.	Onyeaghalanwannya Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
29.	Ezeagu Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
30.	Nkanu United Association	Enugu State	South-East
31.	Aninri Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
32.	Igbo-Etiti Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
33.	Eha-Amufu Development Union	Enugu State	South-East
34.	Eha-Amufu Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
35.	Nkanu Progressive Union	Enugu State	South-East
36.	Udi Local Government Union	Enugu State	South-East
37.	Awgu Local Government	Enugu State	South-East
38.	Imo State United Association Katsina State	Imo State	South-East
39.	Orlu Senatorial Union	Imo State	South-East
40.	Okigwe Senatorial Union	Imo State	South-East
41.	Mbaise Progressive Union	Imo State	South-East
42.	Orlu Divisional Union	Imo State	South-East
43.	Obowu Development Association	Imo State	South-East
44.	Mbaitoli-Ikeduru Patriotic Union	Imo State	South-East
45.	Ngor-Okpala Development Union	Imo State	South-East
46.	Aboh-Ezininnitte Progressive Union	Imo State	South-East
47.	Mbano United Association	Imo State	South-East
48.	Owerri Local Government Association	Imo State	South-East
49.	Obowo Local Government Union	Imo State	South-East
50.	Ihitte-Uboma Development Union	Imo State	South-East
51.	North-East Forum	North-East Nigeria	North-East
52.	Adamawa Development Association	Adamawa State	North-East
53.	Kilba Development Association	Adamawa State	North-East
54.	Marghi Development Association	Adamawa State	North-East
55.	Higgi Development Association	Adamawa State	North-East
56.	Lunguda Development Association	Adamawa State	North-East
57.	Mbula Development Association	Adamawa State	North-East
58.	Zaar Development Association (ZDA)	Bauchi State	North-East

	(Bauchi)		
59.	Biu Community Forum	Borno State	North-East
60.	Kada Development Association	Borno State	North-East
61.	Gombe South Development Association (GOSDA)	Gombe State	North-East
62.	Taraba Development Association	Taraba State	North-East
63.	Jenjo Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
64.	Tinjim Development Association	Taraba State	North-East
65.	Wurkun Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
66.	Yandam Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
67.	Kuteb Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
68.	Jukun Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
69.	Mumiye Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
70.	Chamba Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
71.	Biquen Community Association	Taraba State	North-East
72.	Sothorn Kaduna Progressive Union (SOKAPU)	Kaduna State	North-West
73.	Bajju (Kaje) Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
74.	Anghan (Kamantan) Community Development	Kaduna State	North-West
75.	Gure Community Association	Kaduna State	North-West
76.	Atyap Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
77.	Ham (Jaba) Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
78.	Kagoro Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
79.	Marua Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
80.	Ikulu Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
81.	Adra (Kadara) Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
82.	Nimzom Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
83.	Gog (Kagoma) Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
84.	Ninkyop Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
85.	Numana Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
86.	Nandu Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
87.	Kamantam (Anghan) Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
88.	Chawai Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
89.	Gbagyi (Gwari) Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
90.	Atakar Development Association	Kaduna State	North-West
91.	Plateau Development Association (PLADA)	Plateau State	North-Central
92.	Beco Berum Cultural Organization	Plateau State	North-Central
93.	Bokkos Community Association	Plateau State	North-Central
94.	Bassa Community Association	Plateau State	North-Central
95.	Ngas (Angas) Community Association	Plateau State	North-Central
96.	Jos North Development Association	Plateau State	North-Central

97.	Taroh Community Association	Plateau State	North-Central
98.	Mwaghavul (Magavul) Community Association	Plateau State	North-Central
99.	Mupun Community Association	Plateau State	North-Central
100.	Quanpan (Mikan) Development Association	Plateau State	North-Central
101.	Nassarawa State Indigine Residing in Katsina (NASIWA)	Nassarawa State	North-Central
102.	Eggon Cultural and Development Association (ECDA)	Nassarawa State	North-Central
103.	Mada Development Association	Nassarawa State	North-Central
104.	Rendere Development Association	Nassarawa State	North-Central
105.	Gbagyi Ayenajeji Association	Niger State	North-Central
106.	Mzough U Tiv	Benue State	North-Central
107.	Idoma Community Development Association (ICDA)	Benue State	North-Central
108.	Idoma West Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
109.	Idoma North Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
110.	Idoma West Welfare Association	Benue State	North-Central
111.	Agatu Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
112.	Ado Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
113.	Apa Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
114.	Okpokwu Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
115.	Otukpo Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
116.	Ohimini Development Association	Benue State	North-Central
117.	Igede Community Development	Benue State	North-Central
118.	Igala Cult	Kogi State	North-Central
119.	Igala Central Welfare Association	Kogi State	North-Central
120.	Igala Community Association	Kogi State	North-Central
121.	Ebira People	Kogi State	North-Central
122.	Illorin Desc Union	Kwara State	North-Central
123.	Nupe Community	Niger State	North-Central
124.	Yoruba Community Association	South-West	South-West
125.	State of Osun	Osun State	South-West
126.	Edo Progressive Union	Edo State	South-South
127.	Ijaw	Bayelsa State	South-South
128.	Cross River	Cross River State	South-South
129.	Akwa-Ibom	Akwa-Ibom State	South-South
130.	Lekaku Community Association		
131.	SOKEZA Association		
132.	UPU		
133.	Pede Da Bwatye		
134.	South		

135.	Anioma		
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Source: “Forging Ahead as People.” *Igbo Community Association Maiden Edition. Igbo Day Magazine*, 2008:45-60; *Imo State United Association Katsina State Magazine for Imo Day Celebration*. July 26, 2009:35-46 and Field work from January to May, 2020.⁵²

At this juncture, one might perhaps be tempted to ask whether these community associations had a central body which coordinate their affairs and spoke as one voice before the Katsina State Government, Emirate Council and other agencies. Of course, they do. The Association of Non-Indigenes in Katsina State (ANIK) which was a non-political and non-religious, was opened to all non-indigenous people whether Christians, Muslims and or African Traditional Religious (ATR) followers who were living in Katsina State for the sole purpose of catering for the welfare of its members. Started in 1990, was officially registered with the Katsina State Ministry of Youth, Sports and Social Development in the year 1991, and was renamed the Association of Indigenous Nigerians (AIN) Residing in Katsina State in the year 2008 by the former Executive Governor of Katsina State – Barr. Ibrahim Shehu Shema (May 29, 2007 to May 29, 2015) for the purpose of promoting oneness among Nigerians and community development initiatives.⁵³ This community association, had worked with different governments of Katsina State from 1999–2007, 2007–2015 and then 2015–date.

Administrative Structure and Language of Communication

Further to this, these community associations have administrative structures. It could be recalled that, it had been noted earlier on that they had constitutions and bye-laws which guided their operations. During their general congress meetings, they used to organize elections (by secret balloting) in order to elect their leaders who will serve for a tenureship of 2 to 3 years and in most cases will not exceeding 2 tenures in office if re-elected. Examples of the executive offices are: President/Chairman, Vice President/Chairman, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor, Public Relation Officer I and II, Provost/Discipline Master I and II, Social Organizer I and II, Legal Adviser I and II and so on. In addition to Patrons and

⁵² Note all effort to get the year of establishment and names of the other chairmen of various was difficult. That is why I decided to just used the names of the Community Associations without indication year of establishment.

⁵³ Magaji, Chief & Malam. D. A. Age 55. Care Taker Committee Chairman (2006–2007) & Second President (2007–2015) of Indigenous Association Nigerian Residence in Katsina State (AIN) Katsina State Chapter. Interviewed at Filin Samji, Katsina on August 9, 2018 by 6:00–7:30pm and August 20, 2018 by 2:30–3:30pm,

Matrons are not elected, but appointed without a specific number of years of tenure of office based on their age, social standing and commitment to community.⁵⁴

It is worthy to state here that, the administrative structure of the community associations is in different stages. For instance, there is a tribal/ethnic community association, LGA, State, and that of the Geo-Political Zone as well as the National Level. As such some of the executive members might emerge from only a particular tribal/ethnic group or other levels (e.g. LGA or State). In Adamawa State, for instance there is the Kilba Development Association (KDA) at the tribal level and or Local Government while Adamawa Development Association (ADA) at the state level, and then the North-East Forum comprising of states like Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe which form the North-East Geo-Political Zonal level.⁵⁵

The language of communication for the community associations varies. The idea here is that, for those that were established by a particular tribe, they will basically make use of their native language in order to promote their culture and identity. This is also done in order to inculcate the habit of promoting the speaking of their language so that it will not die. But they often made use of Hausa and English in order to accommodate those wives and husbands who inter-married with men of that tribe. It is also to accommodate children who grew up but could not speak or understand the native language. In the case of for community associations for LGAs, States, Regions, and Geo-Political Zones English and Hausa are the languages used as means of communications. Examples are AIN, North-East Forum, Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) which happens to be the central body for all community associations in the Southern area of Kaduna State of Nigeria such as the Atyap (Kataf), Bajju (Kaje), Ham (Jaba), Kagoro, Marwa, Ikulu, Adra (Kadara), Nimzom, Gog (Kagoma), Ninkyop, Numana, Nandu, (Anghan), Chawai,

⁵⁴ Danna, Elder. D. Age 55. Provost (2007–date) North East Forum and Former Secretary (1999–2001), Zaar Development Association (ZDA). Interview at Usman Nagogo Road, Katsina Metropolis, Katsina State on May 19, 2020 by 4:55–6:00pm and Masaibi, Elder W. T. Age 55. Former Chairman, Taraba Development Association Katsina Chapter (2008–2010) and Chairman, Jenjo Community Development Association (JCDA) (2003–2010). Interviewed at Kwado Sabon Titi behind Hajj Camp, Daura Road, Katsina metropolis, Katsina State on July 29, 2020 by 4:04–4:56pm.

⁵⁵ Hananiya, Elder H. Age 51. General Secretary (2016–Date), Association of Indigenous Nigeria (AIN) and Former Chairman (2011–2016), Adamawa Development Association (ADA). Interview at No. 11 Zango Street, Opposite Goma Guest-inn, Katsina Metropolis, Katsina State on June 17, 2020 by 7:10–9:20pm.

Gbagyi (Gwari), Atakar, Koro, Kamanton, Kuturmi, and Gwandara. Sources revealed that, it is only the ICA that strictly made use of the Igbo language in her congress meetings considering her large ethnic group that covered the South-East with states like Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, and Imo.⁵⁶

Membership and Meeting Venues

In terms of membership, it varied according to each community association in Katsina State Capital. For example, in the case of tribal community associations, most of their constitutions and bye-laws stated that, they were opened only to the people of the tribe living in Katsina State whether the person is Christians, Muslims and or African Tradition Religious (ATR) followers and who have attained the age of 18 years and above. Individuals (men/women) who were not members of the tribe but are married to sons of the tribe automatically become members of the tribe by virtue of their marriage. While for that of LGAs, State and Geo-Political zones, the membership were opened only to the tribes from those areas, who are residing in the Katsina metropolis and Katsina State as a whole.⁵⁷ These community associations especially in the tribal, LGAs and State have a Men Wings, Women Wings, Youth Wings with a central body that brings all of them together which is often called General Congress Meeting or the General Meeting. Furthermore, these community associations, used to be meet once on every first or last Saturday or Sunday of every month. These meetings were mostly held at security barracks such as the Police Barracks Sabon Layi, Police Barracks Dogon Gida, Military Barracks, and Hotel Conference Halls. In some cases, they often rotate the meeting venue to be held in their member's residences to enable them to know the houses of each member in case of any emergency needing urgent attention.

In addition to that, they had uniforms which they wear in almost every meeting or on special occasions such as their yearly festivals, ceremonies, fundraising, launching and courtesy calls to the Government House. Their uniform was a T-Shirt and wrappers (for women) and T-Shirt with black trousers (for men) whose colours represent their traditional attire. In the course of their festivals, other migrant

⁵⁶ Attah, Elder J. Age 60. President (2015–Date), Nassarawa State Indigene Residing in Katsina (NASIWA) and Chairman (1990–1993), Eggon Cultural and Development Association (ECDA). Interview at Kambarawa, Daura Road, Katsina Metropolis, Katsina State on June 29, 2020 by 4:10–6:10pm.

⁵⁷ Dajik, Mr. P. Age 57. Former General Secretary, Plateau Development Association (PLADA) Katsina State. Interview at Hassan Usman Road, Behind Lema Jibril Residence, Katsina Metropolis, Katsina State on June 15, 2020 by 12:55–2:00pm.

communities and their host – the *Katsinawa* are usually invited to rejoice with them during, which they also display their various traditional dances and exhibit their various traditional dishes or foods.

Source of Finance

In the area of finances, these community associations in their attempt to run their day-to-day affairs/ administration and in order to meet the welfare needs of their members, have devised different avenue/plat forms for sources of income and the generation of revenue. These included: (1) membership registration fees; (2) sales of copies of constitution and by-laws; (3) monthly dues and levies; (4) sales of membership cards and renewal of membership cards; (5) donations, grants and aids from other associations, organizations, individuals and government especially during sales of yearly almanac, fund raising and launching for projects, Christmas and Sallah festivities, and political campaigns; (6) profits generated from business ventures such as (commercial bus transportation, sales of plots of land, fertilizer, and cereal grains), interests from loans given to members, sales and use of assets such as landed property, conference halls, plastic seats and tables, canopies, and use of meeting venue; (7) fines accruing from disciplinary measures meted against members who misbehaved such as late coming, charges on default in payment of dues, levy, noise making, absenteeism fighting or quarrelling, and so on.⁵⁸

Roles of Community Associations

The existence of these community associations had played vital roles in the socio-political and economic development of the welfare of their members and Katsina State Capital their host (*Katsinawa* – Hausa and Fulani) through various activities which are highlighted below.

Socio-political roles

First role is in the socio-political aspect, especially in the area of awareness, political participation, peace and unity and cross-cultural relationships. For instance, these community associations encouraged their members to be law abiding citizens who should always promptly report crimes to law enforcement agencies in order to curtail the rate of social vices and criminal activities in the area of study. More so, they play the role of solving intra and inter family and community

⁵⁸ See for example *The Constitution of Plateau Development Association (PLADA) Katsina State Chapter*. Reviewed, 2018 and *The Constitution of Kilba Development Association (KDA) Katsina State Branch*. As Amended 2020.

conflicts/misunderstanding. They also encourage members to always channel their grievances to the leadership of the associations which would forward it to the appropriate government agencies for lasting solutions.

In the area of political participation, such community associations do serve as important avenues for the government to pass across important information with regards to state policies, and at the same time create awareness on the importance of registration to be bona fide voters in order to obtain their Permanent Voter Card (PVC) and equally exercise their political rights during elections. It will interest you to know that, since 1999 to 2019, for any politician contesting for the position of a governor, member of state and national assembly he has to seek the votes of these migrant community associations and with lots of promises.

Thus, this made them to be key instruments in winning elections in the Katsina state capital and its environs as witnessed during the elections of late Governor Umaru Musa Yar'adua (May 29, 1999–May 29, 2007) and Barr. Ibrahim Shehu Shema (May 29, 2007–May 29, 2015) all of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and then Rt. Hon. Aminu Bello Masari, CFR (Dallatun Katsina, Matawallen Hausa) (May 29, 2015–date) of the All Progressive Congress (APC). Consequently, it was considering their important roles that Rt. Hon. Masari in 2017 appointed an Igbo man whose father was the first Eze I of Katsina by name Prince Uche Okonkwo as Senior Special Adviser (SSA) to the Governor on Non-Indigenes Matters. On his re-appointment in 2019, he was made the SSA on Christian Non-Indigenes Matters while Mallam Abubakar Musa Waziri – SSA on Muslims Non-Indigenes Matters.

In the same vein Mrs. Felicia O. Agbaire and Janet Kudayidi were appointed Special Assistants (SAs) to the Governor –.⁵⁹ This gesture was followed by giving of slots for the training of non-indigenes into small and medium scale enterprises/youth empowerment programs as well as donation of funds on request, and provision of food and clothing materials which had been the tradition of the state and LGA governments over the years during Christmas and Sallah festivities to be shared among them in order to boost their celebrations and prayers for the state. In addition, the state government since 1999 to date used to allocate quite a

⁵⁹ "Press Release." *Katsina State Government. Office of the Secretary to the Government of the State*, June 7, 2019.

number of pilgrimage seats through AIN to Christians in order to go to Israel while the Muslim to Mecca – Saudi Arabia for their religious obligations and also to pray for Katsina state and Nigeria as a whole. These developments therefore, further enhanced the common tie between *Katsinawa* and the migrant community associations/other Nigerians who were residing in the state. This also and honoured the outstanding performance/impact of the said migrant community associations in the socio-political and economic development of the area.⁶⁰

In a similar development, Rt. Hon. Masari appointed Malam Haruna Danjuma Ghata – an indigenous Hausa Christian as Chairman Christian Pilgrims Committee/SSA on Christian Matters. In fact, many more appointments were made in the year 2019; Rev. Ishaya Garba Jurau – SSA on Christian Affairs/Chairman Christian Pilgrimage Board, Mrs. Saratu Liti – Special Assistant (SA) on Christian Women Affairs. All of which were Hausa Indigenous Christians and members of Tarayyan Masihiyawa A Nigeria (TAMANI) which emerged in the 1980s popularly known as *Masihiyawa* – an association of indigenous Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri Christians in Katsina state that basically sought to advocate for the recognition of their rightful status as indigenes of Katsina state.⁶¹

In addition to that, these community associations under the auspices of AIN had spoken with one voice in advising the state government, especially on issues relating to peace, unity, and progress of inter-group relations. For example, during the tenure of Barr. Ibrahim Shehu Shema, when he declared a free education policy for indigenes of the state which excluded the non-indigenes his attention was drawn by the AIN to the negative effects and implications of such a policy since the non-indigenes vote and pay their taxes to the state, he immediately rescinded

⁶⁰ Habu, M. M. Aged 70. First Head-Teacher Baban Ruga Primary School and Second State Coordinator Chastain Pilgrim Committee. Interviewed at Sabon Garin Alhaji Yahuza on August 22, 2018 by 4:00–6:30pm; Shehu, M. S. Age 50. Church Elder on Mission, ECWA Church GRA, Katsina. Interviewed at Usman Nagogo Road, Kofar Durbu, Kasina metropolis on August 24, 2014 by 3:00–5:00pm and Damboama, D. M. “Christians and Political Participation in Katsina State.” M.A (Theology) Dissertation, Faculty of ECWA Theological Seminary, Jos-Nigeria, 2014. Pp. 20-40.

⁶¹ Onyekachukwu, Very Rev. N. Age 45. Fourth CAN Chairman Katsina State and General Overseer Power of Resurrection Assembly Katsina State. Interviewed at Power of Resurrection Assembly, Katsina on June 29, 2018 by 2:00–3:00pm and Dauda, Mallam Dr. G. Age 60. Third CAN Secretary of Katsina State (1996–2012), Secretary of CAN North-West (2012–2016) and Vice Chairman (2017–date), Katsina State Coordinator (2004–date), National President of TAMANA (1995–2000) and Nigeria Praise (2004–date). Interviewed at Gabasawa Lay-out, Mani Road, Katsina on April 6, 2014 by 11:30am–12:50pm and on August 21, 2018 by 12:00Noon–4:00pm.

and declares free education for all; irrespective of whether an indigene or non-indigenous residing in the state.

Further to this, these community associations through their activities in the capital many Nigerians came in contact with their spouses i.e. met with their husbands or wives. Hence, a lot of inter-marriages were witnessed between various Nigerian languages and ethnic groups across the 6 Geo-Political Zones of Nigeria who spoke different languages. Examples are Igbo getting married to a Bajju or Igede, Yoruba with Igala, Calabar with Birom, Kilba with Igala or Idoma, Hausa and Fulani with Yoruba, Igala, Ibirra, Igbo, Higgi and so on. All of which cut across major religions in Nigeria – Christianity and Islam. Thus, in the course of these wedding events and or ceremonies, a lot of cross-cultural displays were witnessed, which in turn promoted mutual ties and unity in diversity among Nigerians and makes us to be our brothers' keepers strengthens and love for peace and unity in our country.

Economic roles

Economic roles was another important aspect which these community associations had impacted on Katsina tremendously. In the first place, they made provision for soft loans and or loans without any interest to her registered members in order to help them overcome family financial challenges, boost their businesses/establish small and medium enterprises, pay their children's school fees, house rents and or to purchase residential houses. In addition, these community associations assisted the less privileged families such as retired men and women, widows and widowers, and also orphans through school scholarship, gift of money, the provision of food items, clothes and shelter. They often visit orphanage homes to make donations of foodstuffs, clothes and money. All these have indeed elevated the standard of living as well as reduced the rate of poverty among Nigerian citizens within and across Katsina state capital.

Further to this, they assisted their members in terms of joy and difficulty. For example, during child birth, naming and wedding ceremonies, sickness of family, and or in the case of any incidence that happened to a member either an accident, theft, flood, fire storm, or death. They assisted their members through specially organized free will donation and levies. For instance, when any of their members dies, they shoulder the responsibilities of taking the corpse of the deceased member to his

hometown (village) as well as the burial expenses in addition to donation of money to his/her family.

Further to this, they also contributed immensely in the state capitals Internal Generate Revenue (IGR) through their registrations and annual re-renewals of registration with Katsina State Ministry of Youth, Sports and Development under the Youth Club/Associations Edit of 1986. Coupled with that, her members who are engaged in small and scale medium enterprises paid different taxes and levies such as registrations of business ventures and business premises, annual renewal fees, yearly or monthly levies/taxes, and charges on signboards and PAYE as duly charged by the Ministry of Education; Commerce, Industry and Tourism; State Board of Internal Revenue; Local Government Treasury and Katsina State Urban Planning and Development Authority (KUPDA).⁶²

Besides all these, it should be noted that, whenever the state government was organizing some important functions that affected the residents of the study area, these associations ensured that they participated actively. For example, during the appeal fund of the *Gidauniyar Jihar Katsina* Trust Fund, Igbo Community Association (ICA) donated the sum of ₦ 600,000.00 to show their support and cooperation.⁶³ In addition to that, they even constructed bore-holes at *Sabuwar Unguwa* Quarters, Katsina.⁶⁴ Hence, their participation was a clear testimony of promoting of inter-group relations and service to humanity between them and their host community.

In addition to that, these community associations equally assisted their State of origins, LGAs and villages in the execution of capital intensive projects such as building of schools, hospitals and dispensaries, construction of bridges, roads, bore-holes, markets and the provision of teaching and learning materials.

⁶² Kofar Soro, Alhaji I. M. Age 49. Assistant Personal Income Tax. Interviewed at Board of Internal Revenue Katsina State Office, Justice Muhammadu Bello Road GRA, Katsina on December 16, 2015 by 3:00:00pm; Kankara, Alhaji M. B. Age 46. Assistant Chief Inspector of Internal Revenue. Interviewed at Board of Internal Revenue Katsina State Office, Justice Muhammadu Bello Road GRA, Katsina on December 17, 2015 by 3:00–4:00pm and Kahlid, Alhaji A. K. Age 52. Assistant Director PAYE. Interviewed at Board of Internal Revenue Katsina State Office, Justice Muhammadu Bello Road GRA, Katsina on December 17, 2015 by 2:40–3:20pm; Nnamanni, Mr. I. Age 50. Dealer Domestic Industrial Gas. Interviewed at IBB Way Opposite UBA Bank, Katsina on October 2, 2014 by 12:00Noon-2:00pm; Wycliff, “A History of Igbo-Migrant Community in Katsina Metropolis, 1903–2011.” Pp. 172-174 and Annual Report of Katsina State Board of Internal Revenue Report, 2011–2015. Pp. 1-30.

⁶³ Interview with Chief Nwoso, Ahanonu, Obi, Onyia and Mr. Solomon.

⁶⁴ Chief Nwoso, Ahanonu, Obi, Onyia and Mr. Solomon.

Challenges

Despite the tremendous roles played by of these community associations, they experience quite a number of challenges. Firstly, the official transfers of their members out of Katsina state capital or the state especially, those of them who were federal civil/public servants, force men/paramilitary who for the majority of these community associations. Secondly, the series of conflicts and crisis that erupted such as the Religious Crisis of 1987, the Sharia Crisis of 2000 and Post-Presidential Election Violence of 2011 led to the forced migration and death of many migrant communities as well as the destruction of their properties worth billions of naira.⁶⁵ These had indeed reduced the numerical strength of their activities and affected the nature of inter-group relations between them and their host community. Thirdly, was the inability of people residing in Katsina metropolis, who refused to identify themselves with such community associations for no just reasons but when something happen to them, they kind of look forward to the associations for assistance or supports for which they do not get because they did not identify themselves with the community associations. Fourthly, there are quite a number of their members who hardly pay their dues and levies as such when it accumulates, they cease to be members and such affects the growth and development of the community association. Fifthly, religious differences often affects their unity negatively. This usually splits them into 2 (Christians and Muslims) which discourages other people from joining these community associations and consequently, the aims and objectives of their establishment would be defeated. Sixthly, there is the challenge of leadership crisis, especially as it relates to elections for positions of leadership in the community associations of LGAs, States and Geo-Political Zones. Sources revealed that, some tribes or Geo-Political Zones often desired to be the only ones that will continue to be Chairmen/Presidents, Vice Chairmen/President, and Secretary to the detriment or disadvantages of the other tribes etc.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, from the above analysis, one would agree with me that beyond all reasonable doubt the activities of these community associations and initiatives have indeed transformed the lives of their members and promoted the nature of their inter-group relations. This shows that, Katsina state capital cosmopolitan nature is a replica of the unity in diversity of Nigeria despite the various/numerous challenges. On these notes, this

⁶⁵ Wycliff, S. "Igbo-migrant community Enterprise in Katsina metropolis and Katsinawa Reactions, 1929–2011." *FUDMA Journal of Arts. A Publication of the Faculty of Arts, Federal University Dutsinma-Nigeria*. Volume 1 Number 1, 2018:249-262.

paper recommends that, these community associations should always put their differences aside with a view to always pursue unity and faith, peace and progress of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN). They should also see the importance of Nigeria's unity in diversity as being of paramount importance in every of their life endeavour. More so, there is a need for the host community, not only commercially integrate other Nigerian tribes residing among them, but should also give them the opportunity to contest for political positions. By so doing, they will start investing their resources beyond imagination in not only the state capital but the entire state as a whole. They will equally support different community projects in different parts of the state since they have a high sense of belonging that Katsina state is their home as well.

Contemporary Monarchical Philanthropism in Yorubaland

Olukoya OGEN

Abstract

The prevailing literature on global philanthropism often privileges Western philanthropists and their agencies over and above their African peers. In the main, Africans are generally portrayed as mere recipients of aids, donations and charities from well-endowed and benevolent Western philanthropists. This work dismisses this flawed view. In its stead, it advances the argument that Africans are naturally imbued with a beneficent spirit. Thematically, the study specifically focuses on the historical trajectory of Abolarin College, an ultra-modern, non-fee paying school established by HRM Oba Adedokun Abolarin, a prominent Yoruba traditional monarch in Nigeria. Given this thematic preferment, the paper is largely celebratory of an institution that is contributing significantly to the provision, liberalisation and democratisation of quality education (SDG-No:4). The paper concludes that given the gradual erosion of the awe and reverence hitherto associated with Yoruba royalty, it appears that contemporary Yoruba monarchical institutions will now be judged on the practical benefits that they can bring to their subjects.

Keywords: Yoruba royalty, monarchical philanthropism, Abolarin College, Orangun of Oke-Ila.

Introduction

All of our subjects, from our royal children down to the lowest commoners, will have the same opportunity to study – be they royals, nobles or commoners (King Chulalongkorn, Rama IV of Thailand, 1882).

Globally, available evidence suggests that over the last 200 years the charitable role of the monarchy has become increasingly important. In the United Kingdom the monarchy has always fortified royal popularity by nurturing the belief that individuals, however humble, have a claim on its services. Indeed, one of the most important roles of the modern monarchy is the sponsoring of charitable institutions. Thus, monarchical philanthropy has ancient traditions.

Whereas the history of charity in the developed world has largely been written and continues to be updated, such intellectual engagement are still in the embryonic stage in Yorubaland and most other parts of Africa. This is largely due to lack of institutional records hence the flawed argument that the role of the monarchy in caring for the poor in Yoruba society is non-existent. Beyond mainstream global view of monarchical philanthropy, this work explores African indigenous understanding of charity and monarchical philanthropy. Wilkinson-Maposa et al (2005) found out that the culture of charity and philanthropy is not only widespread in Africa but also firmly entrenched and was vital for societal progress and survival.

By focussing on the historical trajectory of Abolarin College, a thriving secondary school established by HRM Oba Adedokun Abolarin, the Orangun of Oke-Ila to cater for brilliant but indigent students, this paper showcases an Oke-Ila monarchy that has moved far away from royal jamborees and the prosecution of supremacy battles to being an institution of value that is contributing significantly to the realisation of Goal numbers 1 and 4 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. While goal number 1 targets the eradication of poverty, goal number 2 deals with the provision, liberalisation and democratisation of quality education.

Structurally, the study is divided into several major sections, the first part introduces the discussion while the second part situates the analysis within its conceptual and theoretical frameworks. In part three, the thematic focus of the study is approached from a global historical perspective. Thus, case studies of monarchical philanthropic interventions from other parts of the world are highlighted for the purpose of illustration and to show that there is a gap in our existing knowledge of the subject matter. This section also demonstrates how the present study fits into the existing literature on global monarchical philanthropy. Part four concentrates mainly on the establishment, nature, growth and impact of Abolarin College while the last part concludes the essay.

The paper concludes that Abolarin College aptly illustrates the fact that royalty is a summon to charitable duty and that never before in our recent history has there been a greater need for a robust development-oriented partnership between royal charity and government.

Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations

In the Greek tradition, the word philanthropy is derived from the Greek words “philos” meaning “love” and “anthropos” meaning “man” or “humanity. Thus, philanthropy simply means “love of humanity.” In modern parlance, it connotes “the use of private initiatives for the public good”. Three main approaches to philanthropy have been identified in the prevailing mainstream literature (Anheier and Leat, 2007). The first is the charity or service approach which has its origins in religious or moral practice stressing help for the ‘less fortunate’ through alms giving, tithing and its equivalents. The second approach is the philanthropic or science approach which is distinguished from the charity approach by its focus on addressing the causes rather than symptoms of problems. The third approach is the venture philanthropy or entrepreneurial philanthropy approach otherwise known as ‘philanthro-capitalism.’ This approach reflects the rapid accumulation of new wealth from 1990 onwards including the massive wealth generated from the IT sector (Edwards, 2008). This study will provide further elucidation on the philanthro-capitalism as we proceed with our analysis.

Charity versus Philanthropy: Ostrower (1995) opines that philanthropy includes charity and patronage as well as alms giving and the encouragement of self-help. It must be emphasized that charity appears to be specifically directed towards the poor, whereas philanthropy has broader aims and objectives. Of course, philanthropy encompasses charity, but it also dovetails into the wider practices of private giving to the arts, environmental causes, health and rehabilitation, education, universities, museums, religious organizations, parks, cultural institutions, youth, and urban development. Sociologists of the elites typically explore philanthropy from a perspective of elite legitimation and reproduction. One of the most seminal studies in this tradition is *Why the Wealthy Give* by Francie Ostrower (1995). He is of the view that philanthropy is broadly seen as a means by the wealthy to gain legitimacy, secure and control class boundaries and perpetuate social positions across generations. Philanthropy is therefore distinguished from charity by virtue of its focus on the structural and systemic conditions that cause social malaise while charity merely treats the symptoms of this malaise. (Frumkin, 2006: 5).

Smith (2014) and O'Neill (2018) also provide some conceptual clarifications regarding the concepts of charity and philanthropy. The two interwoven and interrelated concepts have often been used interchangeably by scholars, analysts and commentators. According to the authors, while charity is focused on providing immediate relief to people and is often driven by emotions, philanthropy on the other hand is focused on helping people and solving their problems over the longue duree. Besides, *charity tends to be a short-term, immediate emotional response focused primarily on rescue and relief, whereas philanthropy is much more long-term, more strategic and is focused on rebuilding. For instance, it has often been affirmed that the donations of cartons of bottled water to people that lack access to portable water is charity, but sinking a borehole or digging a well is philanthropy. Thus, problem-solving charity is called philanthropy.*' The bottomline is that both charity and philanthropy are key factors in the development of communities and improvement of the lives of human beings. They reflect how people show compassion for others who are less fortunate than they are or those who have been impacted by negative events (O'Neill, 2018).

Elite Philanthropy: To Maclean (et.al) (2021) Elite Philanthropy is mainly self-serving – it merely creates goodwill for the super-wealthy rather than alleviate the social ills of the poor. The authors further argue that Elite philanthropy entails the voluntary giving by the wealthy in order to extend elite control from the economic sphere to the social and political domains of societal life. Thus, Elite philanthropy is considered not as a benign force for good or one that is borne out of altruism, but one that is heavily driven by inequalities and the globalisation of poverty. Indeed, more often than not, elite philanthropists have a way of appropriating the social and political dividends that accrue from their philanthropic 'investments'. Invariably, the fundamental effect of elite philanthropy is the maintenance of the economic, social and political hegemony of the super-rich, nationally and globally. The conclusion is that elite philanthropy essentially functions to lock in and perpetuate inequalities rather than remedying them.

Philanthro-capitalism: Philanthro-capitalism is a veritable dimension of elite philanthropy. The concept stems from Matthew Bishop's and Michael Green's *Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World and Why We Should Let Them* (2008). The foreword to the book was written by Bill Clinton, whose foundation

trades as a model example of philanthro-capitalism, as do the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative. Philanthro-capitalism is also applied to venture capitalists, social investors and entrepreneurs, who believe that their business activities stimulate the wider social good on a global scale.

Thus, at the micro-level, it is a new way of doing philanthropy, which mirrors the way that business is done in the for-profit capitalist world. At the macro level it connotes the ways in which capitalism itself tends to be philanthropic by working for the good of mankind (Bishop and Green, 2008).

Impact Philanthropy

This study cannot but be guided by the theoretical canvas of Impact Philanthropy as ably enunciated in Duncan (2004). Essentially this theory captures the very essence of the philanthropic intervention of Oba Abolarin on the Nigerian educational landscape. As a new theoretical construct of altruism, this type of philanthropy is fundamentally different from what is generally termed as Elite Philanthropy or even its modified variant of philanthro-capitalism. According to him an impact philanthropist is someone who wants to personally ‘make a difference.’

A renowned Professor of Philanthropy who doubles as the co-founder and co-director of the Institute of Sustainable Philanthropy at Plymouth in the United Kingdom, Adrian Sargeant, is of the view that effective or impactful philanthropy is the kind of philanthropy that has impact. It is philanthropy that succeeds at amassing, managing, then allocating financial and human resources in ways that have the greatest long term positive impact on beneficiaries.

Since its establishment, the monumental impact which Abolarin College has made in terms of capacity building, empowering the underprivileged class of the society, bridging the gap between the rich and the poor on one hand and attempting to eradicate poverty on the other hand, is phenomenal. It is a luminous example of Impact Philanthropy at its best, hence the adoption of this theoretical paradigm as our model of analysis.

Monarchical Philanthropy in Global Historical Perspective

It will be apposite in a study dealing with monarchical philanthropy in Yorubaland to draw parallels from other lands especially the developed world as way of providing a rich historical and theoretical background to the thematic focus of this discourse. This justification becomes even more significant when we take into consideration the fact that monarchical philanthropy in the Western and Asiatic traditions seems to be an exception rather than the rule in Africa. In fact, Oba Adedokun Abolarin is one of the earliest purveyors and pioneers of this commendable royal initiative. Our focus in this section will be on the rich traditions of monarchical philanthropy in Britain, Spain, Russia, Japan, China, the Middle East and Thailand.

Monarchical Philanthropy in Britain

From time immemorial, the British royalty has been well known for its involvement with charitable causes. About 3,000 philanthropic organisations around the world are reputed to have at least one member of the British royal family either as a patron or president (Prochaska (2006). While it is easy to see this support as a simple act of charity, Sandy Bair (2018), however, argues that British royal philanthropy should be understood as a reciprocal exchange between the monarchy and the beneficiaries of its philanthropic handouts. She opines that the monarchy is even the greater beneficiary because the public relations value of its philanthropism is used to nourish and maintain its privileged existence. She contends further that the British monarchy has been facing a dramatic decline in its popularity and is desperately trying to salvage what is left of its reputation, consequently, it has turned to high-profile philanthropy to improve its public standing. The conclusion is that it is ironical to observe that while royal philanthropy contributes to causes that fight for economic empowerment, for greater democratic participation and equality; the ongoing existence of monarchies depends upon state-sanctioned inequality and inherited privileges.

Monarchical Philanthropy in Japan

The Japanese royal family is reputed to be the oldest hereditary monarchy in the world, dating back to the sixth century BC

(Blakemore, 2019). In the best tradition of elite philanthropy, for over 2,600 years it has been actively supporting charities. Indeed, in 2020, the Imperial Household Agency announced that Emperor Naruhito donated ¥50,000,000 each to two institutions that are bent on eradicating child poverty and offering relief services to victims of natural disasters. These organisations are the Foundation for the Support of the Children's Future (Kodomo no Mirai Ouen Kiki), and the Japan Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (JVOAD). It would be recalled that Emperor Emeritus Akihito also made a donation of ¥100 million to similar organizations when his son ascended throne. According, to a representative from the Imperial Household Agency, "Their Majesties (the Emperor and Empress) wish to deepen the people's understanding of the problem of child poverty, and the need to support the increasing numbers of volunteers who help people who were affected by the many disasters that occurred during the Heisei period from 1989-2019" (Roll, 2020).

Monarchical Philanthropy in Spain

Spain also has a rich tradition of monarchical philanthropy. This tradition is best exemplified with the Queen Sofia Foundation that was constituted in 1977 by Her Majesty, Queen Sofia with her personal capital. Since 1994, it has managed and promoted many educational and health projects, as well as projects involving social and humanitarian assistance, benefiting children, the elderly, immigrants, the disabled and those affected by natural disasters (Queen Sofia Foundation, 2022). One of Queen Sofia Foundation's main lines of action was the Sofia Foundation Alzheimer's Centre, inaugurated in 2007, the Centre has carried out 27 research projects and produced more than 60 scientific publications. It is currently carrying out a €1.8 million research project on early diagnosis of Alzheimer with the help of one thousand volunteers (Queen Sofia Foundation, 2022).

Monarchical Philanthropy and Philanthro-capitalism in Russia

Schimpfössl (2019) investigates the historical and cultural features of Russian philanthropic practices and argues that philanthropy was initially confined to the aristocracy and the monarchy. The Tsars and Tsarinas kept tight control over who was allowed to give and to whom. The results were the establishment of a great number of educational and health-care institutions as well as institutions of art and culture (Khodorova 2014). By the mid- to late nineteenth century,

industrialists, financiers, and merchants had accumulated sufficient wealth to divert some of it to charitable causes. This philanthropy covered a wide range of areas, from cultural institutions and the arts to social trusteeships or social welfare (Dinello, 1998).

Ironically, these initial gains were reversed under Soviet rule when philanthropic activities became primarily domiciled within the control of a highly centralized Soviet State. In fact, the authorities fully institutionalized social welfare and forbade all philanthropic activities because they perceived them as capitalist practices that undermined the role of the Communist Party (Kurilla 2002).

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in the early 1990s, a small number of Russia's new businessmen started to embrace philanthropic activities. (Khodorova 2014). This resurgence of elite philanthropy by the new Russian billionaires and oligarchs is governed by the principles of philanthro-capitalism. Critics of this new brand of philanthropy argue that philanthro-capitalism has become fashionable at a time of increasing social inequality with the wealth of a tiny group of hyper-rich multiplying exponentially and that never before in history has social inequality widened as rapidly as it has in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2013 Credit Suisse declared Russia as one of the countries with the highest level of wealth inequality in the world (Keating et al. 2013: 53).

The Historical Evolution of Chinese Philanthropism

Important to the understanding of modern Chinese philanthropy is that in pre-modern China little distinction was made between charity and philanthropy. Interestingly, these charitable legacies persist in current Chinese philanthropy. The notion of charity is deeply rooted in the ethical traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. This notion creates a strong sense of moral obligation of giving to help others prior to the secularization that accompanied the Chinese Revolution of 1949. Under the various pre-1911 dynasties and in Republican China (1911-1949), local communities through temples or palace-based associations supported schools, orphanages and hospitals; provided assistance during famine or natural disasters; and helped poor families to defray the cost of burial. From the Song dynasty (960-1279) until the end of dynastic rule, local county magistrates were at the forefront of the provision of charities. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644),

quasi-private foundations supported by local elites, called “benevolent societies,” also emerged and provided support for the needy.

Thus, on the eve of the Communists’ coming to power in 1949, China enjoyed a lively and pluralistic philanthropic environment. This came to an end when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power. Just like it happened in Russia, the new regime held the view that it was the obligation of the state to provide all necessary services and support for individuals in need; not to do so would be regarded as a failure of the state. Consequently, private philanthropic initiatives and non-governmental associations (NGOs) were banned and foreign philanthropies were told to leave China.

However, the reforms in China’s which effectively started in 1978 have resulted in enormous economic gains and remarkable accumulation of private wealth. The broad economic progress has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty to the extent that in 2015 China had succeeded in achieving all of Millennium Development Goals. With an estimated 568 billionaires with a combined net worth of RMB 9.7 trillion (USD 1.4 trillion), China boasts of having the highest number of billionaires in the world. Increasingly, these billionaires are converting a portion of their private wealth to philanthropic capital.

Consequently, philanthropy in China today is in a state of expansion, experimentation and evolution. Though its origins and the charitable motivations of the country’s new philanthropists are deeply rooted in traditional Chinese values, yet at the same time there is a readiness to borrow from Western philanthropic practices and strategies. The new 2016 Charity Law is a milestone in providing more legitimacy to the philanthropic sector and encourages its growth, consistent with government priorities. Article 5 of the 2016 Charity Law states that approved philanthropic organizations will engage in “charitable activities that represent the core values of socialism and promote the traditional morals of the Chinese nation.”

Philanthropy in China is widely viewed by many as an activity in which almost everyone should be involved. It is developing rapidly and the number of private foundations increased from 2,737 to 4,211 in 2014. Between 2009 and 2014, recorded donations also increased by 66% to a total of USD 16.40 billion. Indeed, in 2014, it was

reported that China's top 100 philanthropists contributed USD 3.18 billion to support causes in education (44%), social causes (26%), poverty alleviation (9%) and disaster relief (5%). Given the prevailing scenario, one cannot but agree with the Chinese billionaire and world renowned philanthropist, Lui Che Woo when he boldly asserts that "Philanthropy is the golden key to unlock the gate of China's next chapter of modernization."

The Gulf Petro monarchies and Philanthropy

Lowi (2019) offers a comparative analysis of charitable giving in the four Gulf monarchies of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. She finds out that in these Muslim countries, it is natural for people to give regularly to charity as a way of showing their devotion to God and their willingness to assist the needy. It is interesting to note that with the exception of Kuwait, the most prominent charitable foundations in these monarchies are the ones created by members of the ruling family or by major political associations or interest groups. However, unlike in Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia, charities in Kuwait are not connected to the ruling family but rather to religious tendencies and identities.

In Saudi Arabia, among the largest and most visible foundations are those associated with members of the Al Saud family or their closest associates. In fact, one of the most visible philanthropic organization is the King Feisal Foundation. Apart from the building of schools, hospitals, and mosques, today the foundation focuses primarily on supporting education, providing scholarships and funding research. Similarly in Oman, the largest and best endowed charity is the Oman Charitable Organization (OCO), a public entity founded in 1996 by royal decree. In Qatar, most of the prominent foundations were established with the fortunes and in the names of members of the ruling alThani family. Thus, according to Lowi (2019) the involvement of royals, whether directly or indirectly, combined with the branding of foundations with their name, is in a way, a portent strategy by the Gulf monarchies to use charity as a tool for the attainment of political ends in order to enhance their legitimacies, shore up their influences and to gain more followers.

Monarchical Philanthropy in Thailand

Popularly referred to as the 'Land of Smiles' the long antiquity of Thai's philanthropism typifies the broader role of the royal family in

Thai society. For instance, in the Hall of Inspiration, a museum that features the upbringing and contribution of the Mahidol royal family to Thailand, there is a caption that says ‘not noble by birth, yet noble by deeds’. In a way, this inscription aptly captures the nobility of the members of the royal family and underscores why the monarchy is highly revered in Thailand.

Recently, there has been a transformative shift in Thai philanthropy in the past decade due to the vagaries of Thai’s political economy as well as the forces of globalisation and technology. In the midst of this change, members of the Thai royal family remain key purveyors and major stakeholders of several charitable environmental and social causes thereby impacting positively on many groups of vulnerable and underserved populations. For instance one the lasting impacts of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, named King Rama IX who passed away in 2016 and who at the time of his death was the world’s longest-serving head of state having reigned for 70 years is the close association between the monarchy and the business sector. This relationship was characterised by the enduring and humongous private donations to royal charities. This is philanthrocapitalism at its best. What makes the Thai case distinctive is that the rallying point of philanthropic activities is the monarchy. It is a political institution that is as wealthy as – if not wealthier than – many giant corporations.

Thus, from time immemorial, members of the Thai royalty have been of the firm belief that royalty is not just a privilege but a responsibility and commitment to work for the people. As a strategic way of improving and adding value to the lives of Thailand’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens, the Thai royalty has spent years establishing and working on several education, health, agriculture, legal and poverty alleviation projects. As a matter of fact, royal philanthropic initiatives are given priority for financial and in-kind support from both individual and corporate philanthropists. Of particular significance to this present study is the philanthropic activities of King Chulalongkorn, Rama V and his son King Vajiravudh, Rama VI.

All of our subjects, from our royal children down to the lowest commoners, will have the same opportunity to study – be they royals, nobles or commoners.

This quote, taken from King Chulalongkorn's royal speech to members of the royal family and civil servants, is a confirmation of His Majesty's belief in equal educational opportunity. The King granted the policy to set up schools throughout the kingdom, together with institutions of higher learning, and declared '...education in our country must have the highest priority, which I am determined to develop.'

King Chulalongkorn reigned from 1868 to 1910 and was succeeded by his son Prince Vajiravudh. He was the one that originally founded Chulalongkorn University in 1899 as a school for training royal pages and civil servants.. It is ranked as the best university in Thailand. According to QS World University Ranking 2017, Chula University is placed 245th in the world, 45th in Asia and 1st in Thailand. Similarly, the 2022 AD Scientific ranking ranked Chula University as the best university in Thailand, number 45 in Asia and 648 in the world.

The institution was established and financed from the proceeds of the financial contributions of members of the royal family ably led by King Chulalongkorn. The King also donated about 520 acres of the his private land adjacent to the palace for the college's future expansion. In fact, the Faculty of Arts and Science started from the palace of his son, Prince Vajirunhis. Today, the statues of Rama V and his son, Rama VI stand conspicuously on the campus of Chula University.

Traditional Monarchical Philanthropy in Yorubaland

It is widely known that in the past, the poor and homeless usually took refuge at Yoruba palaces. John illife (1984) confirms that even an 'Ifa divination verse describes a cripple who became rich through the chance favour of a king.' A popular proverb in Yorubaland states that 'a poor beggar never perishes from want in the palace of a Yoruba king. In the past, every king in Yorubaland wore the toga of a philanthropist because a king was perceived and treated as a father to all living and even non-living creatures. There is also ample evidence that indigenous religious cults provided charity. These bodies were usually cults of affliction, in that some members were initiated into them as a way of curing sickness or relieving some misfortune. Indeed, religious cults were among the most important institutions caring for the poor in pre-colonial Africa. Incidentally, the king is the overall custodian and spiritual head of all Yoruba traditional religious forms and practices.

A generous person or philanthropist, *gbajumo*, is highly revered in Yorubaland to the extent that they are usually honoured with prestigious traditional titles for their good deeds. Yagboyaju (2018) opines that the Yoruba like most other African ethnic groups are noted for traditional practices of gift-giving or charity otherwise known in Yoruba language as *ore* or *ebun* - an age-long practice which is widely encouraged to further strengthen communal living. Although kindness may be given in response to the request of a recipient, it is generally regarded as more honourable when it is volunteered by the donor because givers of *ore* or *ebun* are expected to be blessed by God.

This practice is what has been termed ‘horizontal’ philanthropy by Wilkinson-Maposa et al (2005). Essentially, this takes the form of material exchanges such as food, money and clothing as well as non-material exchanges such as physical / manual support, contribution of time and skills, knowledge sharing and moral / emotional support. Mottiar, (2015) is of the view that:

Horizontal’ philanthropy as opposed to ‘vertical’ philanthropy refers to patterns of giving occurring among equals. In this sense givers are not ‘richer’ and recipients ‘poorer’ nor is giving institutionalised but rather socially embedded and morally grounded (Mottiar, 2015).

Thus, as far as charity is concerned, the monarchy, indigenous religious cults, family-based compounds and local philanthropists (*gbajumo*) remain the key units of Yoruba pre-colonial philanthropic activities.

Abolarin College and Contemporary Monarchical Philanthropy in Oke-Ila

Alayeluwa Oba Dr. Adedokun Omoniyi Abolarin, the Orangun of Oke-Ila, who ascended the throne of his ancestors on December 8, 2006 singlehandedly founded Abolarin College in 2014 through his NGO – The Abolarin Aroyinkeye Foundation. The College is strategically located on the hills of Oke-Ila Orangun, the headquarters of Ifedayo Local Government Council in Osun State, Nigeria and home to Ayinkunugba Waterfall, an amazing natural wonder and tourists’ delight.

Driven by his passion for education as well as his humane and sympathetic disposition to the underprivileged, Oba Adedokun Abolarin has succeeded in providing a tuition-free, meal-free, boarding-free, first class post-primary school education designed exclusively for the children of the poor and down trodden in our society (Busari, 2020).

Eligibility for admission

What makes the school remarkable is that the two main criteria for admission are brilliance and the indigent status of every potential student. The king is of the view that brilliant kids from poor socio-economic backgrounds should be given the opportunities of realising their potentials in life so that the future will not belong to only those that are born with silver spoons in their mouth. Interestingly, admission is not restricted to children from Oke-Ila or Yorubaland alone but every less-privileged child from anywhere in Nigeria who is brilliant is *prima facie* qualified for admission. Thus, Abolarin College is peopled by orphans, child labourers, destitute and abandoned children, former hawkers and petty traders, etc. These are the categories of students now studying in Abolarin College in their neat uniforms and living in a clean environment. To Oba Adedokun Abolarin, access to quality education irrespective of any child's background is a *sine qua non* for Nigeria's rapid socio-economic transformation and the eradication of poverty.

Prior to their admission, many of the students had been abandoned to fend for themselves by their parents and guardians due to abject poverty. Consequently, apart from the opportunity for the acquisition of quality education, the school serves as home, a place of refuge and rehabilitation for kids that had hitherto been condemned to misery, penury and social dislocation.

Nigeria's first highbrow college established solely for children of the poor

The school is completely free because it was founded with the vision of providing free world class quality education to children picked from the streets and those from poor homes whose parents cannot afford their education. At Abolarin College, all the students have unfettered access to personal laptops, well equipped library, textbooks and other writing materials, uniforms and school bags. All these are provided free

of charge. All the students are in the boarding house and eat quality meals daily. They also have access to 24 hours electricity supply, portable water supply and basic health, recreation and sports facilities. The school which presently has over 100 students who are learning in a conducive academic environment are taught by qualified teachers.

The nature of training at Abolarin College

This school is unique in several respects. A multilingual school, every student is expected to learn how to speak English, French and Yoruba languages fluently. They are groomed to approach the future without fear or trepidation. With a specially designed and regulated curriculum, students receive all round education that extends beyond the walls of the classroom. They are not only intellectually sound, they are trained to be independent, entrepreneurial in orientation and equally to be excellent agriculturists. They grow, harvest and process corn, yam, cassava, cashew, plantain, etc., which they eat. As a matter of fact, they must spend one hour daily on the school farm to produce or process part of the food they eat.

Each pupil is given equal opportunity to thrive and develop his or her full potentials under the tutelage of dedicated academic and non-academic staff. Academic and mentorship seminar are organised for the students regularly by professionals drawn from both the public and non-governmental agencies. Students are encouraged to dream big and not to allow their humble backgrounds to limit their aspirations but rather to develop the ‘can-do’ spirit. There is no gainsaying the fact that the school places emphasis on the values of hard work, goal setting, self-reliance, honesty, team work, self-confidence, physical and spiritual growth, and academic excellence.

On one of his visits to the College, the present writer was touched by Oba Abolarin’s unusual style of administration. Kabiyesi is more than the owner of the school to the students. Apart from teaching the students Government and History, he offers, mentorship, counselling, leadership, fatherhood and more than anything else, friendship. This is not really surprising given the fact that Kabiyesi’s love for teaching could be dated back his early pedagogical experience as a teacher at the defunct Oyo State College of Arts and Science (OSCAS), Ile-Ife and St Andrew College of Education, Oyo.

Some Quotable Quotes of Oba Adedokun Abolarin

Oba Adedokun Abolarin fervently believes that educational opportunities must be given to children from poor homes so that they will not be condemned to permanent misery, poverty and invariably, crime. According to him:

The thought behind the establishment of ABOLARIN COLLEGE is borne out of the burning passion for education as a tool to liberate families from poverty.... A child's future should not be determined by where the child is born but by the ability of the child to put into maximum use the talents that God gives. Therefore every child born into this world should be empowered through effective, functional and quality education.

Kabiyesi was resolute in sustaining the no school fees policy of the institution with the statement below:

Despite the temptation to do otherwise, this school shall continue to be tuition-free because that is the purpose for which it was set up. We are on a missionary assignment, giving the hopeless hope to also give back to the society. I drum it into the ears of the students that when they become great in the future, they owe the society that duty to give back to it....

On the need for wealthy individuals to partner with the government in the provision of quality and affordable education as well as the danger that out-of-school children constitutes to the society, Kabiyesi has this to say:

The truth of the matter is that government cannot do all these alone. Individuals and groups blessed with resources should join hands to complement government. If we fail to do this and concentrate on our children, the untrained children would not allow our children to enjoy whatever we bequeath to them. What we do here is managing social crisis because if you know the stories of some of these children, regarding their different backgrounds,

you would be shocked. You may call me ambassador of the rural poor. I am okay with that name.

Oba Abolarin always expresses his appreciation and gratitude to those he often describes as his soul mates in his vision to eradicate confront poverty in his domain and give opportunity to the hopeless in the society. He also admonishes corrupt public officers to turn a new leaf. His exact words:

If not that mentioning their names could be embarrassing, I would have loved to tell the world what they do to make the life of these kids better. It is unfortunate that in our society we live only for today. We don't care about what happens the next day. That is why you see a public office holder amassing wealth that he does not really need at the expense of the downtrodden who need just a fraction of the wealth to survive and live a meaningful life for the benefit of the society.

Oba Adedokun Abolarin and the Impact of Abolarin College

Monarchs like Oba Adedokun Abolarin are the change agents that contemporary Nigerian society desperately need to effect positive and enduring societal transformation. A highly respected academic in his own right, Oba Abolarin holds three degrees from the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. He successfully bagged a law degree, a bachelor's degree in Political Science and a master's degree in International Relations. Prior to his installation as the Orangun Oke-Ila in 2006, Oba Adedokun Abolarin, practised as a lawyer and was the Principal Partner at the law firm of Dokun Abolarin & Co in Abuja. He also boasts of extensive working experience in several corporate outfits such as Tell Publications, Pacific Holdings, Peachtree Communications Ltd, Sportsmark International and so on.

Though it came into being in 2014, the impact which the school has since made in empowering the underprivileged is remarkable. Significantly, it has expanded the access by children from low socio-economic background to quality education.

It is heart-warming to note that the first two sets of graduates from Abolarin College are now undergraduates in some of the topmost universities in Nigeria studying courses like Computer Science,

Agricultural Engineering, Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Microbiology, Mass Communication, History and International relations, etc.

Significantly, the establishment of Abolarin College has firmly placed Oke-Ila on the global map of active actors that are committed to the realisation of Goal numbers 1 and 4 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals which has to do with the eradication of poverty as well as the provision, liberalisation and democratisation of quality education.

It has also gradually impacted on the orientations of other Yoruba monarchs and the wealthy in the society who have started showing remarkable interest in having a replica of Abolarin College in their respective domains.

Conclusion

The prevailing literature on global philanthropic activities often privileges Western philanthropists and their agencies over and above African philanthropists. Africans are more often than not portrayed as mere recipients of aid, usually from well-endowed and benevolent Western philanthropists. This work dismisses this flawed view and supports the argument that Africans are naturally imbued with a beneficent spirit and that their traditional acts of generosity have been sustaining millions of their compatriots from time immemorial (Mottiar and Ngcoya, 2016).

In the past Yoruba Obas did not just rule their domains as mere mortals. The sacredness, rituals and myths associated with the monarchical system in Yorùbá land is one of the few reasons why Yoruba traditional systems and values garnered so much respect and admiration (Adebowale, 2021). But over the years, the culture and heritage of the Yoruba nation have not been as vibrant as it used to be. In spite of their heavy involvement with what has been termed horizontal philanthropy in the past, the fact remains that the royalty in Yorubaland ruled, made laws and was largely ‘fed’ or nurtured and sustained by its subjects. Against the backdrop that the awe, reverence, rituals and mysteries associated with Yoruba royalty has dissipated over the years, it would therefore seemed that the monarchical institution will now be judged on the practical benefits it brings to society. It is this charitable purpose, more than anything else that is likely to sustain royal popularity and respectability. As the Abolarin

College model aptly illustrates, the Obaship should not just care about rituals and traditional worship but should look inward and see how the Yorubaland can be developed socio-economically, culturally and in a sustainable manner. Oke-Ila and by extension, Yorubaland is really blessed given the deft and sustainable developmental strides of Oba Adedokun Abolarin since he ascended the throne.

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Book Review

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Failed State 2030: Nigeria – A Case Study. By Christopher J.K., Daniel B.G., et al. Occasional Paper No. 67. Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, United States, 2011. Pp. x + 142.

Keywords: Nigeria, failed state, United States, economy and insecurity.

The publisher in the disclaimer of this monograph stressed that the expressed views are not reflections of the official policy or position of the US government and other security departments. All the same, it was established that it is the property of the US government. As admitted by the authors, Nigeria – “with its vast oil wealth, large population, and strategic position in Africa and global economy can, if it fails, disproportionately affect the United States and the global economy”. This prognosis appears unambiguously significant for the simple fact that by 2030, Nigeria is likely to be responsible for about 25% of US light and sweet crude oil imports. But the important fears expressed in this monograph by the authors, on behalf of the US Air Force, is that the failure of the Nigerian state to resolve the crises of political and economic corruption on one hand, ethno-religious crises, insurgency, inadequate infrastructures, under-investments, etc. on the other hand, before 2030, will deny US economy these prospects and create a global humanitarian crisis as poor Nigerians will likely be forced to search for greener pastures at all cost. Ultimately, therein lies the background to this monograph as the US Air Force set to plan towards overcoming the threats that “another” failed state might pose to the economy of US in 2030.

The purpose of this monograph as indicated above is related to the 2013 publication by Clarence J.B. on behalf of the Strategic Studies Institute and the US Army War College Press¹. In this monograph, as with Clarence’s, Nigeria is taunted as a failing state with the possibility of a total ruin in 2030 through the exploration of the country’s contemporary socio-political, economic and military reputations. The failing state of Nigeria, as quoted in the monograph, can be predicated on the catastrophic state of “uneven economic and social development, a failure to address group

grievances as manifested through an active insurgency, and a perceived lack of government legitimacy”.

Though published in 2011, the contentions and submissions of most authors, fast-forward to 2021, stands relevant given that the Nigerian state is swiftly degenerating to the offensive of farmer-herder violence, banditry, kidnappings, criminality, ethnic bigotry, terrorism and other forms of extremism. The catastrophic state of insecurity in Nigeria today is such that the international media outfit, Aljazeera, in March 2021 reported that “Heavily armed criminal gangs in north-western and central Nigeria have stepped up attacks in recent years, kidnapping for ransom, raping and pillaging”². Between January and March 2021, two mass school kidnappings, involving over 300 students, have taken place in Nigeria. This grave challenge is coupled with the rising state of food insecurity at the instance of a pathetic economy suffering from hyperinflation, fiscal deficit, debt servicing, neoliberalism, corruption, deregulation, devaluation, mono-economy, etc. Predictably, most authors in this monograph, on the weakness of Nigeria’s economy, argues that the overreliance on oil exports is counterproductive and primitive. The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted that a rapid decline in oil price in 2009 and the surge of corrupt activities ‘firmly placed Nigeria into a ‘development trap’” (p.42).

A strong component of *Failed State 2030: Nigeria – A Case Study* is the attempt by the various authors to present a somewhat background to the political and socio-economic challenges that confronts Nigeria, even in 2021. In his intervention, Douglas W.J. meticulously traces the influence of ethno-religious conflicts on the Nigerian state. The 1967 Civil War as a case in point “cost roughly 1.1 million Nigerian lives” (p.21). In 2000 also, the author reported that over 1,900 Nigerians lost their lives to religious conflicts. The degeneracy of these conflicts consequent to the complicity of the Nigerian state propelled more ethnocentric conflicts such as the “Fulani” herders and southern famers’ crises, Niger Delta insurgency, etc. The socio-cultural complexity of the country though could spur a significant developmental pattern or agitation, more so with the “rise in information”, the author argues that the pervasive state of corruption is likely to push Nigeria into the category of a failed state by 2030. The enormity of corruption and criminality in the country is such that it was reported that the “government is losing \$14 billion a year in oil revenues as a result of corruption and crime” (p.41).

Perhaps, the most relevant aspect of this monograph lies in Douglas's intervention, particularly his submission in "Pandemics and Youth Bulge" and "Clash of Haves and Haves Not". The author, quoting the German anthropologist, Gunnar Heinsohn, explains that "...When so many young men compete for the few places available, they become frustrated, angry and violent. They (enlist) quite easily into radical groups and terrorist organizations" (p.26). Ultimately, the 2020 #EndSars Movement, led by young men and women, which shook the nation to its feet, is a pointer to the veracity of Heinsohn's contention. The author adds that "Unemployed and underemployed young adults can rapidly destabilize a society with their restive energy...The youth bulge emerging in Nigeria may swap roles from productive laborers to disaffected rebels in the next two decades, which then may place enormous stresses on the fissures and cracks dividing Nigerian society" (p.26). This is absolutely true in Nigeria of just a decade later.

In addition to the probable crisis of youth bulge, Douglas discloses in this monograph that the unmitigated effects of climate change in northeastern Nigeria particularly, and other parts of the country, could exacerbate ethnic tensions caused by forced migration. Again, this is a palpable image of Nigeria at this instant on account of the prevailing violent relationship between herders and farmers. Mark D.D. in the monograph reechoed some of the sentiments of Douglas. The author was clear that ethno-religious crises will fester in post-2011 Nigeria sequel to the expected failure of governance. Since the Nigeria state will be preoccupied with newer institutional models of corruption and electoral fraud, an inadequate or no attention will be channeled into solving the crises of poverty, inequality, unemployment, etc. A consensus was evidently reached by most of the authors on the unwillingness of members of the Nigerian political class to undermine the dominance of corruption in the country's polity.

As positioned by Christopher J.K., before 2030, successive governments will establish more anti-corruption agencies and institutions, yet given the country's intractable historic penchant for corruption, "it is likely the efforts of these organizations will meet very limited success" (p.75). In spite of the anti-corruption posture of the Buhari-led government, in January 2021, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TI-CPI) reported that in 2020, Nigeria scored a total point of 25 out of 100³. This has been described as a worst rating since 2015. An addendum to this pathetic condition is that the government of Muhammadu Buhari over the years had secured excessive unaccounted loans and aids from the

European Union, China, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc. Christopher J.K. also gave a background to this absurdity in the monograph. Sequel to the sheer failure of the Nigerian state to provide her citizenries basic infrastructures, an attempt will be made to “establish a stronger relationship with the World Bank and venture capitalists to secure funding for improving Nigerian human and industrial service sectors” (p.79). In October 2020, it was reported that in the last five years, Nigeria’s debt has increased by over 158%⁴. This retrogressive increase, as envisaged, has had no impact whatsoever on the social conditions of the teeming population of the country. In August 2020, a report revealed that Nigeria has exceeded “India with the largest rate of people living in extreme poverty”⁵.

Although the authors attempted to locate the systemic factors responsible for the failing state of Nigeria, not proper articulation of this was done. Be that as it may, there is a sense of admission that the “current system of government (in Africa) and the present racial, ethnic and religious conflicts are, to an extent, the result of its colonial past”, (p.10) the authors are silent on the complicity of agents of international finance capital in this quagmire. This oversight is not unexpected owing to the intricacy of Western scholarship. Daniel B.G., quoting a report from the International Crisis Group (ICG), though expresses that while many internal conflicts in Nigeria have been “ethno-religious and community conflicts, the primary underlying source of tension in the country is the uneven distribution of wealth from oil revenue” (p.38). Pragmatically, the lingering uneven distribution of wealth in postcolonial Nigeria is an outcome of the primitive accumulation of state resources by the elites and members of the political class through the channels often conceived by agents of the Bretton Woods institutions.

In the final analysis, as submitted by Douglas W.J., “A weakened petrol-based economy, combined with a large socially oppressed and possibly radicalized youth population and a corrupt and illegitimate government, has the potential to shatter Nigerian society” (p.28). In the monograph, authors consistently raised the possibility of either an impending Civil War or military coup in Nigeria consequent to the failure of governance. This review will conclude by contending that the surge of corruption, ethno-religious conflicts, poverty, inequality, bad governance, banditry, etc. in postcolonial Nigeria is concretely a product of the bigger crisis of capitalism. The authors absolutely scratched the surface of the discourse but not the in-depth systemic inflows that can indict the highly purported

Western finance capital institutions, elites and governments. All the same, as intensely “warned” by the authors, the monograph is primarily aimed at providing the atmosphere for a steady inflow of Nigeria’s sweet crude oil into the United States come what may.

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